

RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED FOR PRESIDENTIAL SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
JACL RESOLUTION #7

submitted in 1990 by Deborah K. Lim

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## PRE-EVACUATION

### IA. The Activities and Relationship with Governmental Agencies Prior to December 7, 1941.

One of the key questions which arises when discussing JACL's relationships with government agencies, prior to Pearl Harbor, is whether the JACL as an organization was involved with intelligence activities which caused the arrests of Issei and Kibei community leaders immediately following December 7, 1941.

### OFFICIAL POSITION

This is a key question of considerable long-standing. In fact, Mike Masaoka, National Secretary and Field Executive from September 1, 1941 to June 22, 1943 for the JACL, addressed this issue in great length in his "Final Report" written in 1944. What follows is an excerpt on the issue of JACL cooperation versus collaboration with U.S. Intelligence Agencies:

In connection with JACL's policy of cooperation with the federal agencies, two divergent rumors have materialized and grown into titanic proportions. One is that JACL did not cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, and other authorities charged with the internal safety of our country. The other is that JACL, in order to enhance its own position as leaders of the Japanese communities, turned in the names of all first generation leaders and asked for their internment. Some have even slyly suggested that JACL officials received a bounty for every name they turned in for investigation. Neither is true; both are lies! JACL did cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Intelligence, and other agencies by furnishing them with all the information which we might have had at our disposal regarding the suspects the agencies questioned us about. This is the duty of every American. But, since we of the JACL are not, and were not then, trained investigators in counter-espionage, we were not able to furnish them with more than what was general community knowledge, that is to say facts or rumors relating to their ostensible business and sympathies, family relationships, and organizational ties. Most of us can't read, write, or speak Japanese well enough to understand much of what happened in the "inner sanctums" of the Japanese community; certainly our Americanism was too well known to

encourage those interested in destroying our  
from placing us in their confidence. In summary,  
JACL did not institute a witch-hunt; neither did  
we evade our duty as patriotic Americans  
interested, as are other Americans, in protecting  
our nation from espionage and sabotage. The  
charge that the FBI, for example, paid us  
twenty-five dollars each for the names and  
information leading to the internment of a  
Japanese alien is too ridiculous to warrant even  
a reply. The answer to the question as to why  
government investigators seemed to converge on  
our office is obvious: it was easier for them to  
obtain the general consensus on a person from us  
who were pledged to cooperate than to try to  
"dig" it out of some frightened by-stander.  
(Masaoka, "Final Rept.", 4/22/44, pp.48-9, File  
T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

The previous excerpt has become the official party  
line, of the JACL on the issue of cooperation versus collab-  
oration with U.S. Intelligence agencies. Let us compare  
this understanding with what was occurring within the  
government at this time.

#### GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIONS

Historians have documented for us the fact that the  
Japanese community was under surveillance by various federal  
agencies as early as the 1930's. In June of 1939, then  
President Roosevelt issued a memorandum for the purpose of  
having this surveillance conducted in a more coordinated  
manner. The agencies involved were the FBI, Military Intel-  
ligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of  
Naval Intelligence. (Kumamoto, "The Search for Spies: American  
Counterintelligence and the Japanese American Community,  
1931-1942", Amerasia Journal 6:2, 1979, p.52.) In fact, FBI  
Director J. Edgar Hoover informed all local law enforcement  
that the President had directed all domestic investigation  
on espionage and sabotage to be headed by the FBI.

Along with coordination of surveillance on the Japanese  
Community, J. Edgar Hoover, in October of 1941, issued  
orders to his field agents to obtain informants. "You are  
instructed to take immediate steps to secure and develop  
confidential informants of the Japanese Race." To be exact:

Hoover was asking for the recruitment of Nisei  
informants. The FBI believed that Japanese  
intelligence was avoiding the use of second  
generation Japanese Americans only: this made  
the Nisei unlikely saboteurs, and the FBI  
convinced a few to become voluntary informants,

reporting on suspicious Issei activities. Among the informants were members of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), by definition a predominantly Nisei and Sansei organization. Although it is improbable that more than a handful of JACL members became informants, Naval Intelligence records on the surveillance admit that "with the help of the JACL, which got to be very much on our side, these were Nisei people, we were able to pinpoint practically every agent that had any potential for mischief. (Ibid. p.57.)

Concurrent with the Federal government's increased coordination of Japanese surveillance and development of an informant network was a commensurate increase in attention by some within the JACL to the issue of loyalty to America. "Out of the habit of defining loyalty, talking about loyalty, interpreting it for both the Japanese and Caucasian communities, a segment of JACL leadership in 1939 and 1940 began to arrogate to itself the authority to judge and evaluate the loyalty of members of the Japanese community." (Tanaka, "History of JACL", File T 6.25, Ch. III p.12 JERS, Bancroft Library.) Tanaka does not specify all who made up this segment within the JACL, except to name National Vice-President Ken Matsumoto as one. Tanaka is also quick to distinguish Saburo Kido, National President during 1941 as not within this particular segment. In fact, Tanaka goes so far as to make a distinction in the activities of JACL on a geographic basis. "One detects a greater willingness on the part of top JACL leaders in Los Angeles to pass judgment upon Issei activities in Southern California." (Ibid Ch. IV p.22.) He goes on to say that "[a]n examination of correspondence between national officers for this period leads to the conclusion that hyper-sensitivity to possible subversive influences within the Japanese community centered more in Southern California leadership than in the north. (Ibid, p.23.)

This would be borne out by the existence of the Coordinating Committee for Southern California Defense, headed by Joe Masaoka and begun for the purposes of encouraging defense activities by the JACL in anticipation of war with Japan. "Among other duties, this body was charged with gathering information on subversive activities; this information was to be turned over directly to Naval Intelligence." (Tanaka, "Report of Manzanar Riot," File O 10.12, p.7 JERS, Bancroft Library.) The September 14, 1941 Minutes for a Special Session of the Southern District Council confirm the Coordinating Committee's existence, but little else in the way of a statement of purpose, function and duties. It will be later that we will see more about the nature of the CCSD.

Consistent with our understanding of what began to occur in the intelligence community after 1939, we are further informed by Togo Tanaka, JACL's unofficial historian, that:

[a]ll the National Officers of the JACL in 1940-41 had come into personal contact with federal investigative agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Military Intelligence, and Naval Intelligence. Close personal relationships characterized most of these top contacts. Similarly, district and local chapter leaders of the JACL found themselves increasingly approached by representatives of not only federal, but state and local law enforcement and security officers. (Tanaka, "History of JACL", File T 6.25, Ch.III, p.14, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

This is corroborated by a letter dated December 4, 1940, on JACL National Headquarters letterhead from Hito Okada, Treasurer, to Saburo Kido, which indicates that the FBI had "visited" Howard Nomura, a chapter president in the Portland, Oregon region.

Regarding the excitement that I mentioned above, Howard Nomura, chapter president here has been visited by the FBI, and has been answering many questions in regards to Niseis and Isseis, especially about the different organizations. I understand they cannot understand the existence of the Junior Kenjin Kai. Neither can I. I hope this investigation here will clarify matters. (JACL Archives.)

In fact, when contacts were made by Intelligence agencies, "JACL representatives for the most part had responded with a patriotic zeal exceeded only by their public expressions of American Loyalty." (Tanaka, "History of JACL," File T 6.25, Ch.IV, p.21, JERS.)

How close were the "personal relationships" between top contacts in the JACL and Federal Intelligence agencies? More importantly, what kind of impact did those "close personal relationships have on the Japanese American Community at large?

**KENNETH D. RINGLE, ONI**

Tanaka informs us that one of the "close-working relationships between a JACL leader and federal agency well-known in Citizens' League circles was that existing

between the National Vice-President Ken Matsumoto of Los Angeles and Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Ringle of the Naval Intelligence Office in Los Angeles." (Ibid, Ch.III, p.14.)

In the Minutes of the Special National Board Meeting held in San Francisco between March 8 and 10, 1942, a report was made by National Vice President Ken Matsumoto on his activities between 1941 and 1942, in which he refers to his relationship with Ringle:

specifically though, an intimate friendship was made with the Assistant Naval Intelligence Officer of the 11th Naval District. This contact which was realized in January, 1941 has proven to be one of our most valuable assets and it can be stated, without fear of contradiction, that through this gentlemen, the good name of the JACL has reached out far and wide. (JACL Minutes, p.4.)

Matsumoto continues his report with a chronology of his activities for 1941. He met Lt. Commander K.D. Ringle, Assistant Naval Intelligence Officer, 11th Naval District, in January of 1941. In March, Matsumoto worked with Ringle on a special invitational dinner given by the Intelligence Dept. of the 11th Naval District for all JACL Chapters in the Southern District. In addition to the 12 Southern District Chapters, three prospective chapters also attended. Attendance, in fact, was "100%".

Purpose of this dinner meeting was many fold. For one, this was an opportunity for the Nisei Leadership to clarify his position and remove any doubts of his status. This was an opportunity to establish contact with the vital branches of the United States Army and Navy, as well as the local Law Enforcement body. It was a chance to ascertain the attitudes and thoughts of the Nisei leadership during these strained days. Finally, it served to inspire young Nisei to take a more positive stand regarding his loyalty and allegiance. Needless to say, the meeting was most significant and momentous. (JACL Minutes, p.5.)

Matsumoto's comments ring with more truth than he may have known. We know now that K.D. Ringle, fluent in Japanese, was conducting a two year study on the Japanese community. This study, under the auspices of Naval Intelligence, would be submitted to the military at the same time as the Munson Report, with a similar conclusion that the Japanese American "problem" was overblown and that this community was for the most part loyal to the U.S. Ringle's

report was one of the three intelligence reports "suppressed" by Justice Dept. Attorneys when the test cases were argued before the Supreme Court. The "rediscovery" of the Ringle Naval Intelligence Report by Peter Irons contributed to the Coram Nobis actions for Min Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu.

Can we conclude, then, that Matsumoto's work with Ringle was beneficial to the community at large? Referring again to Togo Tanaka's "History of JACL."

The Matsumoto correspondence for this period assumed that war with Japan was probable, even inevitable. As a result there was a far greater willingness on his part than on Kido's to point an accusing finger at individuals suspected of adhering to Japan as against the United States. Without doubt, Matsumoto, under the tutelage of federal investigative officials, played a prominent role in the conversion of JACL local leadership to the acceptance of the "security role" it assumed in 1940-41. This role is described variously, depending upon individual points of view. From the standpoint which ultimately came to prevail within the Japanese community, it was the role of "spies and stooges for the FBI." From the standpoint of JACL leadership, it was the role of "constructive cooperators for national defense." From the standpoint of men like Matsumoto, it was a brave service and contribution to the war effort to report to federal agents what they judged to be subversive and disloyal acts and utterances. To the majority of fear-ridden Issei and resentful Nisei, the activity assumed the aspects of a hateful witchhunt. (Tanaka, "History of JACL" File T 6.25, Ch.III p.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

We can also conclude that Matsumoto was an informant for the Office of Naval Intelligence. This is according to an April 21, 1943 Memo from the District Intelligence Officer to the Director of Naval Intelligence. The memo deals with a previous request that "the names of Eleventh Naval District informants in Japanese Relocation Centers who have volunteered for military service be furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence." (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence Rept.") The memo goes on to discuss Matsumoto in particular.

3. It is believed that three other individuals, two of whom in past months have left the relocation centers for outside employment, have volunteered or may do so in the near future. They are Iwao ISHINO, presently at Poston;

Edward YONEMURA, employed in Utah; and Ken MATSUMOTO, presently employed at Cincinnati, Ohio...

5. As additional names of informants entering the armed services become available, they will be forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence. (Ibid.)

While the document deals with informants in camp, it does confirm that Matsumoto was a Naval Intelligence informant prior to evacuation because he had relocated prior to the camps to Cincinnati, Ohio. This is documented in an April 13, 1942 letter from Lieutenant Commander Ringle to Milton S. Eisenhower.

I am enclosing extracts from a letter which I have just received from my friend, Ken Matsumoto, whom you will remember as national vice president of the JACL. He left here ahead of the evacuation order to accept a very good job with the Mayor Jewelry Company, 5th and Vine Streets, Cincinnati, Ohio. (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "Navy Dept.")

Ringle himself wrote about Matsumoto in a letter to Professor E.N. Barnhart, dated April 23, 1951. The letter was written in response to Barnhart's questions about the role "American-Japanese" played in disclosing information to intelligence agencies at the outbreak of World War II. "I also refer you to the Japanese-American Citizens League, which was and is a standby pro-American Nisei organization, and to Ken Matsumoto, who was its National Vice President at that time and my very good friend and chief source of information. (Ringle, April 23, 1951, Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

#### JACL AND RINGLE

How closely and officially did JACL as an organization work with Ringle? No indication from JACL archives, beyond the fact that Ringle's name and comments appear from time to time in Minutes of the Southern District Council Meetings. Minutes for a Special Session of the Southern District Council Meeting, dated September 14, 1941, mention Chairman Fred Tayama introducing Lt. Commander Ringle of Naval Intelligence as the guest of the day. JACL archives did not have a continuous record of S.D. Council Meeting Minutes. Minutes dated January 11, 1942 record comments from Ringle regarding the issues of membership for persons of dual citizenship. He assisted in drawing up a resolution requesting disfranchisement of American citizens connected with any Axis nations and made comments on "behaviors and precautions to be taken during this state of war." He was

not introduced as a guest. In fact from the context of the Minutes, it appeared that by this time, Ringle was a familiar figure at these meetings.

In a letter from JACL National President Saburo Kido to former President James Sakamoto:

When I visited Los Angeles during the latter part of March, Ken Matsumoto took me down to San Pedro to see Lieutenant Commander Ringle, who was instrumental in inviting the Southern California District Council members to a discussion group. During the course of our conversation the matter of holding similar meetings in various districts came up. Commander Ringle has written to Seattle and San Francisco and ascertained the officers in charge of the Intelligence Bureau. Lieutenant Commander Liebenow of Seattle replied favorably, stating that he would be delighted to cooperate with the JACL in the Northwest if he receives an invitation. I would suggest that either you or Tom Iseri. . . of the Northwest District Council contact him and arrange for a meeting. (Saburo Kido letter to James Sakamoto 25 April 1941 from Ichioka, A Study in Dualism: James Yoshinori Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier, 1928-1942, Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, p.73.)

Matsumoto's report to the JACL Board at their special meeting, during March 8-10, 1942 confirms that Ringle had opened up channels for meetings in San Francisco and Seattle at the request of the JACL during 1941, but that there was no follow through. (JACL Special Board Meeting Minutes, March 8-10, 1942, p.5.) "Matsumoto informed Sakamoto that he had communicated with Kido about the arrangements with the Head of the Naval Intelligence of your district, the 13th.' Matsumoto assured Sakamoto that 'their office is ready to meet the JACL leaders at any time they wish, and I believe that it ought to be done at once.'" (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier" Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, p. 73.) Apparently, there is no indication or evidence that any meetings between a JACL leader such as James Sakamoto and Naval Intelligence ever occurred in the Seattle region. (Ibid.)

