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ADDENDUM TO THE RESEARCH REPORT
FOR
PRESIDENTIAL SELECT COMMITTEE ON JAFL RESOLUTION #7

SUBMITTED
BY
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Q1. Was there a coordinated system of activities among JACL chapters with respect to pre-evacuation activities, i.e. Anti-Axis, Defense League, and if so, what was the nature and degree of the coordination?

PRE-WAR COORDINATION

There is a reference to the need for greater coordination prior to Pearl Harbor found in Mike Masaoka's Final Report.

About this time, the need for greater coordination between chapters and the National for the common good became apparent. President Saburo Kido called a special emergency meeting of the National Council Board to canvass the situation and to make recommendations to the National Council for their action. This session convened in San Francisco in August, 1941, and decided upon the necessity of a National Secretary and Field Executive who would devote his full time and energies to the problems at hand. (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, File T 6.15, p. 30, Bancroft Library.)

The National Secretary who was hired as a result of this need for greater coordination between the chapters and the National was Mike Masaoka. In his role as the National Secretary, he was to help carry out "a two-fold program." These two points were, "one, an aggressive campaign to prove our basic loyalty as a group, and two, ways and means of strengthening the organization itself from within." (Ibid, p. 31.) This aggressive loyalty campaign was at the initial direction of the National, but would be carried out by local chapters. "...[T]he local chapters were instructed to cooperate more actively and publicly with any and all civic and patriotic enterprises and to encourage all members to conduct themselves as exemplary citizens--these were the criteria of good citizenship and loyalty as we knew them at that time--and to launch goodwill programs." (Ibid.)

What Masaoka describes here is consistent with many of the activities carried out by the Southern District Council, which co-sponsored a dinner with Naval Intelligence early in 1941. In fact, the Coordinating Committee for Southern California Defense came into existence some time after the August 1941 JACL meeting, and is likewise consistent with the content of Masaoka's remarks.

The Final Report describes the manner in which the local chapters carried out their instructions "to cooperate more actively and publicly with any and all civic and patriotic enterprises."

Most of these took the form of banquets to which

influential community leaders were especially invited...It must be repeated, for the records, that we did not ask for favors or privileges, only the same opportunity as others to serve America, for a "Chinaman's chance" to prove our loyalty instead of prejudgment without trial or hearing. (Ibid, p. 32.)

Masaoka continues with a description of what the JACL itself was attempting to do as an organization. "National Committees were set up for the purpose of aiding the community welfare, thereby making their residents more JACL conscious, and the National Secretary was scheduled to visit every chartered chapter to confer with local leaders regarding their problems." (Ibid.) The committees which were established on a national basis were as follows- public relations, legal, public health, athletic, scholarship/loan, vocational guidance, research, talent, and legislative. There were no listings for a category which would take in, say, the Coordinating Committee for Southern California Defense, or the post-war committees like Anti-Axis or Emergency Defense. Along with establishment of these committees, the National Secretary was to visit every chapter "to confer with local leaders regarding their problems." (Ibid.) Unfortunately, "Pearl Harbor prevented the committees from completing their organization." (Ibid, pp. 33-4.) Masaoka makes no mention in his Final Report how much progress he was able to make in meeting with the various chapters. Books such as his autobiography and Hosokawa's JACL In Quest of Justice do document an extended trip through the mid-west and Rockies after Thanksgiving of 1941. (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, p. 67; Hosokawa, JACL In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1986, p. __.)

PRE-EVACUATION COORDINATION

In a section of his Final Report devoted to "War Activities of JACL" Mike Masaoka devotes one paragraph to the efforts mounted by various chapters.

In the meantime, the various districts and individual chapters were organizing to aid the war effort. In the Southern District, an Anti-Axis Committee was formed to cooperate with local and federal authorities. In the Pacific Northwest, an Emergency Defense Council was set up. In the Bay Region and throughout North and Central California, Coordinating Councils were created. Each had a two-fold purpose: to aid the government in its prosecution of the war and to look after the welfare of the Japanese Americans and their parent generation. (Masaoka, "Final Report",

4/22/44, p. 43, Bancroft Library.)

Unfortunately, Masaoka's Final Report does not shed additional light on the degree of coordination, if any, between these various committees.

If we look at the Minutes of the Executive Board of the Anti-Axis Committee for Monday, December 15, 1941, on page two, we see that National Vice President and Anti-Axis Committee member Ken Matsumoto planned to make a report of Anti-Axis activities to National President Saburo Kido.

Ken Matsumoto is leaving for San Francisco tomorrow to meet with the National President, Saburo Kido, in regards to the members within the City not being able to receive any cooperation from the City officials and at this time he will explain the work of this Committee and the work being done. Masao Satow moved that the Committee delegate Ken Matsumoto to represent our Committee on his trip to San Francisco and impart any information and the program of our Committee and extend our greetings. Motion was seconded by Kay Sugahara, and unanimously carried. (JARP,#2010, Box 301, Anti-Axis, SC-URL, UCLA.)

Thus Matsumoto was officially dispatched to National President Kido in San Francisco to inform him of Anti-Axis Committee programs and activities.

In subsequent Minutes of an Anti-Axis Committee meeting held on December 24, 1941, we read that:

Ken Matsumoto gave a report on his trip to the National Headquarters of the JACL in San Francisco. He stated that on Friday evening, December 19, a meeting of the Northern District Council was called. At this meeting the Northern District divided themselves into four areas: The Bay Region, Sacramento Valley area, Coastal, and San Joaquin Valley area in order to work on the whole problem. (Ibid.)

The Minutes don't indicate if Matsumoto in fact met with Headquarters staff such as Saburo Kido and Mike Masaoka. We may infer that he met with someone from Headquarters, most likely Kido, since that was the stated purpose of his trip. We do know, most assuredly, that he met with the Northern District Council. Again, the Minutes do not disclose what was said, however, it is likely that Matsumoto reported on the activities of the Anti-Axis Committee. Thus, it is highly likely that National President Kido and the Northern District Council was aware of the activities going on in Los Angeles. Whether those

activities were approved of is not directly indicated. The fact that Anti-Axis activities continued for some time after this meeting implies that there was no disagreement from Headquarters with Anti-Axis activities, but again this is based upon inference.

A passage from the Minutes of the Northwest District Board Meeting held in the Seattle JACL office on February 1, 1942 may give us more of an implied coordination among the various chapters and committees.

Mike Masaoka, National Executive Secretary, made a report of the work of the National JACL headquarters as to the amount of work, such as mimeographing, office work, phone calls, and the work done through contacts...He gave a brief resume of the affect of the freezing of the funds directly after the war and how many hardships were created and how JACL was able to help out where there was a need for that particular kind of work. He showed how the National JACL has been cooperating with state and government of [sic] officials and how they had coordinated the problems of each local chapter and tried to work out their problems to the best of their ability. He also made a report on the Northern California District Council as well as on the Southern District Council. (James Sakamoto Papers, Suzallo Library, Univ. of Washington, Seattle, Reel #10.)

This passage demonstrates that information was exchanged about what different regions were doing during this period of time. According to Masaoka, National Headquarters did coordinate problem solving among various chapters. Did this mean that there was coordination of Anti-Axis and Defense League activities? Masaoka's report on Northern and Southern California District Councils implies a reporting of Anti-Axis activities since the Anti-Axis was the active arm of the Southern District Council at this time according to their own Minutes. Even so, awareness or knowledge by one chapter of another chapter's activities does not prove coordination of efforts and activities.

What can be made of the fact that the James Sakamoto papers contained Minutes of the Central California Coordinating Committee (no date), or the Coast Region Coordinating Committee Minutes of February 22, 1942? In the Minutes of the former, the Delano Chapter reported they were "assured by Naval Intelligence that they would give them full cooperation." The Minutes of the Coast Region had this to say. "All Chapters reported good cooperation in the Kibei Survey requested by National Headquarters." These various regional coordinating committees may have sent off copies of their minutes to other District Councils as a matter of course

rather than as an effort to coordinate actions and activities. Again, exchange of information is shown but whether this proves coordination is speculation at best. Of course, these exchanges of information do nothing to disprove coordination either.

When Bill Hosokawa discussed the activities of the Emergency Defense Council and Anti-Axis Committee in his book, Nisei, he prefaced his exposition of these committees with the following remarks.

The Nisei needed no prompting to demonstrate their loyalty, and Kido's telegram to President Roosevelt was only the start of a spontaneous, uncoordinated series of actions that were more notable for their sincerity than their effectiveness. (Hosokawa, Nisei, Morrow:New York, 1969, p. 249.)

Thus, in Hosokawa's mind, there was no coordination of activities among JACL chapters with respect to Anti-Axis and Defense Council types of activities.