What is the significance of JACL as an organization working with Ringle? Ringle's time spent in Southern California was for intelligence work. Additionally, he had "developed an effective system of Nisei informants (which he shared with the FBI)." (Personal Justice Denied, p.54.) One must conclude that Ringle's Southern California contacts and informants included members of the JACL from Southern

District Chapters, or even members of the Southern District Council itself, wittingly or unwittingly. Moreover, since Ringle shared his informants with the FBI, one must further conclude that the same JACL members of Southern District Chapters or Council again were FBI informants as well.

Was there then a difference of attitude among JACL leaders in Northern California and the Pacific Northwest, or were there similar contacts and occurrences?

#### PACIFIC NORTHWEST

According to Ichioka's article, James Sakamoto, former JACL National President and editor of the Japanese American Courier in Seattle "unquestionably believed that the Nisei should cooperate with federal agencies. In 1940 he said so in so many words: 'Every loyal American citizen ... will lend all possible support to the constituted authorities to see that subversive activities are promptly put down.'" When a Japanese spy was arrested sometime in June of 1941, Sakamoto uttered the warning that "every officer and every member of the [JACL] must be on the alert." (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier", Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-1987, p.73.)

#### NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

JACL archives reveal a Resolution discussed by the Northern California District Council meeting in San Mateo, CA, dated November 16, 1941. The Resolution, composed by Mike Masaoka and adopted unanimously by the Nor. Cal. District Council was to have been sent to each chapter for consideration and approval, then sent to President Roosevelt. It is unknown if the Resolution was approved by anyone other than the Nor. Cal. Chapters. It does serve as an indication of the mindset of JACL as war with Japan loomed more imminent. The Resolution pledged all 55 chapters to:

exercise extraordinary vigilance and to report any and all cases of espionage and sabotage which may come to our attention to the proper government authorities, offer individual and organizational facilities and cooperation to intelligence agencies and to create in every chapter, special committees to serve our governmental agencies in any capacity to which we may be called... in the civilian as well as military defense of our country. (JACL Archives.)

A more curious indication of contact with intelligence agencies is found in two letters written by a Kazuo Oka, President of the Monterey JACL chapter. JACL archives

reveal a copy of his letter to President Roosevelt and one similarly worded to the Industrial Security Division of the U.S. Army. Oka also reveals his assistance to FBI agents both before and after Pearl Harbor.

Then, too, prior to my own evaluation and some two weeks before the Pearl Harbor incident, I endeavored to assist the Monterey, California agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Among those with whom I was in constant contact were Mr. Chas. "Chuck" Drussel and Mr. Tom Estop. If I remember correctly, they were affiliated with the San Francisco, Calif. offices of the FBI, the offices of, I think, Mr. N. Pieper. (JACL Archives, Letter to U.S. Army, p.6.)

The letter to Roosevelt also states, "I have cooperated both before and after Pearl Harbor with the Federal Bureau of Investigation..." (JACL Archives, Oka Letter to Roosevelt, p.1.)

These letters were written to the President and Army because Oka had just been discharged from a factory on the basis that defense work was being done and his presence constituted a threat to security. Both letters were lengthy defenses of Oka's own "security risk worthiness." That being the case, it is entirely possible that he overstates his case or that any assistance to the FBI was as an individual rather than as President of JACL, Monterey Chapter. However, Oka does mention specific FBI agents by name, making it unlikely that he overly overstates his case, and his position as JACL Chapter President no doubt made him a person the FBI would more likely prefer over ordinary individuals. At the very least, the position provided the individual with contacts and information not normally found.

#### POSTSCRIPT

Michi Weglyn, author of Years of Infamy, forwarded a copy of a letter written by the late Kay Sugahara, which was addressed to Congressman Robert Matsui. This copy was submitted in response to the JACL's Research Project pursuant to Resolution #7. In this letter, Sugahara claims that "[i]n the five years before Pearl Harbor, practically every leader of the JACL was working closely with the FBI, the ONI and Army Intelligence." (Courtesy Michi Weglyn.) While Kay Sugahara had been involved in the Anti-Axis Committee's intelligence activities, no government documents have been found to corroborate this claim that as early as 1936, JACL leaders worked with these intelligence agencies, to date.

## IB. Response to Declaration of War with Japan

The most immediate reaction to the declaration of war with Japan that we see in the JACL archives is a notice or memo from National Headquarters to all member chapters. The notice, undated but with 12/7/41 penciled in the upper right hand corner, acknowledged Japan's attack upon the United States and that the "acid test" had arrived as far as loyalty to the country was concerned. It goes on to urge caution in personal conduct and to become involved in national defense. It also states:

The Federal government and the laws of this country will give protection to our parents as long as they are law-abiding. Those who have been under suspicion may be apprehended temporarily until their status is clarified. But there is no fear of concentration camps for the Issei as a whole at this time. (JACL Archives 12/7/41.)

It is unclear whether the National Headquarters was commenting in reaction to the FBI pick-ups of Issei on the so-called ABC lists or if it had some prior indication that such temporary apprehensions might occur.

### DEFENSE COMMITTEES FORMED BY JACL

In the three major cities on the West Coast, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle, we see JACL members forming defense committees within their local chapters or regional district councils. In Los Angeles, the Southern District Council of the JACL formed the Anti-Axis Committee. In Seattle and San Francisco, they were called Emergency Defense Councils.

### ANTI-AXIS COMMITTEE--LOS ANGELES

The Anti-Axis Committee was formed on December 7, 1941 and had their first recorded meeting on December 8, 1941. The Minutes to said meeting outline a purpose of pledging "the facilities of our entire organization and our individual services to our government in this great crisis" as well as "unequivocal repudiation of Japan" and "common objective of an American victory." (JACL Archives.) Its objectives were three-fold: "to cooperate with all national, state and local government agencies in their program in this emergency; coordinate citizen and alien activities; [and] get fair treatment for loyal Americans." (Ibid.) The committees' Executive Board members were made up of men, many of whose names have appeared in other contexts, most

notably as so-called or alleged FBI informants prior to and during camp. The chairman, at this point, was Fred Tayama. Executive Secretary was Kay Sugahara. The Board members were John Ando, Dr. Ishimaru, Frank Ishii, George Inagaki, Ken Matsumoto, Masao Satow and Togo Tanaka. Also present at this meeting, among assorted local government officials was Lt. Commander Kenneth Ringle of the 11th Naval District.

The Minutes contain a statement which was aired on the radio on December 7 at 11 p.m. by the Coordinating Committee for National Defense of the Southern District Council. It reads as follows:

We are all Americans pledged to the defense of the United States. Any disloyal act or word by any Japanese or American citizen of Japanese descent harms the United States. . .As Americans we now function as counterespionage. Any act or word prejudicial to the United States committed by any Japanese must be warned and reported to the FBI, Naval Intelligence, Sheriff's Office, and local police. Any menace to the security of our country must be thoroughly and completely wiped out. [Signed, Joe Masaoka, Chairman, Coordinating Committee for National Defense.](JACL Archives, Anti-Axis Minutes, 12/8/41 p.3.)

Later, the Southern District Council sent a telegram, dated February 16, 1942, to Attorney General Francis Biddle. It read, "we have cooperated with all Federal Agencies in apprehending subversives and have actually become informants for the FBI." (NA, RG 146, Entry 13, Box 782, Section 3, 2/14/42-2/16/42, Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

#### ANTI-AXIS MINUTES REVIEWED

A review of the Anti-Axis Committee's literature and Minutes is quite illuminating. Both the Huntington Library and the JARP collection at UCLA's University Research Library-Special Collections possess copies.

The Anti-Axis Committee's Archives begin with a Bulletin, titled "Japanese American Citizens League Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council." The Bulletin outlines the Committee's purpose, objectives and program, which were previously cited in this chapter. The Bulletin contains a "statement by Chairman Fred Tayama" which reads as follows:

The United States is at war with the Axis. We shall do all in our power to help wipe out vicious totalitarian enemies. Every man is either friend or foe. We shall investigate and

turn over to authorities all who by word or act consort with the enemies. (JARP Collection #2010, Box 310, SC-URL-UCLA.)

The Bulletin ends with notification that copies would be sent to the FBI, Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, local and state elected officials, and veterans' organizations.

The leaflet or Bulletin was also printed into Japanese. An accompanying English translation of the Japanese text indicates that the leaflet was "widely distributed throughout the Japanese Community in December, 1941 following outbreak of Japanese-American War". (Ibid.) The Japanese version of the leaflet, unlike the English version, listed by name all 50 of the Anti-Axis Committee members. Included are men such as Ken Matsumoto, George Inagaki, Joe Masaoka, Togo Tanaka, Lyle Kurisaki, Kay Sugahara, Fred Tayama, and Kiyoshi Higashi.

A chronology of log for Monday, December 8, 1941 indicates that courtesy calls were paid to Mayor Fletcher Brown, US Attorney William Fleet Palmer, and US Postmaster Mary Briggs. The ensuing notation reads "Anti-Axis Committee authorized to control daily vernaculars by authority of US Attorney and US Post Office." (Ibid, Box 310.)

The notation for Thursday, December 11, 1941 reads that "Lt. Commander K.D. Ringle (at closed meeting) before representatives of the Agricultural Dept., Treasury Dept., and Officials of the wholesale market, endorsed JACL leadership and express full confidence in them." According to the Minutes, this resulted in restoration of normal operations at the Market. The next significant action took place on Monday, December 15, 1941, when the "[p]ublic relations committee represented by Fred Tayama, Kay Sugahara, Masao Satow and Ken Matsumoto met FBI Chief Hood and offered our services. Special vigilance committee will be formed by Lyle Kurisaki to cooperate with FBI throughout Southland." (Ibid, Box 310.)

On Tuesday, December 16, 1941 at 8:00 pm, the log indicates a meeting of the LA County Council of the American Legion. Fred Tayama spoke on behalf of the Anti-Axis Committee. Points three and four of the summary of Tayama's remarks before some 2000 Legionaries gives an insight into the frame of mind of the Committee members.

3. Keynote of the duration of this war must be constant vigilance against any subversive or subterfuge activity among issei and nisei to defeat our greatest opportunity to prove our stand.

4. The Japanese American Citizens League has complete control of our community and has earned the right to lead the community affairs. Recognition of our loyalty by governmental officials in this area is unprecedented [sic] in present emergency. (Ibid)

The next Anti- Axis document is a directory of the membership with the areas of responsibility highlighted. There was an Executive Board, led by Chairman Fred Tayama, Executive Secretary Kay Sugahara, and Coordinator Masao Satow. There were a number of committees such as the "control of the vernacular press Committee", headed by Dr. T.G. Ishimaru. This Committee's duties were "to keep close check in the vernacular newspapers to see that all the content of the newspapers are entirely in accord with the spirit of national defense." This committee derived its powers from US Attorney William Fleet Palmer and Postmaster Mary Briggs. The Intelligence Committee, which did not identify a chairman, was "to investigate all cases where loyalty to America is questioned. This committee is working in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation." There was also a Family Welfare Committee. We shall read later in Togo Tanaka's words that intelligence work pre-empted much of the welfare activity.

The Anti-Axis Committee Archives also include actual Minutes of meetings. From the Minutes of the December 12, 1941 meeting we read that under the heading of Kibei:

Lyle Kurisaki, Robbin Kaneko, Masao Igasaki and Ken Matsumoto meet with the Kibei representatives Ted Okamoto and Akira Itami. The members reported that the Kibei were very confused and skeptical and were quite undecided about the present situation. Chairman Fred Tayama will call a general meeting of all Kibei for the purpose of explaining that in this critical time we are to stand together and if not the names will have to be turned over to the Federal Authorities. (Ibid, Box 310.)

The report of the Intelligence Committee indicated that Lyle Kurisaki was the Chairman and that the committee would "look into matters that have any casts of suspicion." (Ibid.)

That the Anti-Axis Committee was involved in working with Intelligence Agencies is clear from its own minutes. That this intelligence activity characterized and "worked to minimize, if not eliminate the welfare activities of the Committee" was the assessment of Togo Tanaka. And finally, that the Anti-Axis Committee, and hence, intelligence

activity was the only active expression of the JACL in Los Angeles is admitted in the December 13, 1941 Minutes. "The Anti-Axis Committee being in this emergency the only active unit of the Japanese American citizens League, we are temporarily absorbing the entire expense of the Los Angeles and Southern District Council Office." (Ibid.)

#### ACTIONS AND IMPACT OF ANTI-AXIS COMMITTEE

What the eventual impact of the formation and actions of the Anti-Axis Committee were might best be understood through the eyes of JACL's unofficial historian, Togo Tanaka.

The other influence which produced a clash of opinion within the JACL leadership and worked to minimize, if not eliminate, the "welfare" activities of the organization found expression in the formation of new committees which would report to federal and other authorities "acts and utterances of disloyalty" on the part of members of the Japanese community. This influence tended to vociferously denounce this [sic?] Issei as a group unworthy of American trust. The example of Southern California JACL behavior appears to have been an extreme case but is illustrative. (Tanaka, "History of JACL" File T 6.25, Ch.IV p.32, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

According to Tanaka, during the aftermath of Pearl Harbor and with the appearances of committees like that of the JACL's Anti-Axis, the impact of one man in particular would be felt strongly in the Los Angeles area. The outbreak of war would mark the return and ascension of one Tokutaro Nishimura Slocum, more commonly known as Tokio Slocum. (Ibid.) In fact, Tanaka would imply that he personally had felt Slocum's impact in a way which temporarily placed him behind bars.

On December 8, he [Slocum] had reclaimed a throne position in the disorganized structures of Japanese community activity by sitting in the council sessions of the newly organized Anti-Axis Committee and purging it of his "enemies." The Committee originally had come into existence the evening of December 7 under the auspices of the Rafu Shimpo. Both the publisher and English Editor [Tanaka] of that publication, unfriendly to Slocum before the war, on December 8 were in protective custody, arrested by the FBI. (Ibid p.34.)

While Tanaka would be released by the authorities, he continued to suspect Slocum was his accuser. One must wonder about the legitimacy of others who were likewise unfriendly to Slocum and found themselves among the jailed after Pearl Harbor. This experience undoubtedly colored Tanaka's perspective on the issue of Japanese American "intelligence work."

Slocum was the logical choice of the group to direct the activities which he described as "intelligence " work in the Japanese community. Members of the Anti-Axis Committee were charged with the task assigned by Slocum of turning in written reports about "disloyal and subversive" acts. The JACL had become an instrument of spying within the Japanese community. Meetings were held at which Army and Navy Intelligence officers invited the support of the group; questions most frequently raised by the JACL leaders attending was, "How can we know what is suspicious?" And the answer usually given was "When a man has been living and spending beyond his means, something may be fishy." American Legion and V.F.W. officials spoke to the Anti-Axis Committee, on occasion denouncing the Issei and especially the Central Japanese Association, and close contacts were maintained with the FBI. (Ibid, p.35.)

All of this is not to say that there was anything to "spy" on. Slocum himself would complain that no names were being turned in by the group. (Ibid.) As a matter of fact, the Committee's lack of success can be corroborated by another, equally unpopular member of the group, Ken Matsumoto. In his report of activities for the National Board in March of 1942, Matsumoto summarized the month of December 1941 as follows:

Participated the formation of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council JACL. Almost from the outset, the position of the Vice-President as a member of the Committee, was a most precarious and unpopular one... The almost immediate downfall of the Anti-Axis Committee may be pointed to the inability of the local leadership gathered for the purpose to appreciate the significance of far reaching objectives particularly in these times. (Minutes, JACL Special Bd Meeting, SF, Mar 8-10, 1942, First Session, p.5.)

Regardless of its effectiveness, the consequences of the Slocum-led Anti-Axis Committee actions, the participation in its activities by high level JACL Southern District

Council and local chapter personnel and the fact that the Anti-Axis Committee used the office formerly used by the LA JACL chapter, "earned for the known Nisei leadership of the community the reputation of being "inu" [stool pigeon] in the months preceding mass evacuation orders." (Tanaka, "History of the JACL", File T 6.25, Ch. IV, p.35, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Tanaka wrote in his Documentary Reports at Manzanar that "[t]he only newspaper publicity which the JACL received at this time--in the metropolitan press--dealt with the spy detection activities of the Anti-Axis Committee. This had the effect of confirming in the minds of the Japanese--both Issei & Nisei--that the JACL was witch-hunting among its own people." (Tanaka, "Manzanar Riot," January 29, 1943, p.9, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Tanaka also kept a journal of events from December 2, 1941 to April 3, 1942. The entry for 1/9/42 reads as follows:

Conversation in the Nakamura barber shop on East First Street between San Pedro and Los Angeles Streets this noon seemed typical of growing Issei resentment against the Anti-Axis Committee and the JACL which it represents. There is already considerable suspicion that the Anti-Axis Committee is an "inu" (dog) organization; there is, it seems to me, tremendous growing resentment against unfair "finger pointing" resulting in the arrest and detention of men whose families (sic) insist are completely innocent and will be exonerated. (Tanaka, "Journal" File A 17.07, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

It did not help matters that Tokie Slocum would repeatedly proclaim in public gatherings and meetings and to any who would listen:

...on December 7 night, I went over the top again, leading my buddies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Naval Intelligence to arrest the Central Japanese Association leaders. . . I was personally responsible for the arrest of the Central Japanese Association members who are today in the safekeeping of the FBI. (Tanaka, "Journal" 12/2/41-4/3/42; 1/11/42, p.3, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Slocum would make these statements before the family members of those arrested in the CJA and would continue to, well into his camp experience at Manzanar. The "inu" label would follow Slocum and those JACL leaders around him into the relocation centers. According to Tanaka, actions such

as Slocum's and other vociferous members of the Anti-Axis Committee

discredited the JACL as a force for community leadership among both Issei and Nisei. By a twist of irony, many JACL leaders were Nisei whose parents had been rounded up in the FBI raids and the aggressive, vocal utterances of Slocum and others emphasizing the "vital importance of anti-espionage work" fell for the most part on deaf, if not resentful ears, even within JACL ranks." (Tanaka, "History of JACL" File T 6.25, Ch.IV, p.36, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

In his sharply critical article entitled "The Nisei Assume Power: The JACL, 1941-1942," author Paul Spickard informs us that one of the early actions of the Anti-Axis Committee was to send "Fred Tayama to a meeting of Kibei who had begun to form an organization less enthusiastically patriotic than the JACL. Tayama demanded that the Kibei cooperate with the JACL or he would turn their names over to the FBI. The Kibei had little choice but to acquiesce." (Spickard, "Nisei Assume Power" Pacific Historical Review 52:2, May 1983, p. 159.) We will see that Tayama eventually would participate in turning over the entire Kibei membership list in any event.

Peter Irons also chronicles the formation and activities of the Anti-Axis Committee in Justice at War. In fact, Irons characterizes its activities as "formal collaboration with the FBI soon after Pearl Harbor."

Two weeks later, a Committee delegation met with Richard Hood, who directed the FBI's Los Angeles Office. Hood chided his visitors for their earlier reluctance to "furnish any specific derogatory information concerning any organization or individual." . . . Members of the Anti-Axis Committee admitted the truth of this reproof but assured Hood that "they were now willing to inform on all individuals who appeared to be a danger to this country."

Over the next month the Committee met frequently with Hood and his staff and furnished the FBI with detailed information. In a report to J. Edgar Hoover on January 20, 1942, Hood listed a dozen "ardent supporters of the Japanese cause" fingered by the Anti-Axis Committee. This list included Kaoru Akashi, director of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Los Angeles. "A presidential warrant has been requested for the apprehension of this

individual," Hood noted to Hoover. Committee members also turned over to Hood the membership list of the Kibei Division of the Los Angeles JACL and the names of "pro-Japanese" Kibei leaders. JACL leaders joined the Anti-Axis Committee in providing information to the FBI , and "expressed no objection" to Hood's intention to share this material with other intelligence agencies. (Irons, Justice at War, pp. 79-80.)

Irons, as have many other authors, attributed Fred Tayama's beating at Manzanar as the "heavy price for his role as a government informer." (Ibid, p. 80.)

Review of the Hood to Hoover memo confirms that 1) there was a December 19, 1941 meeting between the LA field office of the FBI and the Anti-Axis Committee; 2) the prior reluctance to inform on the part of individuals underwent a change of heart as a result of Pearl Harbor; 3) frequent conferences were held between the FBI and Anti-Axis Committee; 4) members of the Committee had provided information which led to the arrests of several individuals; 5) members of JACL felt that the Kibei were the most dangerous group; 6) accordingly, the membership lists of the Kibei Division for LA and San Pedro were turned over; 7) more names were turned over; 8) the various intelligence agencies could share Anti-Axis' information. (NA, RG 220, Records of CWIRC, Box 8, Numerical File 7933-9213, File 8705a-8999.)

Contrast these assessments of the Anti-Axis Committee with that of National Vice-President Ken Matsumoto's recap before the National Board of the JACL. "...[O]ur entire efforts were devoted to intelligence work and some public relations." (Minutes, JACL Special Board Meeting, SF, Mar 8-10, 1942, First Session, p. 5.)

#### **EMERGENCY DEFENSE COUNCIL --SEATTLE**

James Sakamoto, one of the founders of the JACL and National President of the organization from 1936-1938, was one of its leaders in the Pacific Northwest. It was Sakamoto who, soon after Pearl Harbor, formed the Emergency Defense Council of what was then called the Seattle Progressive Citizens' League. This was the Seattle chapter of the JACL with its earlier moniker. (Ichioka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese Courier", Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, pp.54,74.)

Within this Council, a special committee was formed "to cooperate with the F.B.I." to report "subversive activities in the Community." Sakamoto notified the FBI that the Emergency Defense Council was prepared to "co-operate

in any way with your office" and "to do our share in the prosecution of the war to a victorious end." (Ibid p.74.)

This is confirmed by another account of what occurred in Seattle after Pearl Harbor.

An Emergency Defense Council was created within the JACL, its purpose being to cooperate closely with the Seattle Civilian Defense Control Offices. . . An important branch of the Emergency Council was its "intelligence corp" that was to cooperate directly under the supervision of the FBI, and it was an openly stated fact that Clarence Arai was the chief of this bureau. (Miyamoto, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation," File 6.24, p.10, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

A week after Sakamoto established the Council at a regular meeting of the Seattle Progressive Citizens' League, Sakamoto, as chairman of the Emergency Defense Council, addressed the members present. He "spoke on the progress of the Defense Council and urged each member to volunteer his support in any way possible to prove his loyalty to America." (JACL Archives, Minutes SPCL 12/19/41 p.1.) He then introduced the various chairmen of working committees within the Council.

Mrs. Clarence Arai--Red Cross  
George Ishihara--Civilian Defense  
Clarence Arai--Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Takeo Nogaki--Federal Reserve Bank  
Ichiro Motosaka--US Defense Bonds and Stamps  
Toshio Hoshida--Fiscal Agent  
Secretary of the Council and Publicity--Bill  
Hosokawa

Did the Emergency Defense Council conduct its activities similarly to those of the Anti-Axis Committee? Sakamoto's subsequent testimony before the Tolson Committee in February of 1942 gives some indications that they did.

I know definitely that our organization, both locally and nationally, has, let us say, "turned in" people whom we thought should be checked into . . . We have been working chiefly among the Japanese, and we have repeatedly stated at our meetings that it is our loyal duty to ferret out those among us who are disloyal, because our interest must be for America first, and secondly for ourselves. (Ichioaka, "Sakamoto and the Japanese American Courier" Amerasia Journal 13:2, 1986-87, p.74.)

The Emergency Defense Council did turn over individuals according to WRA records also. Ruth McKee's "History of the WRA" states that:

On December 12, under the leadership of the JACL in Seattle (the place of the League's origin, in 1930) the Emergency Defense Council was organized. This group formed a civilian protection corps, a Red Cross Corps, a National Defense Stamp Campaign Corps, and an intelligence unit. This Council was active from the day of its organization, and the intelligence unit worked closely with the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the round-up of subversives. In other coastal cities, the JACL collaborated with the FBI, ONI, and MIS. (NA, RG 210 Entry 3 Box 3, File "McKee, Ruth-History of WRA, pp 1-130, Pearl Harbor to June 30, 1944, p. 30.)

One further item of note on the Emergency Defense Council is found in a statement signed by James Sakamoto and forwarded to the Secretary of State by William Hosokawa on January 23, 1942. The cover letter by Hosokawa is on Emergency Defense Council letterhead and lists Hosokawa as Secretary. Since Sakamoto had gone blind some years back, we must assume that the lion's share of the paperwork by the Council was performed by Hosokawa under Sakamoto's direction. However, returning to Sakamoto's statement, he proclaims:

We are actively cooperating now with the authorities to uncover all subversive activity in our midst, and if need be we are ready to stand as protective custodians over our parent generation to guard against danger to the United States arising from their midst. (NA, RG 220, Records of the CWIRC, Numerical File \_\_\_\_\_, File 5386a-87, Courtesy Aiko Herzig and Michi Weglyn.)

Thus, in addition to their informing duties, the Defense Council offered to be trustees and custodians of the Issei. This manifests a considerable commitment to the U.S. at the possible expense of the parent generation.

#### **IMPERIAL COUNTY CITIZENS WELFARE COMMITTEE**

The Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee, sponsored by the Brawley Chapter of the JACL was an organization along the same lines as the Anti-Axis Committee and the Emergency Defense Council. Their stated purposes, objectives, and programs are similar to that of the Anti-Axis Committee. "We shall investigate and turn over to

authorities all who by word or act consort with the enemies." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16 Box 137, Subject Files 21.012, File #1 "April to June 1942".) It is interesting to note that the Executive Secretary of the Committee was Kay Nishimura, who later will be a key figure in the Poston incident. Additionally, Lyle Kurisaki was a member of the advisory board of the Committee. He, too, was caught up in events at Poston.

Whether Nishimura ever "turned over " anyone to the authorities is mentioned in passing in an Army Intelligence G-2 report. "The same source mentioned above also cited the incident when Kay Ishimura [sic], said to be a former FBI informant from El Centro was beaten up. (NA, RG 338 Entry 1 Box 12, File 323.3 Colorado River, Parker.)

Lyle Kurisaki was likewise beaten up at the Poston Camp. An Office of Naval Intelligence Report quotes from a letter of a confidential informant inside that camp. The source reveals that "Kay was attacked but was not hurt...Several days later, Lyle Kurisaki was attacked in his apartment." The Naval Intelligence Officer then writes:

The person referred to as "Kay" in line three of the above-quoted letter, is known to be Kay Nishimura, who supplied valuable information to the United States Naval Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives at El Centro, California, and who cooperated with those representatives in the translation of Japanese documents and papers. Lyle Kurisaki referred to in line six of the above-quoted letter, is known to be Lyle Kurisaki who furnished valuable information to the representatives of the United States Naval Intelligence and Federal Bureau of Investigation at El Centro, California. (NA, RG 220 Records of CWIRC, Box \_\_\_\_, Numerical File \_\_\_\_ File Number 26892-26899, U.S. Naval Intelligence Service, 11th ND, Investigative Report, December 7, 1942, Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

The valuable information which Nishimura and Kurisaki provided the ONI and FBI was undoubtedly through the Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee. The Committee had offices in Brawley and El Centro according to their letterhead. These intelligence reports confirm that the Committee carried out Point three of its stated program to "turn over to authorities all who by word or act consort with the enemies." (NA, RG 210 Entry 16, Box 137, Subject Files 21.012, File #1, "April to June 1942.")

## IC. Response to Various Military Orders, Curfew

The response of one JACL chapter to the various military orders was reported after the fact by an assistant Community Analyst while interned at Poston. Paul Higashi wrote about the Monterey Peninsula Japanese in the Community Analysis Section Report for Poston.

During the evacuation, this JACL chapter acquired a disputable reputation amongst the people. It is reported that the JACL leaders were the first to leave Monterey for inland districts, thus exposing the residents to turmoil. They were left without an influential body to iron out the difficulties that arose during those trying periods. (Rept. No.60, March 16, 1945, p.3, Poston Rept. Officer, File J 1.85, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Higashi's reference to the report that JACL leaders left for inland district would place this sometime during the voluntary evacuation period but prior to the freeze order, which then eliminated travel out of the restricted zones.

In another part of California, we see that shortly after the March 11, 1942 establishment of the WCCA and the voluntary relocation period, the Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee wrote to Attorney General Francis Biddle. In a letter dated March 17, 1942, Shigeo Imamura, Executive Chairman requested group evacuation on behalf of close to 1600 Japanese residents, under the auspices of some organization like the JACL.

As a result of a recent survey taken by our offices, we find that out of the approximate 1600 Japanese residents both citizen and alien, the majority would like to evacuate in a group under some recognized organization such as the Japanese American Citizens League. (NA, RG 210 Entry 16 Box 137, Subject Files 21.012 File #1 "April to June 1942.")