Q.#2. What was the relation between JACL and government entities during the pre-war period? Who initiated the first contacts and what was the nature of those contacts?

PRE-WAR CONTACTS

If we can believe the content of a letter written by the late Kay Sugahara to Congressman Robert Matsui, which stated "[i]n the five years before Pearl Harbor, practically every leader of the JACL was working closely with the FBI, the ONI, and Army Intelligence," (Courtesy Michi Weglyn.) then there was a close relationship between the JACL and certain intelligence agencies. The contents of the letter have never been corroborated, although an interesting side note is raised by Bill Hosokawa's mention in the preface of They Call Me Moses Masaoka that "Kay Sugahara, a Los Angeles Nisei [who] during the war had served in the Office of Strategic Services, predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency." (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, p.9) While this does not substantiate Sugahara's letter, it is consistent with its content. Someone who worked for the predecessor of the CIA may have more knowledge of the workings of intelligence agencies in the United States.

The only other significant contact not previously addressed is documented in a letter from former National President Walter Tsukamoto of the JACL to Jimmie Sakamoto, dated August 27, 1941. Tsukamoto writes:

I have had an interesting two-hour conversation with the agents of the FBI today and during the course of our conversation, it was brought out that the Nisei by their past actions have given the impression to the bureau that they are personally withholding vital information and that they are in other ways uncooperative. I assured them that such was not the case, that the league had hoped the FBI would contact its leaders in an effort to work out some sort of program which would help the bureau and also convince them of the loyalty and sincerity of the Nisei. (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier," Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, pp. 80-1.)

The letter does not say directly whether the FBI agents approached Tsukamoto first or vice versa. Tsukamoto's comments do indicate an expectation or "hope" as he put it, that the FBI would approach JACL leaders. Not only approach them, but that they work out a "program" of mutual benefit to each organization. The purpose of such a "program" according to Tsukamoto, was to convince the FBI of Nisei loyalty and sincerity.

Aside from this and what was previously documented regarding the relationship between National Vice President Ken Matsumoto and Office of Naval Intelligence Officer Kenneth D. Ringle, the FBI visiting Howard Nomura and Kazuo Oka's contact with FBI agents, the only other significant contact between the JACL and government entities came in the person of Curtis Munson.

MUNSON

Sometime during the Fall of 1941, Masaoka writes of a meeting between Curtis B. Munson, Saburo Kido and himself.

I accompanied Kido to the meeting. Munson turned out to be an ordinary-looking individual with some impressive-looking State Department credentials. And we soon perked up when he began to talk. He made it clear that federal officials feared war with Japan was imminent. His assignment, he said, was to anticipate the problems Japanese Americans might face if war did come. Munson asked a good many questions about the attitudes of Japanese Americans, and he inquired about specific individuals. I knew few of them, but many were familiar to Kido. However, most of our conversations, which stretched out over three or four days and several times late into the night, had to do with the possibility of hysterical violence against the Japanese Americans, and what sorts of precautions should be taken to protect them... (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, pp.63-4.)

Masaoka goes on to explain some of the concerns that he and Kido expressed about resentment against Japanese farmers, confusion between loyal citizens and the enemy, and such. Then the discussion became focused on the organization of the JACL. (Ibid.)

Munson asked about JACL, and after a while it became obvious that somehow he knew much about us already and was simply double-checking his impressions. He wanted to know about certain JACL leaders, not about their loyalty but whether they were strong individuals who could be depended on for leadership in an emergency. He mentioned specific names--Jimmie Sakamoto and Clarence Arai in Seattle, Mamo Wakasugi and Howard Nomura in Portland, Fred Tayama, Kay Sugahara, Joe Shinoda, Masao Satow, John Ando, and a host of others in Los Angeles, Franklin Chino in Chicago, George Yamaoka in New York. I had never heard of most.

Munson seemed to understand our concerns, and both Kido and I felt that he was genuinely anxious to help us. (Ibid, p. 64.)

It is noteworthy that Munson already knew a great deal about the JACL and prominent chapter leaders. Where did this information come from and how early had it been obtained? More importantly, what was the import of these meetings, at least from the JACL perspective. Masaoka proceeds to tell us.

Throughout these meetings ran an unspoken theme: the federal government is concerned about the welfare of its citizens, but at the same time the citizens must cooperate with their government. These meetings no doubt had a great deal to do with our decision to work in every way possible with the federal authorities. (Ibid.)

Thus, while Munson did not specifically ask for the JACL's cooperation with the government in the event of war with Japan, this was the message which came across to Masaoka. The impact of the Munson meetings influenced greatly the later decision to cooperate. If Masaoka understood that the "unspoken theme" of these meetings was cooperation with the government, did Munson likewise receive the same type of message from the JACL that they would cooperate with the government in event of war? Unknown. However, at a later encounter between Masaoka and Munson, after Pearl Harbor, we learn of this:

Masaoka recalls that Munson said most of what he had been told in San Francisco had proven correct, that many of the JACL's recommendations for keeping order had been adopted, and indicated this was one reason government officials continued to rely on JACL for counsel and advice. (Hosokawa, Nisei: The Quiet Americans, Morrow: New York, 1969, p. 214.)

The contact with Munson proved to be one reason for government reliance on the JACL. Furthermore, the meetings undoubtedly influenced Munson to write the following in his Report.

The Nisei are pathetically eager to show this loyalty. They are not Japanese in culture. They are foreigners to Japan...The Japanese American Citizens League should be encouraged; the while an eye is kept open to see that Tokyo does not get its finger in this pie." (Masaoka Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, p. 65, quoting Munson Report.)

WHO INITIATED CONTACTS?

As far as who initiated the contacts between the JACL and government entities during this pre-war period of time, clearly in the case of Munson, the meetings were at his initiation. Howard Nomura's contact with the FBI was initiated by the FBI. In the case of Ringle, even after a review of relevant documents, it is unclear who initiated contact with who. What is clear is that the relationship with Ringle began through the friendship between himself and National Vice President Ken Matsumoto, beginning on or about January of 1941. (JACL Archives, Minutes, March 8-10, 1942 Special Emergency Meeting, First Session, p.4.) Who initiated the friendship? Unknown. We may only speculate that it was Ringle, since he was seeking information about the Japanese community.

PRE-EVACUATION CONTACTS: DID THE GOVERNMENT CHOOSE JACL?

As we approach the time for evacuation, we find a body of evidence which leads us to conclude that the government consciously sought out the JACL as the designated representative of the Japanese and Japanese American. Moreover, the JACL did not shirk this responsibility, but in fact sought to be the official liaison between the government and persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States.

The Munson Report did state that "the Japanese American Citizens League should be encouraged." Furthermore, during the March 8-10, 1942 Special National Board and Council Meetings, a number of government representatives indicated the government's preference to deal with one organization concerning the Japanese American population.

In a Special Report by George Shigekawa, who was a representative of Governor Culbert Olson's staff on evacuation, Shigekawa stated the following. "The government wants one organization that represents the majority of the people to work in cooperation with them." (JACL Archives, Minutes, March 8-10, 1942 Meeting, Board Minutes, p.3.)

The response to Shigekawa's statement was immediately delivered by former National President James Sakamoto. He "stated that JACL does reach most of the Japanese families. Outside the JACL there is no national organization. JACL is recognized by both the first generation and second generation in all communities. No other organization can do what the JACL is doing. (Ibid.)

Before this particular session closed, Fred Tayama added comments in a similar vein.

Mr. Fred Tayama stated that in order to have some sort of a strong tie, we should impress the people

that the JACL is the recognized organization and representative of the people and request them to give all information to the JACL in order that we may be of greatest service to them. (Ibid, Board Minutes, p.5.)

JACL LEADERSHIP OR SELF-PROMOTION?

As early as December 16, 1941, Fred Tayama addressed the Los Angeles County Council of the American Legion with some 2,000 Legionaries present. He made this statement, according to a summary of his remarks. "The Japanese American Citizens League has complete control of our community and has earned the right to lead the community affairs." (Collection #2010, Box 301, File "Anti-Axis Minutes," JARP, SC-URL, UCLA.)

In a set of Minutes from the March 8-10, 1942 Special Meeting found in the James Sakamoto papers, which by the way, contains the following remarks not found in the 1971 reprinted version, James Sakamoto made a report on the Northwest District. His presentation included the following:

Tolan Committee asked in fact, told me JACL is not quite representative of all groups. My answer was: "There is no other National organization existing on the Pacific Coast as that is as representative of the Japanese as the JACL. (James Sakamoto Papers, Suzallo Library, Univ. of Washington, Reel #10.)

Later, during the March 8-10, 1942 Special Emergency Meeting, the Committee on Problems Incident to Resettlement had this to offer as a recommendation on "Preparation" for evacuation.