## SUICIDE BATTALION AND HOSTAGES

For lack of a better place to discuss this topic, it will be addressed here. Both Michi Weglyn and Richard Drinnon refer to the suggestion by Nisei leaders to form a "suicide battalion" with family members serving as "hostages" to stave off the impending evacuation of Japanese Americans. (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976, p. 38; Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, Univ. of Calif:Berkeley, 1987, p.77.) The actual source of this suggestion was Mike Masaoka himself. In his "Final Report", written on April 22, 1944, Masaoka writes:

Two ideas which we seriously considered at that time illustrate to what extremes we Japanese Americans were willing to go to safeguard our homes and associations. One was to form a volunteer "suicide battalion" which would go anywhere to spearhead the most dangerous missions. To assure the skeptics that the members of the "suicide battalion" would remain loyal, if such guarantees were necessary to quell the objections of the professional agitators of the west, the families and friends of the volunteers would place themselves in the hands of the government as "hostages." When this idea was informally discussed with a high military official, we were informed that it was not the practice of the government to require "hostages" or to sponsor such "suicide battalions." (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, Insert 3, after p.53, File T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Was this the genesis of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team? Michi Weglyn thought so. "Though Masaoka's brash proposal was summarily rejected at the time, it would be later reconsidered and implemented by the military, notwithstanding their initial insistence that America did not believe in the concept of hostages or of a segregated battalion--except, of course, for blacks." (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976, p. 38)

ID. The Decision to Cooperate with Evacuation

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF EVACUATION

The issue of JACL's prior knowledge of evacuation and possible role in requesting such governmental action is not a new issue. Like the other issues in this report, it has long been rumored that the JACL asked for evacuation, that the organization knew about it in advance and either did nothing to prevent it or worked only for their own self-interest. Most recently, these rumors have seen new light through the writings of James M. Omura, wartime English editor of the Rocky Shimpo and longtime thorn in the side of JACL. In his multi-part essay on the autobiography, They Call Me Moses Masaoka and the JACL which appeared in the Vox Populi Column of the Rafu Shimpo in April of 1989, Omura raises the issue of prior knowledge by the JACL of evacuation. For his support, Omura refers to a taped interview of Lee Murata. The relevant portions read roughly as follows:

That was when brother Mike came out, needed financial backing to combat the public. . . . The time I'm referring to when Mike come out 1940, before the declaration of war, before Pearl Harbor, 1939, could've been spring '39, we were warned from Mike, that we should be thinking about possibilities, what could take place in the event of war... conditions tense...prepare ourselves--with this mind of thinking, people in the area, the young people, we made a trip through the state, through the eastern part of the state warning people, take care of belongings get papers, whatever necessary, legal documents in order to be looking for the worse--possibility of evacuation possibility of being put into concentration camps--limited to traveling, funds frozen, all those things brought out to our group at one time, Mike came out and warned us. Denver? I don't know. Don't know when he spoke to Denver group-- to our group in Lupton, he come out and and forewarned us of the possibilities of outcome in event of war and s well as I could try to explain it myself, I made the trip through Ft. Morgan Hills, Atwood, Cedrick Hills, of the results of the outcome of war, in the event of war...(inaudible)...This was before the war, before Pearl Harbor-1939, early 40, maybe cause I make the trip late 40, early 41 'cause I made the trip-- they were through harvesting, maybe getting ready for spring, don't remember anymore. These are the possibilities and these are the something that JACL are concerned about.

With that thinking, made the trip to inform about the possibilities. (Oral History Tape, Lee Murata, Buddhist Church Lounge, Denver, CO Box 394, Tape 249, Counter Number 536-600, JARP Collection, UCLA.)

During the course of this interview, the interviewer, Joe Grant Masaoka tries to clarify with Murata whether in fact it was Joe Grant and not Mike Masaoka and whether it was after Pearl Harbor that the described events took place. While Murata's response seems confused when it comes to placing the precise date and year, Murata was certain that it was Mike Masaoka, that he spoke before Pearl Harbor, that a concern over evacuation and camps was voiced and that as a result, Murata himself went on a speaking tour to carry warnings eastward. The tape of Murata, of course, can be explained away as the reminiscences of a confused mind. However, while a listener could conclude that there was confusion on the dates, there was no confusion in the interview about Masaoka's message and presence.

This tape by itself would not amount to much in the way of support for Omura's contentions. However, taken along with an even more puzzling document referred to by Omura in Part Three of his "Debunking JACL Fallacies", one must pause to consider. On February 9, 1942, ten days prior to Roosevelt's issuance of Executive Order 9066, Attorney General Francis Biddle wrote a memorandum to his assistant James Rowe. The heading read MEMORANDUM FOR ROWE. It states:

Please note the attached memorandum from Mr. Hoover to the effect that the Japanese-American Citizens' League want us to evacuate its members and alien parents. I think we should begin exploring with Mr. McNutt the possibility of having some refugee camps for the Japs, which we will need.

(initialed) FB  
Francis Biddle  
Attorney General  
(Dept. of Justice Memos,  
File A 7.01, JERS,  
Bancroft Library.)

The file did not contain a copy of the accompanying memo from Hoover. Without the Hoover memo, it would be unwise to jump to any conclusions solely on this memorandum. It is possible that the memo refers to a number of voluntary relocation proposals which were being offered for consideration such as the Maryknoll Church proposal of relocating some Japanese Americans to an area outside of St. Louis. James Sakamoto had proposed a Model City Relocation plan at the Tolan Committee Hearings. However, the language is plain

about JACL requesting evacuation. Likewise the date places any such request well before Executive Order 9066, and well before the Tolan Committee Hearings in the West Coast.

a further argument against this memo referring to the Maryknoll or Model City/Sakamoto proposal is the reference to the need for "refugee camps." The Maryknoll proposal had a location in mind, outside of the city of St. Louis. Likewise, refugee camps seem inconsistent with the Model City proposed by Sakamoto in his Tolan Hearing testimony.

**DECEMBER 7, 1941**

In order to examine the decision of the JACL to cooperate with evacuation, it would be helpful to examine the foundation laid for the general concept of cooperation by the organization. With such an understanding, the decision on cooperating with evacuation may be seen in its proper perspective.

On December 7, 1941, following news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the National Office of the JACL and National President Saburo Kido, dispatched telegrams to President Roosevelt and other government officials. Both contain statements offering the organization's cooperation.

We pledge our services unreservedly to the officials and authorities of our country... The National Headquarters of the League has been collaborating with the officials in the National defense program and is now re-urging members... to cooperate in every way with the civic and federal authorities. (JACL Archives, Press Release, 12/7/41.)

...in this solemn hour we pledge our fullest cooperation to you, Mr. President, and to our country...we are ready and prepared to expend every effort to repel this invasion together with our fellow Americans. (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow:New York 1982, pp.130-1.)

In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, public opinion, or at least public-official opinion, had not yet been roused and directed against Japanese Americans. However, in the beginning months of 1942, as public opinion turned into public hysteria and fear, the call for evacuation of the citizen children along with the alien parents arose.

**MEETING WITH GOVERNOR OLSON**

On February 6, 1942, California Governor Culbert Olson had a meeting with members of the Japanese community whom he had summoned to the State Capitol himself. Among those present were Saburo Kido, National President of JACL; Mike Masaoka, National Secretary; Ken Matsumoto, National Vice-President; Walter Tsukamoto, past-President of the National JACL; Togo Tanaka, English Editor of the *Rafu Shimpo* and Publicity Chair of the National JACL. Among the others were members of other Japanese organizations and individuals from around the state.

At this meeting, the Governor made a statement to the effect that the Japanese, both national and citizens, should be prepared to move out of the area at any time. After he concluded his statements, he then wanted to hear "attitudes and willingness to cooperate." One by one, those present gave their comments. Ken Matsumoto spoke to the effect that Japanese American citizen should be treated like any other citizens, with the Governor expressing dissatisfaction to such "reluctance." Similarly, Saburo Kido also felt that Japanese Americans should not be singled out and that their citizenship rights should be respected. The Governor was able to extract a vague commitment to cooperate from Walter Tsukamoto, although he too emphasized recognition for Japanese American citizenship rights. Mike Masaoka urged recognition for the distinction between American Citizens and enemy aliens as well as the need to have the "active cooperation" and "voluntary support" from those being moved. The remaining individuals basically reiterated the comments of the four previous speakers. After the meeting, there was the increasing fear that evacuation would come to pass. (Tanaka, "Journal" 12/2/41-4/3/42, File A 17.07; 2/6/42 pp.3-4, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

#### TOLAN COMMITTEE

In hearings held before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, 77th Congress, during the latter part of February through the beginning of March 1942, JACL representatives in San Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles, appeared and testified on the issue of evacuation.

Mike Masaoka, as National Secretary and Field Executive of the JACL, submitted a prepared statement into the record of the Tolan Committee Hearings. The portion on Evacuation follows:

...With any policy of evacuation definitely arising from reasons of military necessity and national safety, we are in complete agreement. As American citizens, we cannot and should not

take any other stand. But, also, as American citizens believing in the integrity of our citizenship; we feel that any evacuation enforced on grounds violating that integrity should be opposed.

If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese residents from the West Coast is a primary step toward assuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in that judgment. But, if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel that we have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens. (Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, San Francisco, February 21 and 23, 1942; 11137.)

Thus in his statement, Masaoka agreed to cooperation on evacuation if it was deemed a military necessity. On the other hand, he did object to evacuation on the grounds that a discriminatory motive would be contrary to the rights of American citizens. Masaoka continued with recommendations on policy and procedure in the event of evacuation.

Shortly after the San Francisco Hearings were completed, hearings were held in Seattle and Portland, on February 26, 28, and March 2, 1942. James Sakamoto, founder and past-National President of the JACL testified. He expressed opposition "to the idea of indiscriminate, en masse evacuation of all citizens and loyal aliens of Japanese extraction" and emphasized the desire of Japanese Americans to contribute to the war effort. However, "[i]f, finally, the decision is that Japanese must go, the committee is assured of the Japanese Citizens League's complete cooperation in the evacuation movement. Loyalty demands that orders, no matter what, be obeyed, willingly and efficiently." (Tolan Committee Hearings: Part 30, Portland and Seattle, February 26, 28, March 2, 1942, 11451.) Most notable in Sakamoto's comments on the issue of evacuation, was his proposal for a "model city" within the interior of the nation. (Ibid p. \_\_)

**SPECIAL NATIONAL BOARD AND COUNCIL MEETING, JACL, MARCH 8-10, 1942**

The Minutes of this emergency meeting of the National Board and Council in San Francisco reflect the final decisions made on cooperation with evacuation. The Board Minutes

indicate that Mike Masaoka read a statement of the National Board on the policy of the JACL regarding evacuation which did not depart much from his statement to the Tolson Committee.

1. We are opposed to the principle of evacuation, unless it is ordered by the military as a national defense measure and is applied to all persons, citizens and aliens alike, indiscriminately and without reference to race, color or creed.

2. If the military authorities believe that national safety requires the removal of "enemy aliens" from any regions or areas, we believe that all "enemy aliens" from all countries with which the United States is now at war should be removed, and that no one group or nationality should be singled out for special attention.

3. If it becomes necessary to remove citizens from these areas or regions, as designated by the military, we believe that all citizens should be treated alike and that no single block of citizens be singled out for special consideration or attention.

4. Even though our beliefs may not be recognized by the military and they should single out the American citizens of Japanese extraction, as they have done, for special attention, we believe that, as good American citizens, we ought to accept the word of those charged with the responsibility of national safety and that we should cooperate with them to the best of our abilities, trusting that our cooperation will inspire a reciprocal cooperation on the part of our government in the humane and reasonable treatment of our mutual problem. (Minutes, Special Board Meeting, JACL, March 8-10, 1942, p.4.)

That last phrase in Point Four would be a theme throughout the comments expressed by JACL leaders in their meetings with government officials during this special meeting of the National Board and Council. Saburo Kido made a comment to that effect to Tom Clark. "It has been our premise that the more we cooperate with you gentlemen, the more in turn you will cooperate with us." (Ibid, p. 5 of Conference.) James Sakamoto also made comments to the same effect that:

the government is going to cooperate with us to the fullest extent possible, so now it is up to us to cooperate with the government agents. To you people gathered here now...you have a job to do,

go back to your respective communities to get people working with the government in the evacuation order." (Ibid, Sixth Session, p.1)

The Special National Council Meeting approved of five resolutions, one of the most important being, "a resolution on the evacuation of Nisei as a measure based on military necessity and not a reflection on their loyalty." The second key resolution was to the President, and offered him "our sacred pledge that we will cooperate wholeheartedly in the evacuation program, and in any and all matters integral to the defense of our country." (Ibid, Resolutions, pp. 22-3.)

#### EXPRESSIONS OF INAPPROPRIATE SENTIMENT

After the statement of policy and resolutions for cooperation came expressions of what many have since considered to be inappropriate sentiment, given the conditions facing Japanese Americans in the U.S. On March 8, 1942, Saburo Kido gave a special message to the assembled delegates of the Emergency National Council Meeting at JACL National Headquarters in San Francisco. In his closing remarks Kido told the delegates "let us keep our chins up", "we are gladly cooperating", "we have been grateful to our Federal government", "we are glad that we can become wards of our government", "when we leave our homes, let us leave with a smiling face and courageous mien." (Ibid, Sixth Session p.1.)

Likewise, in Jimmie Sakamoto's comments at the same meeting, he urged his fellow JACLers, "so now it is up to us to cooperate with the government loyally and cheerfully." (Hosokawa, JACL:In Quest of Justice, Morrow:New York,1982, p. 158.)

#### BETTER IN ADMINISTERING THAN OPPOSING EVACUATION?

An examination of the situation in Seattle during evacuation led Frank Miyamoto to conclude that "it seemed to me, the JACL was far more efficient in administering the process of evacuation than in organizing against it." (Miyamoto, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation", File T 6.24, p. 26, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Miyamoto documented the work of the JACL in operating as an intermediary between the Japanese and the U.S. Employment Service, in acting as a clearinghouse for evacuation sales, and most importantly, in communicating information about evacuation from government agencies to the community. (Ibid, pp. 24-5.)

The weakness of the JACL in organizing against evacuation, however, may have had its basis in the

general political stand which it took from December 7 on...If the JACL was weak in organizing against evacuation it seems that this weakness arose from the stand the organization took... The Nisei were not in a position to condemn powerful governments in their action against weaker minorities. Out of this paradox it seems, grew the attitude of cooperation with the Army that prevailed among the JACL leader in Seattle throughout this period. (Ibid.pp.26-27.)

Consistent with Miyamoto's "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation" is an assessment of the JACL by the District Intelligence Officer from the 13th Naval District in a confidential report entitled "Japanese Evacuation and Relocation, in the Thirteenth Naval District (to March 10, 1943)." The Thirteenth Naval District encompasses the greater Seattle area and Pacific Northwest.

Under the heading of Japanese American Citizens League, the report indicates the following:

When it became certain that evacuation of the Japanese was inevitable, the local chapters of the Japanese American Citizens League seemingly cooperated wholeheartedly with the designated evacuation authorities, offering the services of their members as translators and interpreters and in Seattle, Washington, loaning their office at 517 Main Street together with clerical and stenographic staff, to the Provost Marshall and his staff and personnel of the Wartime Civil Control Authority. With the knowledge and approval of the United States military authorities in charge of the evacuation, the Seattle Japanese American Citizens League prepared, along military lines, an organization known as the "Evacuee Administration Headquarters", that was to be in charge of the internal administration of the Puyallup Assembly, under the Caucasian staff of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17 Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence",pp.5-6.)

Since the rest of the report goes into the relationship between prominent JACL figures and the WCCA personnel at Puyallup, this avenue of examination will re-emerge in Section II B-Relationship with War Relocation Authority and Other Governmental Agencies.

However, it is quite clear from this excerpt what was the degree of cooperation offered by the Seattle JACL in

response to evacuation and in their efforts to facilitate rather than oppose it.

## BRANDING ISSUE

During the Special Emergency Meeting of the JACL held in San Francisco, Mike Masaoka makes a statement, which, if truly ascribable to him, is outrageous and shocking. In the Report on Conditions in Distant States, a number of delegates report on the situation in the mid-west. Near the end of the session, Masaoka gives his report.

Mr. Mike Masaoka, reported on conditions in Wyoming, Nebraska, Colorado, and Montana.

At the Tolan hearing, to fifteen telegrams sent to governors, nine answered. Eight were in the negative and one qualified. This state was Colorado. Colorado, Wyoming Nebraska and Montana will take Japanese, but the government must guarantee adequate protection. He recommends one of the three following methods:

1. Be put into Labor Concentration camps to be farmed out to large sugar beet combines as cheap laborers.
2. The Japanese internees be brought in for roadmaking.
3. The Japanese be branded and stamped and put under the supervision of the Federal government. (Minutes, Special Emergency Meeting, JACL, March 8-10, 1942, First Session pp. 15-16.)

Now then, who does the phrase "he recommends" refer to in that sentence? It could refer to Masaoka or to one of the governors of the four states mentioned. There are a number of plausible explanations to explain why it may appear that Masaoka suggested that Japanese be branded and stamped like cattle. It is possible that an error in transcribing the minutes occurred. Possibly it was one of the governors of the aforementioned states who suggested branding Japanese, which, if you think about the times, is highly plausible. However, there is one further matter to be considered. The Minutes of the March 8-10, 1942 meeting are not the original minutes. In fact, the Minutes were reprinted in 1971 in the Southern California JACL Office and contains an introduction by Mike Masaoka, dated December 31, 1970. His introduction states he had reviewed the Minutes recently. "In reading again, after some 28 years, the official Minutes of the special emergency meeting held by the National JACL Board and National Council in San Francisco in early 1942..." (Ibid, Intro p.1.) Thus, Masaoka had an opportunity to review the Minutes prior to its reprinting and had a chance to correct and typographical or transcription errors.

( Author's Note: An interview was scheduled with Masaoka in October. It was hoped that such an interview would clarify this particular point, but his poor health prevented it.)

## IE. ACTIONS INITIATED IN THE COMMUNITY

### **KIBEI SURVEY**

One of the actions instituted in the community by the JACL which drew a great deal of criticism was the Kibei survey. Following the assistance provided by the JACL in the registration of all alien Japanese required by the U.S. Government shortly after Pearl Harbor, the National Headquarters of the JACL was asked to conduct a survey of the Kibei in each local chapter. (JACL Archives, Bulletin #114.) Press release #81, dated February 13, 1942, indicates that the survey request must have gone out to each chapter sometime in the first two weeks of February. The purpose of the survey was two-fold, according to Bulletin #114. One was to provide the National Office with information on the Kibei, the second was to protect the Kibei, who were then the subjects of misinformation and innuendo.

The survey was to be conducted during the week of February 16-21, on forms provided by the National Headquarters, to be submitted in triplicate. Bulletin #114 stated that each individual chapter had discretion in the method utilized for the survey. While the Bulletin stressed the voluntary nature of the survey, chapters were warned that "those chapters who do not comply with this request will be reported to the authorities who requested the survey." No indication was given of who these authorities were. Moreover, the Kibei who might have been uncooperative were to be reported to the National office as well.

The form accompanying the Bulletin contained 23 questions of a rather basic nature. Identification information was requested, as was information on trips to Japan, religion, education and military experience in both the U.S. and Japan, hobbies and organizations. The survey ended with a question on dual citizenship and an attestation clause by the particular JACL chapter involved.

Subsequently, in Press Release #82, addressed "To all Kibei", National Secretary Mike Masaoka confronted the issue of opposition by Kibei to the survey. "Some of you have expressed the idea that this is a trap to convict you of some heinous crime for having gone to Japan at some some in the past." (JACL Archives Press Release #82.) Masaoka then proceeded to reiterate the purpose of the survey as being for the protection of Kibei to the extent that JACL could, with this information, prevent a case against the demand for Kibei internment. Then to encourage cooperation, Masaoka urged the following:

This survey is a purely voluntary one. If you have nothing to hide, it is better that you fill in the questionnaire. The mere fact that you may

have visited Japan should not be used against you. For your own protection, it is better to register with your local JACL office immediately. If you do not register, certain inferences may be made against you--and it is to prevent the excuse for such inferences that the National JACL is sponsoring this voluntary survey. . . The degree of your cooperation on such matters as these may indicate the degree of your loyalty to the United States; therefore, in order to help protect your own welfare, please cooperate with the only organization which is prepared to help you fight your legitimate battles for you as American citizens. (JACL Archives, Press Release #82 n.d.)

It is ironic that Masaoka offered as justification for the survey the need to combat unfounded rumors based purely on Kibei status, but himself indulged in the belief that cooperation and loyalty were linked.

Bulletin #117 dated February 18, 1942 from the National Secretary reiterated the issue of non-cooperation on the Kibei survey. Masaoka again stressed the need for specific facts about the Kibei. "If the Kibei desire our aid in this hour of their greatest need, it behooves them to cooperate with us 100%." Masaoka is also more firm in his conclusion that "the degree of your cooperation on this matter is the degree of your loyalty to the United States." (JACL Archives.)

Masaoka admonished the chapters by saying the following:

They (the Kibei) must be educated to realize that they must cooperate on such matters as these, for assuming for the sake of argument that the government desired information on them, the officials could easily look into the passport records and draw their own conclusions. Is it not better for them that they themselves voluntarily make these reports and thereby prevent inferences against their good faith and intentions. (JACL Archives, Bulletin #117, Feb 18, 1942, p.2.)

Were this the case, what then was the purpose of the Kibei survey besides providing the National JACL with information and providing a symbolic show of loyalty? If government officials could obtain information through passport records why then did they ask the JACL to obtain such information in a much less direct manner? And perhaps much less reliable as well?

The next press release issued, #87, indicated an extension of the deadline was requested by many of the Kibei themselves to allow until February 28 to complete the forms. No archival records from the JACL reveal any numerical or percentage data on responses, nor if any compilation of the information was done.

#### LT. BROWN, OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Some time following the Kibei survey, a memo was issued from the National Secretary to all Northern California District Council Presidents and Executive Secretaries regarding a request by Lt. D.M. Brown of Naval Intelligence in San Francisco. Masaoka informed the recipients of the memo that they were being appointed by National Headquarters as co-chairmen, "of a committee of information to fill out the enclosed confidential personal reports." (JACL Archives, Memo RE: Lt. Brown's Request, n.d.) Masaoka suggested that their committees be composed of the older American citizens of Japanese ancestry. "The idea is to have each of these committees go through the Japanese directories name by name and to furnish their pooled information regarding each individual listed therein residing in that region." (Ibid.)

The attached report form consisted of 25 questions, beginning with basic personal data, organizations active in or affiliated with, travel, military service, and hobbies. The next few questions ask about friends and acquaintances, relatives and approximate economic status. Question 19 asks if the person is "living better that he should considering his occupation and other signs." The next group of questions ask about religion, education and family size. Question 23 asks for the person's political sympathies and asks to elaborate on "attitudes of loyalty" and says "rumors, too should be included but they should be noted as rumors. Reasons for this section is to attempt to establish their true feelings." The questionnaire closes with an assessment of general public opinion of the person and a personal evaluation of same. The persons reporting were to disclose their names and addresses at the end, but were informed that the information was strictly confidential and that their names would not be divulged.

After these reports were sent out, another memo, undated, was issued, again to Northern California Chapter Presidents and Secretaries, expressing the National Secretary's feelings about the response to LT. Brown's confidential, personal reports.

This office has received rather disgusting information from a number of chapters to the effect that they would not cooperate wholeheartedly with this project. May I say that it

is this type of attitude on our part which makes the position of the Japanese American so questionable in this hour of crisis. . . They need this type of information to protect our groups, and unless we can furnish this information immediately, we may not be able to stem the tide of hysteria which demands that all of us, nationals and citizens alike, be moved out of this area for the duration... The information asked for is not one which can be called "spying" or "informing." You are merely asked to do what every other patriotic American may also be asked to do: Ferret out the bad in order to protect the rest of the community. (JACL Archives.)

It is arguable that every other patriotic American was necessarily being asked to go through the phone book and assess whether individuals were living beyond their means and to provide rumors regarding person's political attitudes. The "living beyond their means" questions would be one to haunt those Japanese living in rural areas of California who were, against all odds and poor land, able to eke out a living and then be accused of receiving funds from Japan for espionage because they had survived, much to the envy and dismay of their white peers. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 1944, p.62.)

In any event, JACL cooperation with Lt. Brown's project does go considerably beyond the bounds set forth in the so-called official position of the JACL, set forth by Masaoka in his Final Report. This is not just "furnishing them (FBI, ONI, MID) with all the information which we might have had at our disposal regarding the suspects the agencies questioned us about." (Masaoka, "Final Report", 1944 p.48.) Certainly in the eyes of those in the community, and indeed, those listed in the aforementioned Japanese directories, such actions as commenting on whether a person was living beyond their means, what rumors about their political affiliations were circulating and how the general public regarded the person did more closely approximate a witchhunt.

Lastly, it would appear from the tenor of the memos that Masaoka or at least the National Organization committed itself to performing the reports for Lt. Brown prior to obtaining any commitment or agreement from individual chapters.

#### **"EXPLOITATION OF DISTRESS"**

With the removal of Issei community leaders and heads of households immediately following December 7, 1941, came

the vulnerability of Issei wives and family. Did Japanese American citizens, in particular, the JACL, exploit the distress of these aliens? Was there cheating going on? According to Togo Tanaka "there is a considerable body of evidence, not all of it reliable, to indicate that it was not rare for Nisei individuals to take advantage of the Issei business man or farmer's weakened position and attempt literally to expropriate the latter's holdings." (Tanaka, "History of JACL", File T 6.25, Ch.IV, p.40, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Tanaka speaks specifically of the situation in the Imperial Valley of California. Given the fact that the position of Issei farmers was already tenuous due to the prohibitions against property ownership and certain leaseholds in the Alien Land Law, detention by the FBI directly resulted in great monetary losses.

In one instance, an Issei farmer was taken from his family and his home in the first week after the war. He had 80 acres of carrots ready for harvest, reportedly worth \$15,000 at the prevailing market price. Under the California alien land law regulations restricting Issei operations of leaseholds, the farm was legally under the operation of a Nisei. Under the circumstances, the Issei had no redress if the Nisei chose to pocket the \$15,000. In this particular case, the temptation reportedly overcame the Nisei: the Issei internee's wife and children went penniless. (Ibid pp.40-1.)

These recollections were based upon notes of a personal interview Tanaka did with Lyle Kurisaki in December of 1944. Kurisaki was one of the founders of the JACL chapter in Brawley, located in the Imperial Valley. According to Kurisaki:

I knew personally of 20-30 Nisei who cheated the poor wives of Issei internees. And I put the pressure on a lot of them and told them that the JACL wouldn't stand for any such monkey business. I wouldn't anyway. Trouble was, some of the JACL members were crooked too. (Ibid p.41.)

It would appear then that any exploitation perpetrated in the Imperial Valley was the result of individuals who happened to have been JACL members, at least in the Imperial Valley instance.

Rumors of exploitation again arise but in an unexpected context when Reports Officer Brown at Manzanar writes about the JACL. Quoting a Nisei he writes:

The Nisei felt that after the assets of the aliens were frozen that here was their opportunity

to further themselves economically, and there was a tendency to shove the older folks out of business.

At this time Toku Slocumb, as chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee publicized the fact that the JACL would help aliens in filing the proper forms, permits, etc. It is a common rumor that when applicants arrived they were sent by the JACL office secretary to the offices of the Pacific Service Bureau, which was headed by Higashi and Slocumb. There the Japanese paid various sums for services rendered; in some cases as much as \$25.00. It has been said, various Anti-Axis Committee members were suspected of reporting people to the FBI at \$25.00 a head and some have openly bragged about such duplicity in camp. (Manzanar, Correspondence, Center Staff Reports, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library, p.1.)

Robert Brown, Manzanar's Reports Officer, again reiterated this charge of exploitation in his oral history, taken by Dr. Arthur Hansen, at California State University at Fullerton on August 23, 1974. Brown was told of the rumor of a \$50.00 fee for travel orders for Issei by a Oko Murata, secretary to the doctor in the hospital.

JACL [was] "out to run a racket on the older Japanese before the evacuation order and that they helped put the finger on older aliens to get their business". Told of a fifty dollar "fee" deal for filling out travel orders for the older men who could not write English. (O.H. 1375, p. 42 JAOHP, CSUF.)

Togo Tanaka, likewise acknowledged the charge of exploitation by the Pacific Service Bureau for travel orders.

In the months between Pearl Harbor and April 1942 when evacuation was half under way, two stories about Tayama began to make the rounds. One was that his Pacific Service Bureau was making exorbitant profits from high charges for services which could be obtained free by walking several blocks to the Federal Building. These services included the filing of alien travel permits (then being required by the Dept. of Justice), transfer of business licenses, and the like. Another version of the story was that Tayama, through his connection with the JACL and the Anti-Axis Committee, instructed secretaries of these organizations to send individuals who went to these offices to send them upstairs to the Service Bureau

Office. It was charged that the JACL was rendering these services for free, that the Service Bureau charged a fee anywhere from three dollars to twenty dollars. Tayama did not deny that some individuals were referred to the Service Bureau by the JACL, but these only when the League was unable to help them. He said no exorbitant charges were made, that all his clients were not only satisfied but many very grateful; he denied any unethical practices and said that charges that he was exploiting aliens distress were outright distortions. (Tanaka, "Manzanar Riot," January 24, 1943, File O 7.50, p.9, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Another source also relates similar charges.

The JACL set up before the outbreak of was a subsidiary organization known as the Anti-Axis Committee. Its chairman was Tokie Slocum ...This group, once war was declared, publicized the fact that the JACL would help aliens in filing the proper forms and permits. Some of those who sought aid reported that they were sent by the JACL Office Secretary to the offices of the Pacific Service Bureau which was headed by Slocum and a Japanese American named Higashi; there the aliens paid varying sums for services rendered, in some instances as much as \$25. (NA, RG 210, Entry 3, Box 3, File "McKee, Ruth-History of War Relocation Authority, Pearl Harbor to June 30, 1944", [pp.131-247] pp. 146-7.)