A. We recommend that the Federal Government designate the National JACL and its various chapters be considered as official liaison personnel. (JACL Archives, Minutes, March 8-10, 1942, Special Emergency Meeting, Committee on Problems, p.1.)

Again, the Minutes from a conference between government officials and the JACL on evacuation during the same Special Meeting recorded a number of comments. Saburo Kido opened the conference with these remarks.

We believe that now that some organization or group should be assigned by the government, or recognized by it, as a coordinating agent through which information is to be disseminated to the Japanese public at large...

I understand that at the time of the evacuation from Terminal Island, there was considerable confusion in what different agencies gave different interpretations and opinions as what should and could be done...To avoid such difficulties in the future, we recommend that our Japanese American Citizens League, which is the only national organization of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, be recognized by your agent as the one organization capable of cooperating with you in this tremendous job of evacuating 100,000 people. (Ibid, Conference, p.1.)

After Kido suggests a number of JACL members who can assist the government, Tom Clark asks whether an organization exists which could contact the aliens among the Japanese population. Kido's response is that "there is no representative body of Japanese nationals now functioning." (Ibid.) Masaoka, in fact, then takes Kido's statement a number of steps further when he says:

Our organization is better equipped to contact the nationals than any other organization for the simple reason that the parents of our members are in that category, and our membership included practically every Japanese family in every community. (Ibid, p. 3.)

Kido continues where Masaoka leaves off by stating:

There is no question that the Citizens League is the central body among the Japanese Americans and that the Japanese nationals are looking to the Citizens League for leadership and guidance. (Ibid, p.3.)

This exchange with Tom Clark, Richard Neustadt and Colonel McGill seems to show JACL offering itself as the representative organization for purposes of evacuation and working with the Government. When Clark asks about Togo Tanaka and the United Citizens Federation, Kido informs him that Tanaka is JACL's national publicity director and that the UCF is a local group in Los Angeles made up of mostly JACLers. Clark then asks about the membership of the JACL. He is told by Masaoka that the JACL currently had "about 20,000...Most of our group is comparatively young, but we are more representative by far than any other group because there is no other national group of Japanese Americans or any competitive organization in any city with the possible exception of Los Angeles." (Ibid.) When Clark asks if the government should work with JACL or the United Citizens Federation, the response given by Jimmie Sakamoto is as follows.

I think that if you designate one organization, you are going to get more done than if you try to work with two organizations as they will conflict and quarrel. The United Citizens Federation is only a local organization in Los Angeles, and therefore, on a national scale, the JACL is the only possible organization for this coordination and cooperation. (Ibid, p.4 of Conference.)

JACL AND UNITED CITIZENS FEDERATION

The UCF was definitely a local Los Angeles group, and newly formed at that.

In Los Angeles on the night of February 19, the United Citizens Federation, representing a wide range of pro-Nisei interests, held its first meeting of more than a thousand people. Plans were laid to persuade the press, the politicians and the government that their attacks upon the ethnic Japanese were unfounded. (CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied, Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1982, p.85.)

However, the existence of the United Citizens Federation did not sit well with the JACL hierarchy. Togo Tanaka noted in his Journal during a February 22, 1942 meeting of Nisei representatives of over 20 organizations the following:

Fred Tayama, though chairman of the larger Southern District JACL, sits in the corner with Shigemi Aratani, president of the Los Angeles JACL. Both seem to hold themselves aloof from the discussions, and the few comments they make reflect the attitude that "all these meetings and discussions should really come under the Southern District and the National JACL." The split between the newly-formed United Citizens Federation and the Japanese American Citizens League is widening. (Tanaka, "Journal" 12/2/41-4/3/42, 2/22/42, File A 17.07, Bancroft Library.)

Tanaka continues in his Journal along the same lines with these comments. "Kido and Masaoka are a little disturbed over the formation of the United Citizens Federation and ask why "you guys down south can't get together; we're more or less all in the same boat." (Ibid.) These comments document an uneasiness on the part of the National and local JACL with what was perceived as a competing organization. In fact, the United Citizens Federation did not exclude JACL but rather featured several JACL leaders as speakers at the February 19, 1942 meeting.

A more indicative exposition of the JACL's attitude towards the UCF can be seen in the exchange between Tom Clark and Fred Tayama during the conference between government officials and the JACL during the March 8-10, 1942 Special Emergency Meeting. After asking "what is the United Citizens Federation" and "how many members do you have," Clark poses this question:

Clark: I wonder if there are any jealousies between your group and the Los Angeles group?

Tayama: I think it is the same with all localities except that Los Angeles is on a little larger scale. There are always a few individuals who for personal or selfish reasons try to incite trouble and foment dissension. If you rally examined their background, as in Los Angeles, you will find that these people never really belonged to any organization. They have always considered themselves above working with groups for the common good, but because of the present difficulties, in order to protect their own best interests, they are attempting to usurp the leadership of those who have served their communities for a long time and use these organizations for their own selfish ends.

Tayama's statement goes much further than just expressing the need for one organization to work with the government in this crisis. Though he does not name them, Tayama called the UCF people "selfish" and characterized their work as "incit[ing] trouble and foment[ing] dissension." The Tanaka Journal records that Tayama himself was one of the speakers at the UCF rally, along with Tokio Slocum and Togo Tanaka. (Tanaka, "Journal," Dec. 2, 1941-April 3, 1942, February 19, 1942, File A 17.07, pp.1-5, Bancroft Library.) Therefore, who exactly is it that is inciting trouble and fomenting dissension? Was Tayama referring to the UCF's plans "to persuade the press, the politicians and the government that their attacks upon the ethnic Japanese were unfounded." (Personal Justice Denied, p.85.) More pointedly, whose leadership was Tayama accusing the UCF of attempting to usurp? The JACL's? Finally, this whole episode raises one final question. Was the JACL's attitude towards the UCF, as reflected here in statements by Tayama, indicative of just organizational rivalry or was it due to a more fundamental difference, that being the difference in agreeing to cooperate with the government versus an attempt to oppose the impending evacuation?

Q4. Was JACL involved in any way in suggesting, supporting or encouraging "evacuation"?

There is little else aside from what materials have already been reviewed which can aid in answering this question. One item which was not incorporated previously is a statement of National Vice President Ken Matsumoto found in the Minutes of the Special Emergency Meeting held in San Francisco on March 8-10, 1942. Matsumoto gave a report of his activities as National Vice-President beginning with January 1941 and ending with February 1942. The last item under February 1942 is this recount of his activities.

Made a four day trip through Orange County, San Diego, Imperial Valley and Riverside in the company of Lt. Commander Ringle and Lt. Commander Whorle to study the Japanese problem relative to the forthcoming evacuation. Studies were made on the attitudes and reactions of both Japanese aliens and citizens as well as Officials of each representative area. It was keenly felt and expressed that the rising tide of resentment on the part of White Americans, would soon get beyond control and that for the sake of protection of innocent lives, total evacuation was the only recommendation which could be given. (JACL Archives, Minutes, Special Emerg. Meeting, March 8-10, 1942, San Francisco, First Session, p.6.)

First, let us set these comments within a context. Matsumoto only had two entries or reports of activities for the month of February, 1942. The previous entry is a report of the Culbert Olson meeting. Other sources have placed that meeting with the governor of California on February 6, 1942. So, sometime after February 6, 1942, but during the month of February, Matsumoto accompanied an officer of Naval Intelligence and another officer of unknown affiliation, but most likely also Naval Intelligence, on a four day fact finding trip related to evacuation. This is noteworthy in and of itself, since no decisions or official pronouncements by the JACL on evacuation occurred during the month of February. What groups were studied? Alien Japanese, Americans of Japanese ancestry and local officials. What was the recommendation? Total evacuation. Who was making this recommendation? Was it Naval Intelligence?

Upon first impression, one presumes, this study was commissioned by the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, upon reflection, this recommendation of "total evacuation" seems strangely inconsistent with the findings of the Ringle Report, dated January 26, 1942, wherein he "estimates that the large majority of ethnic Japanese in the United States

were at least passively loyal to this country.. Ringle saw no need for mass action against people of Japanese ancestry." (CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied, Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 54.) Since, as of the end of January, Ringle saw no need for mass evacuation based upon his three year study of the Japanese community, why would a four-day study change his mind so drastically? This being the case, is the implication then that Ken Matsumoto was the person making the recommendation of total evacuation?