Granted what Tanaka and McKee provide is documentation of stories or rumors which circulated about exploitation. However, these stories share some factual specificity with each other as to particular people, agencies and sums of money involved. Also, the fact that the National Headquarters saw the need to warn of fraud and JACL imposters, lends additional credence to these rumors.

It has been brought to the attention of the National Office that there are persons purporting to represent the Citizens League who are going around collecting funds from the community. Any activity of the JACL is well publicized and the identity of such persons should be familiar. (JACL Archives, n.d. circa January 23 or 24, 1942.)

As in the instances in Imperial Valley, any exploitation appeared to have been the result of corrupt individuals

who may have coincidentally been affiliated with JACL. The problem for both the JACL and those exploited was the inability to differentiate between the individual and the organization the individual represented.

INTERMENT PERIOD (1942-45)

IIA. JACL Position on Legal Test Case

**BULLETIN #142**

The issue of what JACL's position on a legal test case was clearly and unequivocally spelled out in Bulletin #142 of the JACL, Office of the National Secretary, dated April 7, 1942. This particular bulletin, issued and signed by Mike Masaoka in his capacity as National Secretary and Field Executive is entitled RE: TEST CASES. It specifically discusses the facts of Min Yasui's case. The third paragraph of the three page bulletin states:

National Headquarters is unalterably opposed to test cases to determine the constitutionality of military regulations at this time. We have reached this decision unanimously after examining all the facts in light of our national policy of: "the greatest good for the greatest number."  
[emphasis in original document.] (JACL Archives.)

The Bulletin goes on to discuss the justifications for such a position, especially in light of the fact that:

...self-styled martyrs who are willing to be jailed in order that they might fight for the rights of citizenship, as many of them allege capture the headlines and the imaginations of many more persons than our seemingly indifferent stand. We realize that many Japanese and others who are interested in our welfare have condemned the JACL for its apparent lackadaisical attitude on the matter of defending the rights and privileges of American citizens with Japanese features. (Ibid.)

Masaoka goes on to give a ten point argument for opposition to Yasui's or anyone else's test case. His ten points are: 1) cooperation in the war effort; 2) the JACL and its members had pledged total cooperation to the President; 3) cooperation with Federal Authorities will cause reciprocal cooperation; 4) our contribution to the war effort is to accept all army regulations and orders; 5) public opinion is opposed to any challenges of the Army and its authority; 6) we might win the case, but lose goodwill in the process; 7) any challenge might result in retaliation by the Army; 8) Attorney General Biddle said there was little chance the courts would challenge the military's authority; 9) the ACLU decided against a test case and they are the champions of civil liberties; 10) unfavorable publicity as seen in the headlines from the Yasui case. Masaoka ends by saying that "we are not giving up our rights

as citizens by cooperating with the government in the evacuation program." (Ibid.)

Ten days later, Min Yasui submitted a document entitled "Discussion of the Ten Points of JACL and explanation of the stand of Minoru Yasui", dated April 17, 1942. In this document, Yasui responds to Masaoka's arguments point by point.

There has been speculation that prior to his curfew violation, Min Yasui had sought the assistance of JACL. "Before deciding to test the curfew, Yasui had written to Mike Masaoka in San Francisco stating his intentions, and asking JACL's support. There is no record the letter was ever delivered." (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1982, p. 176.) This has been suggested as a reason for what seems to be a rather negative personal attack on Yasui in Bulletin #142.

Yasui did solicit the aid of local JACL chapters as well, although it is unclear exactly when this occurred.

YASUI, who had been an active leader in the Hood River, and later Portland chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League asked these chapters to offer moral support to his venture. These chapters were entirely in accord with YASUI who was encouraged and abetted by one Clarence Edward OLIVER of Portland, Oregon...The Seattle Chapter was also asked to lend its support, both moral and financial. Refusal on the part of the Seattle chapter to have anything (at least officially) to do with YASUI, led to less intimacy between the Washington and Oregon groups, and some split among the Seattle members. (District Intelligence Officer, 13th ND, Memorandum to Director of Naval Intelligence, Dated March 25, 1943, NA, RG 210 Entry 17 Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence," p.18.)

We will continue with Yasui's story momentarily when examining the impact of the JACL upon the Civil Liberties League, Yasui's support committee at Minidoka.

**SPECIAL EMERGENCY NATIONAL CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 17-24, 1942  
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH**

The policy of opposition to test cases is subsequently reaffirmed at the Special Emergency National Conference held November 17-24, 1942 in Salt Lake City, Utah. In the Sixth Session of the Conference devoted to "General Japanese American Problems", National Secretary Mike Masaoka

introduced ACLU attorney A.L. Wirin, who proceeded to discuss the various cases pending in court. Wirin reviewed Regan v. King, (effort to take away citizenship of Japanese Americans); Kawata (could Japanese aliens sue in court?); Brown v. Oshiro, (did military orders cancel or suspend contract obligations of those subject to evacuation?); Yasui (Constitutionality of curfew); Wakayama, (habeas corpus); Hirabayashi, (curfew and evacuation); Korematsu, (evacuation); Endo (habeas corpus). After an explanation of the constitutional and legal issues raised in the evacuation cases, the National Secretary states an interest in having JACL appear as a friend of the court (i.e. submit an amicus brief) in the Native Sons' case (Regan v. King) but not evacuation. "We are particularly interested in the suggestion that the JACL appear as a friend of the court in the Native Sons' and other suits against our civil rights. That does not refer to the evacuation cases." (JACL Archives, Minutes:Special Emergency National Conference of November 17-24, 1942, Salt Lake City, Utah, p.31.)

Discussion at the Sixth Session is then focused on an agenda item entitled "Philosophy of Court Cases." The National Secretary leads this discussion and explains the two differing points of view: 1) push the evacuation cases to determine their constitutionality or; 2) "soft peddle" them because of the danger of losing everything and gaining nothing through a court decision. After outlining these two points, the minutes indicate off the record discussion. Saburo Kido expresses his opinion that "evacuation is over and we are no longer concerned" although he too weighs the pros and cons of pursuing evacuation test cases. Others present continue discussion until the chair passes to another agenda item.

It isn't until the Thirteenth Session that any resolution of this issue appears. In addressing the "Project Division", under the project heading of "Civil Rights and Liberties" the National Secretary outline as a project, entering the Native Sons of the Golden West lawsuit as amicus curiae. On the evacuation cases, Masaoka states: "Although it is not our function to actively participate in the various court cases which are testing the constitutionality of the evacuation orders, we are bound to take official cognizance of them." (JACL Archives, Minutes, p.101.)

There was no objection to granting the "National Secretary the discretionary powers to put into effect as he sees fit the national projects on Americanism, Civil Rights and Liberties, Credit Unions, and Contests." (Ibid, p. 103.)

CIVIL LIBERTIES LEAGUE

More proof of JACL's policy on the Yasui case in particular comes to us from a different source and perspective. In a Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer, Thirteenth Naval District, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, dated January 30, 1943 on the subject of Japanese Activities at Minidoka, Mike Masaoka makes several policy statements, on the Yasui matter. The Memo in question discusses the "Minoru Yasui defense committee's" recent name change to the "CIVIL LIBERTIES LEAGUE", made up primarily of former Portland, Oregon residents. The District Intelligence Officer or DIO identifies several Issei involved in fundraising activities for the Yasui committee. The DIO states that Mike Masaoka visited the Minidoka camp on January 23 & 24, 1943.

At a JACL meeting held on January 23rd, Masaoka declared that the organization of the Civil Liberties League was a "stab in the back" at the efforts of the JACL. Most of the Seattle Chapter leaders of the JACL have opposed the Yasui committee right along, contending that to help Yasui would be un-American. At this meeting all the leaders of the Civil Liberties League were present. . . and it was finally brought out that certain leaders among the Civil Liberties group were opposed to the JACL due to its failure to contest the orders of the military authorities in connection with curfew and evacuation. Masaoka, on the other hand, argued that it was the duty of the Nisei to cooperate with the government, not to fight it. (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence Rept.")

Attached is a copy of a circular by the Civil Liberties League outlining Yasui's case and requesting contributions to its fundraising drive. From the circular, we know that the support committee for Yasui was formed the previous month--approximately December of 1942.

Yet another ONI report fixes the date of the first meeting as December 2, 1942. The meeting attracted some 300 persons, partly in response to the publicity on the case in the Minidoka Irrigator, the camp newspaper. (DIO, 13th ND Memo to DNI March 25, 1943, NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2,

File, "Office of Naval Intelligence", p. 21.) The same report is given on Mike Masaoka's reaction to the Civil Liberties League. It does add the following comments though.

The president of the former Seattle chapter of the JACL on being questioned as to his views stated, "You must remember Yasui was a reserve officer in the United States Army while at the

same time being admittedly a paid agent for Japan--You must remember this is war, and to aid Yasui is to aid a Japanese agent. Such an act is not American. (DIO, 13th ND Memo to DNI, January 30, 1943, NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence Report." p.2.)

Jimmie Sakamoto was most likely, the person referred to who delivered the remarks on Yasui, as he was President of the Seattle Japanese Progressive Citizens League (read JACL) at the time of evacuation.

Masaoka's visit to Minidoka and comments directed at the Civil Liberties League served to quash the fledgling organization.

As a result of the attitude of the National governing body and the Seattle chapter of the Japanese American Citizens League, Dr. Tani, the real head of the YASUI committee, stated that the Civil Liberties League would disband and that any further support of Yasui would be, "by individuals and as individuals." (DIO, 13th ND Memo to DNI, March 25, 1943, NA, RG 210 Entry 17 Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence", p. 22.)

The Civil Liberties League did in fact officially disband, although individuals such as Tani and others continued their fund drive.

Myron Gurnea's FBI Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers also contained information on this conflict. Referring to a WRA staffer by the name of Townsend, Gurnea writes:

He said that this effort had caused a division between the Japanese-American Citizens group in the camp and other members of the Nisei. He said that the JACL is definitely opposed to any further efforts to help YASUI in the instant case. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 1 Part II, Gurnea Report-Interviews with WRA Personnel, p.255.)

#### CHANGE OF POLICY

When did JACL's policy towards the evacuation and detention cases change? Interestingly enough, in the Thursday, February 18, 1943 issue of the Pacific Citizen an article on court reviews of evacuation orders indicates that according to Wirin, the JACL, having filed an amicus brief

in the Regan case, is considering doing so in the other evacuation cases if they are taken to the U.S. Supreme Court. (Court Reviews Army Orders on Evacuation, Pacific Citizen, February 18, 1943.)

Official communication of a policy change appears in the March 4, 1943 Bulletin #7, to all JACL leaders and National Board Members from National Secretary Masaoka. On page two under the heading of Civil Rights Committee, Masaoka informs the recipients of the Bulletin that the government has been making disturbing claims regarding the unassimilability of Japanese Americans, effect of dual citizenship on allegiance of the Nisei, schooling and indoctrination of Japanese Americans and so forth. As a consequence:

While we did not participate directly in these cases, it now appears necessary that we submit a brief as a friend of the court which does not challenge the constitutionality of the evacuation orders as such but strongly refuting the government's inferences concerning the loyalty of the Japanese American and the other "traits" attributed to the Japanese, citizens and aliens alike. We have instructed Attorney Wirin to prepare such a brief.

Should these cases testing the constitutionality of the evacuation orders be carried to the Supreme Court, we believe that the JACL should, and must, appear as "friends of the court" to question the broad constitutional powers involved. While this may seem to be a reversal of our policy, it actually constitutes an affirmation of our policy that we cooperated with the government in the evacuation program but that we did so under protest and without admitting its constitutionality. Evacuation is now an accomplished fact, and the military are no longer directly concerned, and therefore, by testing the constitutionality of these orders, we are not now hampering the war effort of our government but rather determining for once and for all the basic rights of military groups under our Federal Constitution. (JACL Archives.)

The second paragraph quoted poses several questions for the reader. Certainly, this is a change of policy, at least in regards to the National's position on test cases and constitutional challenges in court, particularly if any case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. It is curious then that Masaoka chose to phrase this change of policy as an affirmation of the JACL's overall policy of cooperating with the government in evacuation. Certainly Masaoka's statement

before the Tolson Congressional Committee in February of 1942 confirms that JACL never admitted the constitutionality of evacuation. However, this paragraph is strangely inconsistent with the ten point defense of "unalterable opposition" particularly given Masaoka's original concern that such cases were inconsistent with JACL's pledge of cooperation to Roosevelt, acceptance of all army regulations as their contribution to the war effort, fear of being labeled fifth columnists, etc.

After the issuance of Bulletin #7, articles in the Pacific Citizen began to publicize National JACL's amicus briefs and oral arguments in the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases. (April 29, 1943 and May 13, 1943) In the May 27, 1943 issue of the Pacific Citizen wherein A.L. Wirin reports on the Supreme Court Hearings, the role of the JACL is addressed. On page 8 of the issue of the Pacific Citizen, Wirin informs us that:

The JACL, it is to be remembered, did not take or press the cases to the Supreme Court; others determined that policy. Once the rights of the Nisei were before the Supreme Court for decision, the JACL felt a duty to make as adequate a presentation as possible to the court of the loyalty of the Nisei and the unjust discrimination of the military orders.

According to Mike Masaoka, "JACL submitted a 'sociological and human' brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on curfew" in the Hirabayashi case. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, p. 169, File T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

As for the Korematsu and Endo cases, which were progressing more slowly than the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases, the Pacific Citizen on Saturday, October 14, 1944 announced that JACL filed an amicus brief on the unconstitutionality of evacuation. The 200 page brief was signed by Saburo Kido, National President of JACL and A.L. Wirin, then special counsel of JACL.

No amicus was filed on behalf of Endo, however. The 1946 Biennial Minutes indicate that "since the Endo case was being argued at the same time, we did not think it necessary to file a separate brief on the same points" (Minutes, 1946 Biennial p.9.)

IIB. Relationship with War Relocation Authority and Other Governmental Agencies.

**RELATIONSHIP WITH WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL AUTHORITY**

In a previous section dealing with the decision to cooperate with evacuation, a confidential Navy Intelligence Report from the Seattle area stated the following:

With the knowledge and approval of the United States Military Authorities in charge of the evacuation, the Seattle JACL prepared, along military lines, an organization known as the "Evacuee Administration Headquarters", that was to be in charge of the internal administration of the Puyallup Assembly, under the Caucasian staff of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence", p.6.)

This ONI report was written after the fact. Another ONI document executed much earlier by Hartwell Davis, gives a more ominous description of the manner in which the internal administration was set up at Puyallup.