In reviewing the Matsumoto calendar of activities from January 1941 through February 1942, we see that Matsumoto reported official actions in which he represented the JACL. For instance, in January 1941, he inducted new chapter officers; February 1941, he mediated a dispute between two JACL factions; March, he worked with Ringle to organize the Naval Intelligence Dinner with the Southern District of the JACL; May, he spoke at a JACL Americanization rally; June, he spoke on a radio show; August, he met with Intermountain District leaders, leaders in Chicago and JACL leaders in the Denver region; December, he helped form the Anti-Axis Committee. The only significant departure was his notation in January of 1942 that he met Ringle for the first time. Assuming that all entries by Matsumoto were for official actions as National Vice President of the JACL, can we assume that his role in the four-day study recommending "total evacuation" was also in his official capacity as a National Officer? If this was so, was Matsumoto committing the JACL to a course of total evacuation in the month of February 1942? Did he, by his participation in this study, contribute to the government's perception or belief that the JACL encouraged or supported evacuation? The JACL as an organization did not formally agree to evacuation until it passed a resolution recommending cooperation with the government on the same at its March 8-10, 1942 meeting.

Q5. Did JACL's relationship with government entities involve any issues of threat, promises, expectations, incentives, and if so, what were the nature of such?

EXPECTATIONS

In Bulletin #120, dated February 25, 1942 issued by the Office of the National Secretary, Masaoka includes in the Bulletin these comments about cooperation. "If the military speaks, we have no alternative but to cooperate. Our task now is to get the best possible break in this evacuation by cooperating." (JACL Archives.) From reading this, it can be said that there was an expectation on the part of the JACL that "cooperation" would result in better treatment.

In the next Bulletin, Masaoka pens the following:

The entire attitude of the National JACL may be expressed in the following sentence: "The greater our cooperation with the government, it can be expected that the greater will be their cooperation with us in the solution of our problems." (JACL Archives, Bulletin #121, March 2, 1942.)

This statement is more direct than the one previously quoted. The JACL hoped or expected the government to be more cooperative with them based on the JACL cooperation in evacuation.

We see this same expectation of reciprocity in another statement of Masaoka's, found in his Final Report.

...that cooperation was the best way to secure humane treatment and consideration. Cooperation on our part would impose a moral obligation, at least, upon the government to reciprocate that cooperation by working with us in the matter of planning and administration. (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, p.65, Bancroft Library.)

Here in this statement, we see that Masaoka thought JACL's cooperation would impose a moral obligation, possibly a sense of indebtedness upon the government, and as a result, JACL hoped to obtain humane treatment in the evacuation process.

Similarly, in Masaoka's autobiography, he writes that "we had been led to believe that if we cooperated with the Army in the projected mass movement, the government would make every effort to be as helpful and as humane as possible." (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, p. 93.) In this passage, Masaoka implies that the government or Army led the JACL to have this

expectation of reciprocal cooperation based upon JACL's initial cooperation in evacuation.

THREATS

In Mike Masaoka's autobiography, the issue of a threat by the Army is discussed in terms of JACL's decision to cooperate with evacuation. Masaoka recalls,

The officers made it clear to us that we could cooperate or they would do it the Army way. Anxious to avoid panic, the military did not make that threat public, nor were we in a position to do so. Only when the evacuation was well under way did Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, who has been described by the Army's official historian as the "most industrious advocate of mass evacuation" reveal in a blood-chilling speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco that he had been prepared to complete the evacuation "practically overnight" in an emergency. (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, pp.92-3.)

Actually, this passage presents two threats from the Army. One was when Kido and Masaoka went to the Presidio to hear that an evacuation was planned. It was at that meeting that Kido and Masaoka "asked for and received permission to call a conference of league leaders to discuss our response." (Ibid, p.92.) The second threat came in the form of Bendetsen's speech before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco several months later.

BENDETSSEN SPEECH

Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen delivered an address before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco on May 20, 1942. Bendetsen was the Assistant Chief of Staff for the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. He has been referred to by Roger Baldwin and others as the "chief architect of evacuation." His remarks regarding the evacuation program and three "interim steps" which made up that program contained the following paragraph to which Masaoka had alluded:

The second interim step was a plan for immediate evacuation if development required. The Army needed time to prepare a permanent program and the situation called for an emergency plan. It was impossible, of course, at this time for the Army to reveal the fact that it was prepared to affect a complete evacuation, practically overnight, in the event of an emergency. Plans were made to move the 113,000 Japanese into already established Army cantonments in a mass movement which could

have been undertaken immediately. (NA, RG 220, Records of CWRIC, 1861-1868, The Story of Pacific Coast Japanese Evacuation, p.1864.)

Part of Bendetsen's speech was a report that evacuation would nearly be completed by the end of May. In fact, "by June 6, all Japanese Americans had been evacuated from Military Area No. 1 to the assembly centers." (tenBroek, Prejudice, War, Univ. of Calif. Press: Berkeley, p.126.) By the time Bendetsen had uttered his "bone-shilling" remarks, about an overnight evacuation plan, much of the population was already in Assembly Centers. This being the case, does the Bendetsen speech qualify as a threat, since the action sought, i.e. mass evacuation, was already agreed to by this time, and close to completion? Also, in May of 1942, who of the JACL leadership would have been present to hear these remarks? It is possible, however, that the threats the Army made to Kido and Masaoka were along the same lines of the Bendetsen speech.

A side note to this issue is found in a response to a letter which Bill Hosokawa wrote to Karl Bendetsen in 1968. The letter concerned Hosokawa's research for the book Nisei. In his few remarks on the issue of cooperation, Bendetsen had this to say:

It is entirely fair to say that the evacuees cooperated...I dealt with, frequently talked to and discussed with leading Japanese the plans, methods and steps. The candor between us and their cooperation convinced me beyond a shadow of a doubt that this would continue to be the case, and we had no contingent plans because they were unnecessary. (Collection #2010, Box 124, File 3, "Correspondence and other papers 1966-69, p.2, JARP, SC-URL, UCLA.)

A few individuals have referred to this letter as proof that the Army had no overnight emergency evacuation plan as conveyed by Bendetsen in his May 22, 1942 speech. If this letter can be read to say that, however, how would those listening in 1942 have known not to believe the Assistant Chief of Staff for the Western Defense Command and a Colonel in the Army? On the other hand, the use of the Bendetsen speech to justify cooperation with evacuation would not seem warranted with this knowledge that there was no contingency plan.

In another letter by Bendetsen to Aiko Herzig, dated April 28, 1981, Bendetsen writes as follows:

Your question relates to an allegation that the Western Defense Command issued a preemptory[sic] order that Japanese and Japanese Americans must

cooperate and that if they did not, the Army would come without notice, "with bayonets drawn, backed by tanks and artillery to force them out of their homes or hiding places one by one."

The allegation that any such order was ever issued by WDC is totally false. The truth is that to their eternal credit all such persons cooperated from the beginning.

I cannot bring myself to believe that Mike Masaoka would himself fabricate such a falsehood; most certainly not one as base and demeaning as this. If it is true that he has made such an allegation, I would be compelled to conclude that someone has deceived him for mischievous purposes. (Aiko Herzig Collection.)

The exact reference under quotations is unknown. However, a similar phrase can be found in Hosokawa's JACL In Quest of Justice, from a quote by Masaoka. "Moreover, we feared the consequence if Japanese Americans refused to cooperate and the Army moved in with armed troops and even tanks to eject the people forcibly from their homes." (Hosokawa, JACL In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1982, p.151.)

Q6. What was the role of the JACL in the development and implementation of all of the questionnaires? What role did JACL play in instructing, advising individuals how to respond?

When the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians heard testimony in Seattle, playwright Frank Chin made accusations about the JACL's role in the loyalty oath or loyalty registration questions. His testimony was summarized in William Hohri's book Repairing America. The following passages are relevant excerpts of Chin's testimony:

The loyalty oath, questions 27 and 28, was invented and created by the Japanese American Citizens [League] in late 1942 as a publicity stunt to convince the government the Japanese American Citizens League was the only leadership organization over the Japanese Americans... The loyalty oath, key phrases, and the fore-swearing of all forms of known and unknown allegiances to the Emperor of Japan are virtually identical in the JACL loyalty oath of 1942 and the questions 27 and 28 of the WRA leave clearance application...

You are familiar with Questions 27 and 28. I will read the JACL part here in 1942:
I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I hereby renounce any other allegiances which I may have knowingly or unknowingly held in the past; and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Hohri, Repairing America, Washington State Press: Pullman, 1984, pp. 126-7.)

Mike Masaoka denies any responsibility for the loyalty questionnaire. His comments on the questionnaires appear in his autobiography.

I had urged WRA to undertake some kind of segregation program in the camps, separating the agitators from those who wanted to cooperate with the government. Loyalty to the United States was not the main issue at this point; we were looking for a way to halt intimidation of the peaceful evacuees and violence against certain JACL leaders so the people could live without fear while waiting to be relocated or simply sitting out the war. We had never discussed with officials anything so drastic as the mass questionnaires. (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka,

Morrow: New York, 1987, p.131.)

Q7. Clarify JACL's position with respect to the test cases and how that position may have changed over time.

The policy of "unalterable opposition" on test cases was firmly established by Bulletin #142 in so far as a constitutional challenge to evacuation was concerned. That policy remained in effect, from April 7, 1942 to the November 17-24, 1942 Special Emergency National Conference, at Salt Lake City, Utah. At the Salt Lake City Conference, opposition to taking up the evacuation challenges was reaffirmed. The JACL, did, however, decide to pursue "test cases" on citizenship rights of Nisei. The JACL then decided to file an amicus brief in the Regan v. King case, commonly known as the Native Sons' or Native Daughters and Sons of the Golden West case, which was a move to take away the citizenship of all American citizens of Japanese ancestry. The amicus was suggested by A.L. Wirin, ACLU attorney and legal counsel for the JACL. In the Minutes, we read how JACL bifurcates pursuit of "test cases" by not filing in the evacuation cases, in favor of filing an amicus in the citizenship case. Speaking here is Mike Masaoka on the project category of Civil Rights and Liberties:

I believe that we must do everything, consistent with our policy of cooperating with the government, which will establish our rights and liberties. Although it is not our function to actively participate in the various court cases which are testing the constitutionality of the evacuation orders, we are bound to take official cognizance of them. On the other hand, as indicated by Mr. Wirin, we can and must take an active part in defending our citizenship. I believe we should enter the Native Sons of the Golden West suit, for example, which seeks to cancel our citizenship. I believe that we should enter that case, and all other similar cases, as a friend of the court and publicly record our sentiments against such vicious un-American activities. (JACL Archives, Minutes, Special Emergency National Conference, Nov. 17-24, 1942, Salt Lake City, Thirteenth Session, p.101.)

The decision on test cases was reported in a letter written by National Headquarters staff person, Hito Okada to Mildred Bartholomew of the Portland YWCA. The letter, dated December 4, 1942 was in response to Bartholomew's earlier letter regarding the Min Yasui case.

As Dillon Myer said to us in a closed session, "Do not irritate the Army," I feel that we should not undertake any projects at this time that may hinder the Resettlement Program as announced very recently by the WRA...

Min is a personal friend of mine, and since the trial, I have had several letters from him. I have explained to him the position of the JACL and believe he fully understands why we cannot aid him at this time. My outlook on the matter may not be those involving that which we call great principles, however, taking a realistic viewpoint, I personally cannot assist in any program that would jeopardize the future resettlement of the people in the relocation centers.

I hope that this will give you a clear picture of what the JACL stand is on Min Yasui's case. Our young people have flocked to his cause, however, I believe that they do not see the broader aspects of how it may affect the Resettlement Program pushed by the WRA... Our present plans in regards to these test cases are to in some manner appear as a friend of the court especially in matters referring to the question of citizenship and as things progress, I shall be glad to keep you informed as to not only this matter, but also Min Yasui's case. (JACL Archives.)

From Okada's perspective, JACL support for the Yasui case would jeopardize resettlement of evacuees because the Army might be irritated by support for the Yasui case. Okada does reaffirm JACL's position to file an amicus brief on the citizenship case, though.

CHANGE OF POLICY

Why did the JACL later change its policy towards the evacuation cases? The answer to this question is as a result of the falsehoods portrayed in the government's defense of the military orders, the JACL felt it necessary to refute those claims as to Japanese American loyalty through an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Page two of a bulletin from the Salt Lake City National Headquarters, dated March 4, 1943, reads as follows:

Our legal counsel, Mr. A.L. Wirin of Los Angeles, informs us that the cases testing the constitutionality of the military orders produced disturbing claims by the government with particular respect to the unassimilability of the Japanese Americans; the charge that the doctrine of dual citizenship affects the allegiances of the American born Japanese; the allegation that American born Japanese have been encouraged to go to Japan for their education, and had been, thereby indoctrinated with Japanese nationalism

Mike Masaoka's "Final Report" is also responsive to the question of why JACL's policy on the evacuation test cases was reversed.

Since the JACL was filing a brief amicus curiae, friend of the court, with the United States Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the curfew regulations imposed by General DeWitt, much research and compiling had to be done. Knowing that the government brief contended that the Japanese and Japanese Americans were a "peculiar" sort of people whose affinity to Japan made them a "proper" subject for special restrictions and treatment under the "military necessity" then existing, the JACL brief which was finally submitted was a refutation again of all the charges made at the Tolan Committee hearings, but buttressed with facts and authoritative statements. Many legal minds, including the heads of a number of eastern law schools have decided it to be one of the finest explanatory briefs ever filed with the highest tribunal. I recommend it to all as the finest treatise on the background and history of the Japanese and Japanese Americans in the United States ever written. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, p. 106, Bancroft Library.)

RETROSPECTIVE

Masaoka's Final Report, written in 1944, his oral history, recorded in 1966, and his autobiography, written in 1987, contain comments on the wisdom of JACL's original opposition to the evacuation test cases.

In the Final Report, Masaoka noted,

It might be worthwhile to recall here that at the time the litigants decided to test the constitutionality of the particular orders, JACL questioned the timing of their action. After having listened to the questions and the remarks of the Justices, I am inclined to believe that had the cases been tried after the war, better results may have followed. This, however, is hindsight and an observation, not a criticism. (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, p. 107, Bancroft Library.)

In his oral history tape, Masaoka responds to interviewers Robert Wilson and Joe Grant Masaoka on the topic of evacuation test cases in this manner. He "thought the Korematsu case should have been brought with a different person, at a different time." He remarked in the recording

and imperialism; the claim that a large number of Americans of Japanese ancestry are devotees of Shintoism; etc. While we did not participate directly in these cases, it now appears necessary that we submit a brief as a "friend of the court" which does not challenge the constitutionality of the evacuation orders as such but strongly refuting the government's inferences concerning the loyalty of the Japanese American and the other "traits" attributable to the Japanese, citizens and aliens alike. We have instructed Attorney Wirin to prepare such a brief. (JACL Archives, emphasis added.)

The underlined portion of the above text should be responsive to the question posed earlier as to why the JACL reversed its policy. This is made quite certain in the subsequent paragraph in the bulletin, which discusses while an amicus brief at the Supreme Court may appear to be a reversal of JACL policy, it is actually an affirmation of their prior policy.

Who participated in this decision? Clearly Wirin provided the needed information. The Bulletin tells us that this decision was one of many which "members of National Headquarters Staff, with Saburo Kido, National President who is on an indefinite furlough from Poston" had been conferring on together. Bulletin #7 is in fact a summary of those findings and suggestions of National Headquarters as to future programs and policies of the JACL. (JACL Archives, p.1, first paragraph.)

The Bulletin is stamped with Mike Masaoka's signature at the end. However, this bulletin also indicates that Masaoka was given a leave of absence, effective as of his date of induction. Therefore, we can infer that he was not a party to the "conferences as to the future program and policies of our organization" nor a participant in the decision to file an amicus brief in these test cases. Who else was still at National Headquarters? We may assume that Teiko Ishida, the Office Secretary was still at Headquarters. Bulletin #7 closes by indicating who on the staff has applied or volunteered for various military service. George Inagaki, Joe Masaoka, and Larry Tajiri, we are told had all applied for MIS or the special combat team, respectively. As a result, the National Headquarters acknowledged that a complete reorganization of staff "is imminent". Given this wording, we can assume that Inagaki, Joe Grant Masaoka, and Tajiri had not yet departed Salt Lake City, and therefore were also participants of the decision to file an amicus in the evacuation test cases.

MASAOKA FINAL REPORT

that this still "haunts" him. On the Supreme Court cases, Masaoka stated that the JACL "let other people carry the ball for us. Our contribution-the sociological study, money. Let the attorneys present the legal point of view." (Phonotape #1050B, Reel #6, Mike Masaoka by Robert Wilson and Joe Grant Masaoka on July 27, 1966 at San Diego JACL Convention, Bancroft Library.)

Masaoka addressed the subject of Min Yasui in his autobiography in the following manner:

One morning about this time, I read that Minoru Yasui, a young Nisei attorney in Portland, Oregon, had violated the curfew to invite arrest so that he could provoke a test case...In 1942 I knew nothing of Yasui, except that he was considered an important JACL leader in the Pacific Northwest. The news stories about Yasui's arrest made it appear that he was just a maverick publicity-seeker...Many years later, Yasui told me he had written to express his feelings and outline his intentions. I never received that letter. Completely in the dark and fearful that Yasui was endangering the delicate unwritten understanding we had with the federal authorities, I issued a strong statement criticizing him...Even today that statement is cited as proof of my shortsightedness in failing to oppose the Army's evacuation order. I do not apologize for it. Under the circumstances that existed in 1942-and it is important not to judge long-past decisions by contemporary values-I could not have done otherwise. There is no doubt in my mind that even had I known of Yasui's thinking I would have opposed his action, morally defensible as it was, because of my conviction that it would hurt the majority...In the final analysis, my disagreement with Yasui was less over policy than timing. He wanted an immediate challenge. I had been convinced the challenge must come later. (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow:New York, 1987, pp. 99-100.) [emphasis added.]