Attention is particularly invited to the military lines along which the Japanese staff (Enclosure A) has been set up. This group organized in Seattle prior to evacuation to the Puyallup Assembly center for the expressed intention of controlling the inner operations of the camp, was appointed by the Emergency Defense Committee of the Seattle Chapter of the Japanese Americans Citizens League. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17, Box 2, File WRA, Memorandum, DIO, 13th ND, to DNI June 15, 1942.)

There have been accusations and rumors that the JACL took on administrative roles in Assembly Centers and camps as a result of self-interest, rather than altruism. In Ruth McKee's "History of the WRA," she quotes Ken Nishimoto, a former WRA staffer and member of the 442nd Infantry Battalion in Italy as revealing that:

In the Assembly Period, the JACL members, because of their previous contacts with WCCA, were able to monopolize the more desirable jobs at the centers, and they had the name of being "more pro-administration than the administration." In one instance, a JACL member at Puyallup was appointed by WCCA as representative of the residents of the camp. He was disliked by the

community as a whole and would have been the last man in camp they would have chosen to represent them. (NA, RG 210 Entry 3, Box 3, File "McKee, Ruth-History of WRA (pp.1-130) Pearl Harbor to June 30, 1944, p. 58.)

Bill Hosokawa in JACL: In Quest of Justice admits as much that JACLers were prominent in the positions selected in Assembly administration.

The JACL Emergency Defense Committee in Seattle, with the encouragement of Army officers sent in to prepare for Evacuation, picked individuals to supervise operations in camp--to disseminate information, run recreation and education programs, look after sanitation, assign housing police the kitchens, maintain internal order. Jimmie Sakamoto as Council Chairman made the appointments from those close to JACL. It was not a democratic procedure, but the appointees were in place to ease the way through the inevitable maze of petty problems. (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow:New York 1982, pp. 172-173.)

In Frank Miyamoto's account, we are told that a group in the University YMCA and YWCA began to organize in the Assembly Center at Puyallup. However,

...they never gained authority to organize in Puyallup Center and as a consequence it was the JACL which shortly took the rein on control. The fact that the JACL gained control was due largely to its close relationship with the Army, which when the time of evacuation approached went directly to James Sakamoto and the JACL to carry out evacuation. One may well understand the feelings which developed among the defeated group or groups against the JACL when it was learned that the latter organization had gained its authority through cooperation with the Army. ...The general feeling expressed by one person who declared, "There's no use belonging to any other group than the JACL; now they carry the whip hand and we might as well follow along." (Miyamoto, Frank, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation", File T 6.24, p.30, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Miyamoto relates a rumor to us about when the Army went to Sakamoto and asked him to organize the community to evacuate, he supposedly responded:

Since the Army has come to me with a duty and responsibility of this task I feel that I should

assume leadership in this matter." Whatever truth there may be in this rumor, Sakamoto assumed or was appointed to the leadership and he proceeded to organize for evacuation and the community in the Center by selecting leaders largely from his own group. (Ibid, pp. 30-31.)

Moreover, the manner of selection was not democratic. "By nature of selection procedure here selected to the staff were those known to this group, and no elective process was followed." (Ibid p.33) Consequently, "[t]here was considerable feeling among certain Nisei leaders who failed to gain appointment or who received lesser positions than they felt they deserved that Sakamoto and his group had by self-appointment gained control of the Assembly Center." (Ibid.)

Hostile feelings were not just directed towards the selection of leaders but towards the assignment of living quarters as well.

Rumors developed to the effect that it was those who were "in" with the JACL leaders who were getting the choice of rooms. This talk was entirely unjustified but sufficient instances of JACL members who arrived late and given better quarters made these rumors seem correct. (Ibid.)

The close association and cooperation by JACL members with the WCCA was also evident in the opening of the Manzanar Camp. In Michi Weglyn's Years of Infamy we read that:

Preferential treatment was especially pronounced at Manzanar, where nearly a thousand volunteers, JACLers among them, had come early to assist the WCCA in opening camp. Bendetsen noted after a visit that "there seems to be thrown throughout the center an attitude of favoritism and politics," and he referred to "politicians" who had come early "so that they might worm their way into the confidence of the center management. (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976 p.300 n.19)

Hosokawa confirms the presence of JACLers in the volunteers who assisted the WCCA at Manzanar. "In the advance cadre sent to Manzanar to prepare the way for mass movement, members of JACL also were prominent." (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow:New York, 1982, p. 173.)

JACL Bulletin No. 1, dated 5/8/42, put a different "spin" on the involvement of JACLers in WCCA administration. Page two of the Bulletin reads:

JACL LEADERS ACTIVE IN RECEPTION & RESETTLEMENT CENTERS. Displaying the sense of civic responsibility which has made them active in JACL work, many JACL leaders are already at reception and assembly centers taking an active part in building a new life for the west coast Japanese. Among those at Manzanar are Kiyoshi Higashi, President of the San Pedro Chapter; Fred Tayama, Chairman of the Southern District Council, and others. At Santa Anita are Masao Satow, Shigemi Aratani, Kiyoshi Okura and others of the Los Angeles Chapter; Sam Fujita, Executive Secretary of the San Diego JACL, and many others. Howard Nomura, President of the Portland Chapter, is assistant director of the Portland Assembly Center. James Sakamoto, Past National President of the JACL, will have an official capacity at the Puyallup Assembly Center in Washington. (JACL Archives)

What then was the consequence of having JACL members in charge of internal administration? According to a footnote in The Spoilage,

[r]esentment against the JACL had been widespread in Tule Lake since its inception, owing partly to the control JACL leaders had exercised in the Walerga and Puyallup Assembly Center, from which Tuleans were recruited, and partly to the prominence they achieved in politics in the Tule Lake Center itself. (Thomas, Dorothy S., Nishimoto, Richard, The Spoilage, Univ. of Calif. Press:Berkeley, 1969, p.73n.)

Miyamoto also notes the distrust directed at JACL leaders in Puyallup Center.

As a consequence of disappointment of the people over the failure of their leadership to express resentment and rebellion that was latent among them, the tendency among the people was to view the JACL leaders with considerable distrust. The popular feeling was that the JACL Headquarters staff was a puppet organization of the WCCA who mixed with Caucasian administrators in order to gain special privileges for themselves while sick people were left to remain in unhealthy living conditions. Likewise in the matter of movement from one area to

another, staff members had special privileges of passes by which to effect passage from area to area. But this freedom was looked upon with envy by the rest of the evacuees. It was said that because of special privileges granted to staff members the latter assumed [an] attitude of superiority that they scarcely deserved in the light of their inferior status in the community in Seattle. Miyamoto, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation" File T 6.24, pp. 44-5, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

#### WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

On March 18, 1942, Executive Order No. 9102 established the War Relocation Authority. Milton Eisenhower was appointed as director. (tenBroek, Jacobus; Barnhart, Edward; Matson, Floyd; Prejudice, War and the Constitution, Univ. of Calif. Press, Berkeley, 1954, p.122.) Shortly after his appointment, Eisenhower traveled to San Francisco. On or about March 25, 1942 after meeting with General DeWitt at the Presidio, Eisenhower met with Mike Masaoka, thus beginning the formal relationship between the WRA and the JACL. In Eisenhower's own words,

I completed two other very important tasks during that first visit to San Francisco in late March. I met with a group of Japanese-Americans and we established an advisory council to represent those who were affected by the President's Executive Order. This was the wisest thing I did in that whole traumatic experience. The advisory council was headed by an attractive twenty-one year old Japanese-American, a Nisei, Mike Masaoka. He was secretary of the Japanese-American Citizens League, a graduate of the University of Utah, a man of great perception and heart. He was deeply respected by Japanese-Americans of all ages. After the establishment of the advisory council, I did not make a single major decision without conferring with this young man and, when necessary, with the advisory council. (Eisenhower, The President is Calling, Doubleday:New York, 1974, p. 117.)

Mike Masaoka's recollection is consistent with Eisenhower's that such a meeting took place and on the degree of influence Masaoka wielded over the development of WRA policy.

Immediately upon his appointment, Mr. Eisenhower flew out to San Francisco and conferred with the National President and Secretary regarding the problems incident to his post. At that time, JACL, submitted a long memorandum of recommendations and suggestions which I am certain, influenced major WRA policy thereafter. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, p.81, File T 6.115, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

The long memorandum to which Masaoka referred is the eighteen page document which will be examined shortly.

Eisenhower's meeting was not limited to Saburo Kido and Mike Masaoka. "At the invitation of the WRA, leaders of the JACL from all section of the West met with Director Eisenhower in San Francisco and made a number of constructive recommendations."(Ibid, p.83.) In these meetings, four main points were stressed to Eisenhower; 1) Restoration of Selective Service without reservation to all Japanese Americans; 2) Resettlement; 3) the President should issue a statement that the evacuation was not due to disloyalty; 4) there should be periodic meetings of representatives from all of the centers with WRA officials to air out problems. (Ibid, p.84.)

Immediately following the meeting of the advisory council with Milton Eisenhower, Mike Masaoka submitted a two page letter in response to topics discussed during that meeting. Dated March 28, 1942, Masaoka submitted nine names, including his own as persons who could aid Eisenhower. They included National President Saburo Kido; Chairman of the Southern District Council, Fred Tayama; Secretary of the Japanese YMCA, Masao Satow; Past President Dr. T.T. Yatabe; Executive Secretary of the Southern District Council, George Inagaki; Chairman, Northern District Council, Tom Iseri; National Treasurer, Hito Okada; and Agricultural Co-ordinator Nobumitsu Takahashi. What were these men to be called upon to do? Masaoka suggested the following:

1. Act as a consulting and advisory committee to present their view points and whatever new problems may be called to their attention by those with whom they may come into contact.
2. Travel from community to community and cooperate with and aid your office in not only selling your various ideas and explaining the reasons for them but also in urging cooperation and maintaining morale.
3. Checking upon the various chapters to see they are carrying out their assigned tasks.
4. Doing everything possible for those involved but actively cooperating with your

office in the movement.

5. Doing everything and anything which your office may call upon us to do. (JACL Archives.)

On page two of this letter, Masaoka wrote that "we are prepared to serve without pay and title, provided that we are able to move freely about in order that we might be able to render the greatest possible service." (Ibid.) He closed the letter by "trusting that these names will be approved for travel exemptions and that we will be able to cooperate with you in these troubled days, we remain... Japanese American Citizens League. (Ibid.)

This letter is significant for a number of reasons. It appears that the advisory council idea was Masaoka's or the JACL's. Also there has been speculation that certain JACL leaders were on the WRA payroll. This letter would substantiate an interest and willingness on the part of the JACL for such an arrangement. In fact, the willingness to serve was so great that pay and title could be bartered for freedom of movement.

The letter also commits the leadership of the JACL to a course of cooperation with and subservience to the WRA. Point Two of the letter is particularly disturbing in that the JACL leadership would be representing the WRA viewpoint and urging conformity with it, rather than representing their constituency to the WRA. While they would be serving as consultants to the WRA, they would be "selling" the WRA ideas to the Japanese American community. Point Four is consistent with the assessment that the JACL was better in administering evacuation than in opposing it. Point Five is a blanket commitment to Eisenhower and the WRA at a fairly early point in time; certainly too early to know what many of its policies would be and how the camps would be structured. This commitment is reminiscent of the JACL's pledge of cooperation to President Roosevelt. One wonders, having made such a commitment, how effective JACL leaders would be later when a difference in point of view or priorities arose.

#### APRIL 6, 1942 LETTER

Proceeding chronologically, the next document of major significance in the relationship between the WRA and the JACL is the eighteen page letter sent by Masaoka to Eisenhower, dated April 6, 1942. This is the "long memorandum of recommendations and suggestions" which Masaoka later felt "influenced major WRA policy thereafter." (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, p. 81.) Before launching into the recommendations and suggestions, Masaoka begins with background information for Eisenhower. He takes

considerable pains to distinguish for Eisenhower the U.S. citizens among the Japanese population to be interned, from their parents the "enemy Aliens", and warns against treating both groups the same. (JACL Archives, pp. 1-2) He also notes the difference in age between the two generations and the fact that a majority of the population are from urban areas, so they shouldn't be treated as farmers. The Japanese have been model citizens and this should be maintained in camp. Masaoka stresses the importance of education while in camp. Moreover, the Japanese are more American than anything else and should be treated accordingly. Lastly, he says that there is no national organization aside from the JACL and that both generations "have greater confidence in our league than they have in any other organization or group or leaders, regardless of their nationality or affiliation. (Ibid, p.3.)

Masaoka again sounds the recurring theme of the JACL that the organization did not contest the military orders for evacuation "because we believe that cooperation on our part will mean a reciprocal cooperation on the part of the government." (Ibid, p.4.)

In discussing general policies, Masaoka writes that the projects should focus on five points:

- 1) to create "Better Americans in a Greater America";
- 2) to maintain a high and healthy morale among the evacuees;
- 3) to train them to cope with the difficult problems of adjustment and rehabilitation after the war;
- 4) to permit them to actually and actively participate in the war effort of our nation; and
- 5) to develop a community spirit of cooperative action and service to others before self. (Ibid, p. 4.)

These five points are quite innocuous in content. However, Masaoka proceeds to state that there should be as much interaction with "white" Americans as possible. (Ibid, p.5)

We do not relish the thought of "Little Tokyos" springing up in these resettlement projects, for by doing so we are only perpetuating the very things which we hope to eliminate: those mannerisms and thoughts which mark us apart, aside from our physical characteristics. We hope for a one hundred per cent American community. (Ibid.)

Thus Masaoka expresses the desire that assimilation would occur during the evacuation period to the point where only the physical differences between white and Japanese Americans would remain.

The letter goes on to advocate in favor of service in the armed forces regardless of whether one is in camp or not, and regardless of whether one volunteers or is drafted. (Ibid, p.5.) The importance of education is again stressed. Masaoka emphatically opposes any Japanese language schools and encourages Americanization. "Special stress should be laid on the enunciation and pronunciation of words so that awkward and 'Oriental' sounds will be eliminated." (Ibid, p.7.)

The remaining topics discussed are religion, sports & recreation, publications and radios, health & medical facilities, Japanese professional and specially-trained people, business and industry, agriculture, labor and wages, citizenship recognition, organization, private projects, induction or assembly centers, and finally semi-permanent resettlement projects.

What stands out in these topics are the suggestions of cooperatives, farming, credit unions, self-government by citizens only, and resettlement. These are suggestions which the WRA later implemented. Interestingly, the document advocated against "Hearing or Determining Boards or Commissions," in essence loyalty boards. (Ibid, p. 14.) The Buddhist faith would be permitted so long as church people did not engage in "other spheres of activity." (Ibid, p.8.) Many of Masaoka's recommendations were eventually adopted by the WRA, though by no means were all of them.