Furthermore, Masaoka does confirm the fact that the JACL did not get involved in the evacuation cases until they reached the Supreme Court level and implies the decision was reached without his presence. "JACL did not become involved in these cases until it filed amicus curiae briefs after I had left for military service." (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow:New York, 1987, pp. 100-1.)

Q8. Are you aware of any exploitation of issues by JACLers/Nisei prior to evacuation? If so, what was the extent of the exploitation? Were any efforts made by JACL to curtail the exploitation?

Aside from what has already been presented, the one other mention of exploitation was found in remarks made by National President Saburo Kido in his oral history. Kido said that the JACL "gave instruction to JACL chapters--stay to help--be the last to leave. I was shocked to hear JACL sold out the Japanese Americans in the valley. I thought we did a good job in San Francisco." (Phonotape 1050 B, Reel #2, Counter #500, January 4, 1967, interview by Joe Grant Masaoka and Robert Wilson.) This may have been a reference to Lyle Kurisaki's claim of JACL involvement in exploitation of Issei in the Imperial Valley, as reported by Togo Tanaka.

IMPOSTERS

There was enough of a problem of individuals representing themselves as JACLers and obtaining personal gain, for the National Headquarters to require chapter representatives to have credentials and special identification cards. Bulletin #117, dated February 18, 1942 from the Office of the National Secretary states:

Today, many persons who are not authorized to represent the JACL are going about the country, claiming to represent us and seeking some personal gain from their activities as our representatives. (JACL Archives.)

The National Secretary then proposed that such persons be arrested and prosecuted for impersonating League officials. He also related that as a result, representatives of the JACL would henceforth carry a special identification card. (Ibid.)

This would indicate that financial gain and exploitation did occur and may have been a serious problem. To what extent this was perpetrated by imposters and to what extent it was done by JACLers operating beyond or outside the scope of their authority is not clear from this or any other bulletin.

Q9. What was the extent of JACL influence in shaping WRA policies? Did WRA check off with JACL prior to policy decisions? What policy areas commanded the greatest attention by JACL?

The book, Nisei, examines the working relationship between the WRA and the JACL. This passage gives some insights into the extent of JACL influence over WRA policies in a general sense. The excerpt below was written by Masaoka in one of his reports to the JACL.

'Because of its administration over the lives and futures of Japanese Americans, the national office of the War Relocation Authority was the major interest and concern of JACL representatives. Daily contacts were maintained with it. When reports of unsatisfactory conditions which could be corrected came in, calls were made on the proper officials in charge and the allegations submitted for their investigation, together with suggested action. When ideas as to policy or program occurred to us, or were sent in by National Headquarters or interested individuals, we would present them to the officers directing the section or division involved in their consideration. Sometimes we would be asked to supply some information on specific items or to make recommendations or suggestions on various topics of mutual interest. Although we may have differed on some subjects, in the main we cooperated wholeheartedly with them because it became apparent early in the program that this government agency, at least, was sincere and honest in its efforts to deal with one of the most difficult problems in the history of this country. (Hosokawa, Nisei, Morrow: New York, 1968, pp. 381-2.)

Masaoka does not indicate whether there were particular areas of interest that the JACL focused upon.

Masaoka's autobiography also mentions an early contact with the WRA in Washington.

Our first meeting with officials in Washington was with Milton Eisenhower. Ken Matsumoto came in from Cincinnati and joined me and Inagaki in a long conference with the director of the WRA. I asked Eisenhower's aid in realizing JACL's goals--to let the nation know that our evacuation was a military decision not connected with any acts of disloyalty so that we could eliminate public suspicions about where our commitment lay, to launch a vigorous resettlement program that would

get the evacuees out of the camps and back into the nation's mainstream, and to work for elimination of discriminatory laws and practices after the war was won. Eisenhower admitted he knew little about Japanese Americans, expressed support for our objectives and in turn asked our assistance in carrying out his difficult assignment. (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, p. 114.)

Here Masaoka does indicate one particular program or policy which the WRA later instituted, that of resettlement. It is possible that during the long conference to which Masaoka refers also resulted in the memorandum on segregation which was written on WRA letterhead and which was signed by Matsumoto, Inagaki and Masaoka.

Q10. What was the extent, nature, and consequences of "stooging" activities in camp, and by whom? Was it a JACL strategy? *Yes*

WAS STOOGING A JACL STRATEGY?

In response to whether "stooging" was a JACL strategy, it appears that the use of informants was suggested by Mike Masaoka as one approach to the problem of segregation in Masaoka's Confidential Statement submitted to Dillon Myer on January 14, 1943. On page 4 of his five page piece on segregation, Masaoka suggested that the WRA place "trained investigators, such as FBI, Military or Naval Intelligence agents, in the centers in some administrative capacity which will permit them to ferret out those who are disloyal and to arrive at some satisfactory arbitrary method of mass segregation, if that is necessary." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 559, Confidential letter to Dillon Myer, p.4.) Masaoka then proceeds with the following suggestion:

We believe, too, that American citizens of Japanese ancestry of unquestioned loyalty should be trained in investigative methods and that these people should be delegated with the jobs of cooperating with the government in "searching" out those who are pro-Japan in their sentiments or who are troublemakers. There is no question that those with Japanese characteristics, if they can be made available, will be able to discover many facts which a non-Japanese might not be able to. (Ibid.)

The idea was that while FBI or ONI agents could pose as WRA administrators working in that capacity to "ferret out" the disloyal, Japanese Americans could have better access due to their "Japanese characteristics." This was a proposal to use Japanese American civilians in an undercover capacity for purposes of identifying those who were pro-Japan or troublemakers in order to segregate them.

Earlier in the same document, Masaoka indicated to Myer that in view of the fact that "practically every person who has been beaten up in the centers is a member of our Japanese American Citizens League," the WRA ought to segregate "known agitators." (Ibid, p.3.) "Most of our chapter leaders have signified their willingness to name those whom they consider inimical to center welfare if their own names are not revealed." (Ibid.) Thus as an overall strategy for segregation and as a particular approach to the threat of physical harm facing JACL leaders, Masaoka offered use of confidential informers. In this latter suggestion, it would be JACL chapter leaders providing information as confidential sources. In the earlier suggestion, it was a more

formal use of Nisei trained in investigation to search out the pro-Japanese and other agitators.

Q11. What did JACL see as its role in the camps? What may have impeded its success? Did JACL rise to power under self-government in camp? If so, explain. If not, why not?

POSTON

The oral history of George Fujii contains comments relevant to JACL's role in one particular camp. Fujii was interned at Poston. His interviewer, Russ Nowell asked about the strike at Poston, and Fujii had this to say.

Under those uncertain circumstances, people were suspicious of government policy, even each other among Japanese. There were some who took advantage of the situation. They were arrogant, as if they were authorized by the government. You find those types of people in any situation, I suppose. You must not forget that these self-appointed, so-called leaders caused much uneasiness and mistrust among evacuees. It so happened that many of them were the leaders of the JACL. Here I don't intend to knock JACL as a whole, I must emphasize. (George Fujii, O.H. 1479b, JAOHP-CSUF, p.6.)

MANZANAR

The oral history of George Fukasawa includes discussion of the JACL at the Manzanar camp. Fukasawa was vice president of the Santa Monica chapter of the JACL at the outbreak of the war. While at Manzanar, Fukasawa worked on the internal security unit. When asked whether he had been involved in the Manzanar Citizens Federation, Fukasawa responded as follows:

I didn't get involved in that at all. I was at the meeting which you speak of mainly as an observer for the security because we did have some advance intelligence that there might be some violence--and there was.

In a later section of the same oral history, Fukasawa commented that he thought "The JACL kept a very low profile in camp." His interviewer asked:

H: You mean prior to the formation of the Manzanar Citizens Federation?

F: That's right, yes. I believe that's when many of the leaders of the JACL, feeling that their prior experience would be helpful, came to the forefront, and it was after that that much of the problems arose regarding JACL people. (Fukasawa, O.H. 1336, by Arthur Hansen, 8/12/74, p.33, JAOHP, CSUF.)

WHAT DID JACL SEE AS ITS ROLE IN CAMP?

One indication of what the JACL thought as its role in camp is revealed in a Bulletin from JACL Headquarters. Bulletin #23, was an interim report, dated 8/10/44. On the topic of Relocation Centers, it has this to say:

The relationship between the residents of the relocation centers and the JACL has been an uncertain one but the segregation has clarified the atmosphere to a certain extent. National Headquarters has been sending materials to the community councils, the block managers and to the center press of the nine "loyal" relocation centers. In a sense, it has been most unfortunate that a closer relationship has not been established. We need the support of the center people and feel confident that we can be of service to them. (JACL Archives, Bulletin #23, 8/10/44, p.4.)

This passage implies, almost states, that the relationship between the JACL and the evacuees had not been close. Also, the implication is that the evacuees don't support the JACL as an organization, or perhaps, not to the degree which the organization would like. The Bulletin goes on to say"

When our leaders were still living in the centers, despite the rumored tense feelings against the JACL, Minidoka had over 800 members; Gila, 600; Poston, 300; and Topaz, 200. Other centers did not conduct any drives. This shows that if there are strong leaders, the position and the work of the league can be explained. We have confidence that a greater understanding of our activities will lead to a stronger support from the relocation centers eventually. Our objective is to work for the general welfare. When we are faced with such strong opposition from the racists of the Pacific Coast and when we have the prospects of winning new friends and a more secure position in American life, unity is of the utmost importance and necessity. This realization is bound to come in due course. Then we know that the JACL and residents of the relocation centers will be able to cooperate and help each other. (Ibid, p.5.)

The sentiments voiced in this memo review a two year relationship between the JACL and center residents. At the time the Bulletin was written, it appears that JACL leaders were no longer living in the centers. When leaders were still in camp, JACL had an overall membership of more than 1,900, according to this Bulletin, in four camps. The Bulletin attributed the absence of JACL members in other

camps to the failure to conduct membership drives and the absence of strong JACL leaders. The tone of the comments in the Bulletin seem to be prospective. That is to say, in the future the JACL and center residents " will be able to cooperate and help each other." In the future, the need for unity will come in due course. "A greater understanding of our activities will lead to a stronger support form the relocation centers eventually." The implication then is that there hasn't been very much unity, cooperation or help between the evacuees and the JACL. The tone is anticipatory of a time when the cooperation, unity and support will be there.

Q12. What was JACL's attitude toward draft resisters? Did JACL cause ACLU to refuse assistance to resisters?

There is little else written by the JACL which would disclose the organization's attitude towards draft resisters, aside from what materials have been previously presented. A passage from Hosokawa's JACL In Quest of Justice does discuss what JACL did in response to the resisters as well as the prevailing JACL attitude towards them.

JACL had in fact made considerable efforts to help some of the draft resisters. Joe Grant Masaoka and Min Yasui first met with Nisei from the Amache camp at Granada being held at the Federal Correctional Institution outside Denver. Yasui, who had gone to jail to challenge the curfew order as discriminatory, endorsed restoration of Selective Service because it ended discrimination. Next they visited Amache to talk with confused young men being pressured by activists to resist Military Service. Then they traveled to Cheyenne, Wyoming, to talk with some fifty imprisoned draft violators from the Heart Mountain camp. (To put the numbers of resisters in perspective, it is necessary to note that more than seven hundred men from Heart Mountain signed up for the draft and took their physical examinations.) Some time later, the pair visited the Gila and Poston camps and patiently listened to the protests of those opposing the draft. Their complaints had to do mostly with bitterness over evacuation on the basis of race; understandably they refused to serve in the uniform of a country that had mistreated them. Yasui and Masaoka agreed that the Evacuation was unjust, but they also argued that the Nisei would be in a much stronger position to demand justice if they demonstrated their loyalty by complying with the draft law like all other citizens. By violating the law, the two declared, the resisters were not only establishing a criminal record for themselves, but taking an action that reflected on the loyalty of all Japanese Americans. (Hosokawa, JACL In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, pp. 273-4.)

Thus, Hosokawa chronicles the attempts by the JACL representatives to repeatedly "help" the resisters by attempting to dissuade them from their course of action. Resistance in JACL eyes would not only harm the individual resister but would reflect, one presumes negatively, on the loyalty of all Japanese Americans.

Mike Masaoka also addresses the topic of resisters in his autobiography.

Some historians, writing from the isolation of their ivory towers, have contended the draft resisters were the real heroes of the Japanese American story because they had the courage to stand up for a principle. These historians are wrong. The significance is in the relatively small numbers of dissidents in the face of gross injustice. The heroes are the men and their families who demonstrated their faith in America. In the postwar years, Congress passed one remedial measure after another to correct historical wrongs. In every instance it was the record of Nisei military valor and sacrifice that drew attention to past injustices and convinced those in power that change had to come. Without that record the fight for justice would have been infinitely more difficult. There is persuasive reason to believe that Japanese Americans, and other minorities, today would not be enjoying unrestricted citizenship rights without the Nisei record of unswerving loyalty. (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, p. 179.)

According to this passage, the resisters are by implication, not heroes. They did not demonstrate their faith in America. Were it not for the Nisei war veterans, ethnic minorities would still face restrictions in their rights. If the Nisei veterans demonstrated unswerving loyalty, then conversely, the resisters demonstrated unswerving disloyalty? Perhaps swerving loyalty?

Finally, in Masaoka's Final Report, there are comments on the topic of draft resisters.

Many stories of strife and dissension among prospective draftees, especially in the centers, have reached us in the Combat team. While most of us appreciate the feelings of those who have undergone the awful experience of evacuation, we ask them to cooperate with the Selective Service as another contribution to the war effort. We realize how difficult and unjust this may seem, yet we see no alternative if these young men intend to remain in the United States after the war is won to reap the benefits of the American way of life...Even if the prospective draftee does not care what happens to him personally, let him consider what he does to the fine record being won by his fellow Japanese Americans, many of whom have, and will be, either killed in action

or wounded that their loved ones will gain thereby: he not only nullifies their efforts but he causes them to have served, and perhaps died, in vain. Let him also consider what he does to the future of all other Japanese Americans, the majority of whom do not agree with his philosophy: he threatens their future welfare and destiny in this country, for in these times the actions and words of a single Japanese American are construed to be representative of all...Before we Japanese Americans begin to demand certain rights and privileges, let us be sure that we have earned the honor of asking for them. (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, File T 6.15, pp. 126-7, Bancroft Library.)

Masaoka's Final Report was written concurrent with the action of the draft resisters in camp. It reflects the attitude that resisters were not contributing to the war effort; that the actions of the resisters would cause those in the combat team to die in vain; that resistance to the draft endangers the future of Japanese Americans; and finally, that the resisters had not earned the right to demand rights and privileges from the U.S. government.

In response to whether JACL caused the ACLU to refuse legal assistance to the draft resisters, no determination can be made without examining the ACLU archives and the correspondence of Roger Baldwin in particular. The American Civil Liberties Union papers are located at Princeton University Library.

Q13. What was the extent of JACL's role in the process of "segregation"?

Mike Masaoka addresses the topic of segregation in his autobiography.

I had urged WRA to undertake some kind of segregation program in the camps, separating the agitators from those who wanted to cooperate with the government. Loyalty to the United States was not the main issue at this point: we were looking for a way to halt intimidation of the peaceful evacuees and violence against certain JACL leaders so the people could live without fear while waiting to be relocated or simply sitting out the war. We had never discussed with officials anything so drastic as the mass questionnaires.

In fact, Masaoka had urged segregation as early as June 6, 1942 in a memorandum to Milton Eisenhower. Later, in a confidential statement dated January 14, 1943, Masaoka devoted five pages to recommendation for segregation.

Q14. What was JACL's definition of "loyalty" and what were the variables critical to the definition?

In examining the definition of loyalty according to the JACL, several recurring themes appear. One was that loyalty had to be proven. Another that loyalty meant obeying the laws and orders of the government.

PRE-WAR

One variable critical to the JACL definition of loyalty prior to the war is expressed in Mike Masaoka's Final Report. He writes that "the local chapters were instructed to cooperate more actively with any and all civic and patriotic enterprises and to encourage all members to conduct themselves as exemplary citizens--these were the criteria of good citizenship and loyalty as we knew them at that time..." (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, File T 6.15, p.30, Bancroft Library.)

EVACUATION

According to Jimmie Sakamoto, "a basic tenet of loyalty is to obey the orders of the government to which one owes his allegiance." (*Japanese American Courier*, 6 March 1942, cited in Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier," *Amerasia* 13:2 (1986-87) p.74.) Through this statement, Sakamoto urged compliance with the government's evacuation order.

INTERMENT

Another variable critical to the JACL definition of loyalty is again seen in Masaoka's Final Report. Military service according to Masaoka was an expression of loyalty.

Speaking strictly as an individual, it was my thought that since we already have the 100th and the 442nd to serve as examples of the mass or group loyalty of the Japanese Americans, what we now need is more individual examples, like Ben Kuroki, who fought side by side with other fighting Americans not of the Japanese race who today vouch for him and his people as patently loyal and American...Then, if we should be challenged as to our loyalty, we would have three types of positive examples to point to: the mass or group, as demonstrated by the 100th and the 442nd; the individual, as witness the personal testimony of so many of their fighting buddies; and the specialist, in the intelligence division whose duties were to aid in the war in the Pacific against the enemy who looked like him and who had reserved special tortures for his kind. What

greater proof, more concrete evidence, would any reasonable person need to appreciate the loyalty of the Japanese American? (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, File T 6.15, pp. 125-6, Bancroft Library.)

Masaoka wrote in his autobiography that military service was a way for Nisei to "demonstrate their loyalty." "The pacifists were dismayed that we would feel the need to fight to prove our loyalty." (Masaoka, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, pp. 123,124.)

Q16. Who/what asked JACL to conduct the Kibei survey?

A review of the documents in hand does not provide a definitive answer to the question posed above. The first JACL document to mention the Kibei survey, was Bulletin #114, dated February 12, 1942. It states "[w]e have been requested to conduct a Kibei survey." (JACL Archives.) Given this grammatical construction, we surmise that someone or something outside of the JACL requested this survey. The next sentences of the Bulletin explain the purpose of the survey, which was two-fold: to correct misinformation about the Kibei, and more importantly "to aid the government in their Americanism work." The last phrase is repeated in Press Release No. 81 as one of the purposes for the Kibei survey. In a subsequent Bulletin, No. 117, dated February 18, 1942, Masaoka urges, "if we conduct this survey well, we may be in a position to clarify some conflicting reports which the government may now have concerning this group." (JACL Archives, Bulletin #117, p.2.) The implication is that the Kibei survey was at the request of the government and part of their Americanism work." However, the actual form for the survey has the following heading: "sponsored by the Japanese American Citizens League in the interests of Americanism." (JACL Archives.) Moreover, a reference to the survey in Minutes of the Coordinating Committee of the Coast Region, dated February 22, 1942, was worded as follows: "All chapters reported good cooperation in the Kibei survey requested by the National Headquarters." (James Sakamoto Papers, Suzallo Library, University of Washington, Reel #10.)

Apparently the existence of the Kibei survey gave rise to a rumor about it. One individual, Tomatsu Shibutani, collected and analyzed rumors which circulated during the pre-evacuation period. One such rumor follows:

February, 1942 (no specific day): The JACL started their survey on the Kibeis in order to turn in information to the FBI. They are making this as a protective move to whitewash themselves by blaming others. (Shibutani, "Rumors in a Crisis Situation," unpublished dissertation for the M.A., University of Chicago, September, 1944, p. 116, quoted by Takahashi Cates, "Comparative Administration and Management of Five War Relocation Authority Camps, University of Pittsburgh, 1980, p. 84.)

There have been references to the fact that two issues of the Nichi Bei Times, February 15 and 20, 1942 mention the Kibei survey. Attempts to locate these back issues have to date been unsuccessful.

Q17. Who was responsible for the 442nd being a segregated unit?

By all counts, there is no disagreement that during the November 1942 Special Emergency Convention, a resolution was approved, unanimously, urging the federal government to restore Selective Service for Nisei. However, two accounts do differ on the issue of who argued in favor of a segregated, all-Nisei unit.

Masaoka's Final Report Report has this to say about JACL's position on a segregated combat unit. "Let me make clear now, for the records [sic], that JACL has never advocated a segregated unit for Japanese American soldiers. It would be inconsistent with our known policy of fighting all forms of discrimination as un-American." (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, File T 6.15, p.122, Bancroft Library.)

In Mike Masaoka's autobiography, he begins chapter 7 of his book by stating that in early January of 1943, Colonel Scobey asked to see him in Scobey's Pentagon office. Both Masaoka and George Inagaki attended.

Without preliminaries, Scobey said the Army was thinking favorably of letting Nisei serve in combat. My face lit up. Then Scobey dropped a bombshell. What did we think of an all-Nisei volunteer force led by white officers? There was a long silence, and then my protests began to flow. That wasn't what I had in mind at all when I was pushing for restoration of Selective Service responsibilities, I said. (Masaoka/Hosokawa, They Call Me Moses Masaoka, Morrow: New York, 1987, p.123.)

Masaoka indicates that after his response, Scobey gave him and Inagaki the Pentagon's views.

The Army was sympathetic with the Nisei's desire to demonstrate their loyalty through military service. But there were millions of Americans in uniform and millions more would be called up, and a few thousand Japanese Americans dispersed among all those men would be virtually invisible. But a regiment size outfit of Japanese Americans fighting as a unit was bound to attract attention, and sympathy and admiration, particularly if it set the kind of heroic record that could be publicized...He urged us to think over the proposal, consult our friends, and report back to him within a few days." (Ibid, p.124.)

Masaoka then describes the ensuing sleepless nights when he wrestled with whether he should agree to a segregated unit. Later, convinced that the Nisei had to accept this challenge, he and George Inagaki then met with Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and Scobey. "McCloy went over their proposal that Scobey had outlined in our previous meeting...McCloy showed no surprise when I told him JACL would back his plan fully. He seemed to expect it. (Ibid, p. 125.) At the end of the meeting, both Masaoka and Inagaki volunteered for duty.

In Hosokawa's own treatment of this subject, he writes:

It was fitting that the chief spokesman for JACL which had pleaded for restoration of military obligations, should get first word of the policy change. Some time in mid-January Masaoka was asked to come to the Pentagon Office of Assistant Secretary of War McCloy. Inagaki accompanied Masaoka to the meeting with McCloy and his administrative assistant, Colonel William P. Scobey. McCloy explained that a great many persons had vouched for Nisei loyalty, that many Nisei had written to ask for the right to fight for their country and that, confidentially, the War Department was preparing to announce that volunteers would be invited for an all-Nisei regiment-sized combat team. Before long, McCloy went on, it was likely that all Nisei males would become subject to the draft.

Masaoka's elation was tempered by reservations about a segregated unit and the call for volunteers rather than an immediate restoration of Selective Service. Scobey convinced Masaoka and Inagaki that a few thousand Nisei scattered among millions of American servicemen would be lost from view and it was to their advantage to fight together...In the euphoria of the moment, both Nisei volunteered on the spot. (Hosokawa, JACL In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1986, p. 210.)

The major difference between these two accounts seems to be on the amount of time which transpired and whether it was a single meeting or a sequence of meetings which led to the decision. Also, Hosokawa's treatment seems to lessen the input or involvement of the JACL or at least of Masaoka in the ultimate decision. However, these two accounts are in stark contrast to Frank Chuman's rendition of the decision to have an all-Nisei combat unit. After explaining the JACL's resolution for reinstatement of Selective Service for the Nisei, Chuman writes as follows:

In January 1943, to implement this resolution,

three young Nisei members of the JACL obtained special approval to leave their camps to make a special trip to the White House. Their mission was to try to convince President Roosevelt that they belonged in the uniform of the United States Army...They did not meet the President but did discuss their right to serve in the army with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy... The JACL delegates from the camps declared that the Nisei were ready to fight for the United States, but some of them did not want a racially segregated unit of Japanese-Americans. They felt instead that the Nisei soldiers should be dispersed throughout the Army into whatever branch of Service they might be assigned. These three camp delegates felt differently, and they urged upon Stimson and McCloy that such dispersal would mean a complete loss of identity as citizens of Japanese ancestry. They argued that a segregated, all-Nisei outfit offered the best method of prove their loyalty to the public. The sincerity of the delegates and the uniqueness of a segregated Nisei unit apparently convinced Stimson and McCloy of the efficacy of the project. On January 28, 1943, Stimson announced plans to organize a Japanese-American combat team composed of Nisei volunteers from the mainland and from Hawaii. (Chuman, The Bamboo People, JARP: Chicago, 1976, pp.174-5.)

After reading this, a number of questions come to mind. Does Chuman mean to say that JACL delegates requested the segregated unit and in fact, may have persuaded Stimson and McCloy to institute it? Who exactly were these three individuals and why was there no reference to them in either Masaoka's autobiography or Hosokawa's book? To obtain special permission to leave camp would have taken some effort, as well as knowledge or permission on JACL Headquarters, it is assumed. Both George Inagaki and Mike Masaoka returned to Washington, D.C. after the November 42 Special Meeting in Salt Lake City. One would assume that they should have known of such a special delegation, especially one which would ask for a segregated unit. Thus while Masaoka and Hosokawa in their books lay the responsibility for segregating the Nisei at the feet of the Army, was it in fact the JACL's responsibility, according to Chuman's account?