#### JUNE 6, 1942 LETTER

The next document which illuminates the relationship between the JACL and the War Relocation Authority is a rather curious letter, dated June 6, 1942. The document was addressed to Milton Eisenhower, and actually more closely resembles a memorandum rather than a letter. The heading reads "FOR: MR. EISENHOWER" with no address following his name. The document's contents attempt to define a Kibei for Eisenhower's benefit, who was still head of the WRA, but would soon step down on June 17, 1942. This particular memorandum is important for a number of reasons, having to do with its content as well as who it was written by and the letter itself.

In examining the content, we see three basic scenarios laid out to determine who exactly should be considered a Kibei. For instance, we are told,

...in the case of families, if the husband is Kibei and the wife Nisei, the family should be considered Kibei, and if the husband is Nisei, and the wife Kibei, the family should be considered Nisei. Inasmuch as the parents sent the

child to Japan in most cases, the parents should be held suspect, regardless of the number of other children which they may not have sent to Japan for study. In all cases, they may appeal their status. If the child under question is 16 years of age or more, he is entitled to elect whether he chooses to be placed in the same classification as his parents or not, provided that his parents are declared suspect. If the child is under 16, he assumes the status of his parents, but on becoming of age many have the privilege of election. (NA, RG 210 Entry 16, Box 379, File 39.050 "Loyalty Boards".)

The subsequent text explains the procedure a "suspect" may undergo to appeal a determination that they are Kibei, and therefore impliedly disloyal. The content is consistent with the file in which it was found at the Archives, that being loyalty boards. The document ends with a single sentence which reads "[i]ncidentally, we are in unanimous agreement as to the principle of segregation." (Ibid.) Three signatures follow: Mike Masaoka, Ken Matsumoto, and George Inagaki. All three were prominent National leaders of the JACL. Which brings us to the issue of the letter itself. The document was written on War Relocation Authority letterhead. We have three prominent JACL leaders making policy recommendations on who should be considered Kibei to Milton Eisenhower on WRA letterhead.

Let us digress momentarily for some additional background information. Bill Hosokawa relates the fact that during this time, "Masaoka and Inagaki were working tirelessly, traveling from Washington to Philadelphia to New York and back again for a series of conferences with WRA officials, American Friends Service Committee, the ACLU" and others. (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow:New York, 1982, p. 188.) "Accompanied on occasion by Ken Matsumoto, Masaoka and Inagaki called on Eisenhower to exchange views. Eisenhower welcomed all the input he could get to help cope with the responsibilities that had been thrust upon him." (Ibid.)

Thus, on one of the occasions when Masaoka and Inagaki were with Ken Matsumoto, they gave Eisenhower their thoughts and recommendations on how Kibei and Nisei should be separated or segregated. However, the use of WRA letterhead is puzzling. One obvious response is that there is no significance to the use of it. These three men just happened to use whatever supplies were readily available.

On the other hand, we can also draw a contrary inference, and conclude that the use of WRA letterhead and the memorandum format indicates that Masaoka, Matsumoto and Inagaki were in the employ of the WRA. This would be

consistent with the March 28, 1942 letter to Eisenhower from Masaoka in which the National Secretary offered the services of JACL's leadership to serve Mr. Eisenhower.

Confirmation that at least two of the three were indeed WRA employees comes in a May 23, 1942 memorandum written by Commander Kenneth D. Ringle of the U.S. Navy. The memo is addressed to Commander Wharton regarding "duty with War Relocation Authority." Ringle's duty with the WRA was "an assignment to prepare answers to various questions on policy regarding the handling of Japanese." Ringle goes on to write,

While in that office yesterday, I met Mike Masaoka and George Inagaki, both Nisei leaders with whom I am well acquainted and whom I previously put in touch with Mr. Eisenhower. These two men are serving as liaison and contact men officially with the War Relocation Authorities. [emphasis added] (Courtesy Michi Weglyn Collection.)

This letter, written by Commander Ringle along with the March 28, 1942 letter and the WRA letterhead document, taken together, forces us to conclude that Masaoka and Inagaki were WRA employees acting as consultants on important issues such as how to handle the Kibei and segregation. Not only that, but if the March 28, 1942 letter is any indication, they were selling these same ideas and urging cooperation among the Japanese American community.

We must ask what kind of influence did such documents and recommendations have on Eisenhower and the development of the segregation policy. We know from Ringle's memo that he thought so highly of Masaoka, and Inagaki that he thought, "it would be a good idea for a few of the officers interested in this question to meet the men during their stay." In fact, we see in a Memorandum of Understanding Between the War Department, "the Department of Justice and the War Relocation Authority Relating to Procedures for Separating Potentially Dangerous Evacuees from the Remainder" a great deal of similarity between the JACL suggestions and what was proposed in the draft MOU.

(k) Where the male head of the family shall be classified as potentially dangerous under the procedures to be established pursuant to this Memorandum such classification shall apply, also to his wife and to all of his dependents residing with him in his household, except that his wife and any of his dependents who shall be 16 years of age or over shall be given the option ... of declaring their preference to be separated from the male head of family...

(1) Where the male head of family shall not be classified as potentially dangerous under the procedures to be established pursuant to this Memorandum, his wife and all of his dependents under the age of 16 years, living with him in his household shall likewise not be classified as potentially dangerous, regardless of the classification that would otherwise apply ... (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 286, File 39.050, pp.3-4.)

Both documents select the age of 16 as an age of self-determination. Both documents also permit an appeal where the applicant submits five (5) names to vouch and provide information for him or her. (Ibid. p.6.) Attached to the MOU is a note which reads: "For M.S.E. Dear Milton-This is a draft of the memo on Comm. Ringle's suggestion re: separation of potentially dangerous evacuees. The memos you gave me are also attached. P.M.G. June 8." (NA, RG 210 Entry 16 Box 286, File 39.050.) The P.M.G. most likely is Philip M. Glick, Solicitor of the War Relocation Authority. The National Archives file in which those documents were found had the WRA letterhead document immediately following the War Dept./DOJ/WRA MOU. Thus Glick was returning memos which Eisenhower had shown him earlier, along with a draft policy on segregation. The Masaoka/Matsumoto/Inagaki memo is the earliest JACL position on segregation and undoubtedly influenced national policy on this issue.

This is confirmed by a WRA source. In a section entitled SEGREGATION-Development of the Policy, Ruth McKee acknowledges two of the earliest suggestions on segregation came from Lt. Comm. K.D. Ringle and Mike Masaoka.

No policy shaped by WRA has received such painstaking attention and deliberative scrutiny as that of segregation...The first suggestions were offered in May, 1942, by Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle, a Naval Intelligence Officer detailed to WRA in its early months to assist in developing a program. (NA, RG 210, Entry 3, Box 3, File McKee, "History of WRA," p. 198.)

Ringle's plan was ultimately rejected because it focused entirely in the whole Kibei population. McKee goes on to discuss Masaoka's proposal.

In a letter of June 6, 1942, Mike Masaoka, Executive Secretary of the JACL, wrote to Director Eisenhower recommending segregation of a specific group of Kibei...(Ibid.)

**SPECIAL EMERGENCY NATIONAL CONFERENCE  
NOVEMBER 17-24, 1942, SALT LAKE CITY**

The supplement to the Minutes of the above-references meeting held in Salt Lake City in November of 1942 by the JACL contain two references to the WRA. In Supplement No. 18 of the Minutes, under the topic of Resettlement, there are "three battle front" referred to, these being the home, government, and public relations. Under the government front, we read "Action on this front requires unceasing operations. Among major activities might be listed: Collaboration with the WRA.." (JACL Archives.) Perhaps collaboration was not meant in the pejorative sense, but merely that JACL would work with the WRA on the issue of resettlement.

Later in Supplement No. 25 on the issue of relocation, we see the reference "JACL will act as consultant, resource, and liaison with local committees, WRA, Manpower Commission, Social Service Agencies." (JACL Archives.)

**HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE, DIES COMMITTEE,  
COSTELLO SUB-COMMITTEE**

In the words of author Michi Weglyn, the House Un-American Activities Committee of Congress, headed by Congressman Martin Dies, with a sub-committee headed by John M. Costello, was "the most unbridled campaign aimed at discrediting not only the evacuees but also their allegedly 'soft-on Japs' keepers." (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow: New York, 1976, p.151.) The main contention of Costello in the hearings, which began on June 8, 1943, was that "the JACL-dictated WRA was overfeeding, overpampering and over-releasing" Japanese Americans into inland communities. (Ibid, p.152.) The committee's chief investigator was Robert E. Stripling. His "strategy was to depict JACL as a dangerous, un-American organization, and then to show that JACL through Masaoka wielded undue influence over WRA." (Hosokawa, JACL: In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York, 1982, p.225.) The headlines announced that confidential WRA policy directives were in the files of JACL'S Washington Office and of Masaoka's presence and participation in top level WRA meetings. (Ibid.) That the Costello Committee's contention was thoroughly discredited is undisputed by all authors and chroniclers of Japanese American history.

However, the testimony of Dillon Myer and Mike Masaoka as well as others does provide additional insights into the WRA-JACL relationship as well as into other JACL related issues.

Dillon Myer testified before the Dies Committee beginning on July 6, 1943. His testimony of July 7, 1943 was that "he meet in conference with either Masaoka or Kanazawa

once a week for about a year." (NA, RG 107 Box \_\_, Entry \_\_, File \_\_, Courtesy Jack Herzig.) The purpose of these visits according to Myer was to learn of news for the Pacific Citizen newspaper. (Ibid.) Myer also received information from the JACL. "Witness stated that about two weeks ago he requested copies of Masaoka's reports to the National Headquarters from the Salt Lake Office of JACL, and that he had read most of Masaoka's reports. (Ibid.) Myer responded to the question of whether JACL was given confidential WRA directives by stating,

JACL received WRA administrative instructions and directives just as anyone else who requested them. ...the words "For Use of WRA Staff Only" on the directives did not imply, in any way, that the directives and instructions were confidential. (Ibid.)

Myer also testified that he and Masaoka discussed policy. "He admitted that he discussed policy with Masaoka on a number of occasions. He stated, however, that he had not discussed all major policies with Masaoka before adoption." (Ibid.) Why then did Masaoka's reports to National Headquarters such as one dated September 19, 1942 read as follows?

Myer put this up to me. Myer deals with us like he deals with his own staff. We have discussed every major policy with him before its adoption. Do not reveal any confidential material, and allow all matters of policy to be announced first by WRA. Congressmen would jump down their respective throats (WRA) if they knew the part we play in forming WRA policy. Do not reveal any confidential material as we are fortunate to obtain these directives. (Ibid.)

In fact, this attitude is supported by another JACLer. George Inagaki, in his report to the National Staff on January 18, 1943 wrote the following:

Confidential Matters:

WRA being so good about letting JACL in on important confidential matters, am deathly afraid that I might let something out or they might leak out elsewhere unintentionally. Ben Yoshioka was surprised at the confidence Holland had in us...Mike has done a heluva good job with the WRA. John Thomas expressed same thought. JACL must live up to it. (JACL Archives.)

The reason given for this is, according to Myers's testimony, "Masaoka was often expansive in his reports and

was given to exaggerations. He took credit for policies formulated by others." (Ibid.) In fact, the major by-product of the Dies Committee was the discrediting of Mike Masaoka.

When Masaoka was called to testify, beginning on July 3, 1943, he began with a chronology of his employment history. We are told that,

subject was appointed National Secretary of JACL by the National Board of JACL and resided in San Francisco at the time of evacuation. Witness was not evacuated and refused to state the reason therefor. Witness stated that he worked on the evacuation and volunteered information to Naval Intelligence. In May, 1942, he came to the Eastern Headquarters of JACL in Washington, D.C. (Ibid.)

The information volunteered to Naval Intelligence may very well be the "personal, confidential reports to Lt. Brown," which Masaoka urged JACL to undertake.

Masaoka also testified that he exaggerated the membership of the JACL.

Witness stated that at the time of evacuation JACL had 20,000 members, but that since evacuation this membership has fallen off to 5,000. Witness admitted that in May and June, 1943, JACL claimed a much larger membership and accredited this to the fact that in March, 1942, JACL decided to freeze its membership even though members had not paid their dues. Witness admitted the JACL publicly has claimed a membership of 20,000 and has reported this fact to Dillon Myer and the WRA. Doctor Matthews, Committee Investigator, produced a list of the membership of JACL taken from JACL records, and a count of the members listed showed 1800 regular members and 600 associate members. Witness stated that the list of 20,000 members is either in San Francisco or has been lost. Witness stated that JACL misrepresented and exaggerated its membership because it is the only group in a position to represent Japanese Americans in the United States. (Ibid.)

This testimony is remarkable for a number of reasons. Within the context of the relationship between the WRA and JACL, Masaoka is guilty of misleading Myer, the WRA and the government in general. Masaoka wanted the JACL and himself to be the voice of Japanese Americans, even if the numbers did not support such a position. One also detects an ends

justifies the means attitude in Masaoka's justification that the JACL was the only group in a position to represent Japanese Americans in the U.S. As a result, Masaoka "padded" the membership figures considerably. If JACL had only 1800 regular members and 600 associated members out of an internee population of approximately 110,000-120,000, exactly whose voice were they?

Moreover, the Committee questioned Masaoka on a statement in his September 19, 1942 report to National Headquarters which read, "we must increase our membership. Make everyone automatic members if necessary. Our membership does not cooperate with us." (Ibid.) His reply was "that the plan to make all Japanese-Americans automatic members was not effected. He stated that when he referred to non-cooperativeness of the membership, he was thinking of the militant minorities of the JACL." (Ibid.) One wonders at the audacity of a plan to make everyone who was Japanese American a member of the JACL ostensibly for the purposes of being able to make representations to the government.

In response to the claim that JACL was receiving confidential material from the WRA, Masaoka's response was that "he was merely exaggerating and 'liked to shoot the bull.'" He admitted that JACL received directives possibly before the public would be permitted to receive them." (Ibid.)

According to the Library of Congress' Legislative Reference Service Summary of this same testimony, Masaoka

admitted a tendency to exaggerate and a strong desire to put his organization in as good a light as possible. He also agreed that he had sometimes used big names to impress his own national organization. He had written of meeting Mrs. Roosevelt, Chief Justice Stone, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox, Mr. Biddle and others, but on questioning revealed that although he had met the first two, his contacts with the others had been indirect. (Costello Sub-committee, July 5, 1943, G-754, File T 1.03, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

He was again confronted with the following statement,

We are unable to obtain additional gasoline from WRA since an investigation might reveal that a Japanese pressure group is dictating their policies. (NA, RG 107, Box\_\_, Entry\_\_, File \_\_\_\_, Courtesy Jack Herzig.)

Masaoka's response was "that JACL did not dictate the policy of WRA, but admitted that JACL 'liked to feel that they had influence with WRA'." (Ibid.)

The remainder of Masaoka's time before the Committee was spent with the Committee confronting him with statements and Masaoka backing down from these statements. He did close his testimony by endorsing the need for segregation, but that it "should not be based entirely on answers to question 28 on the WAR Department questionnaire. Some considerations should be given the reasons for these answers." (Ibid.)

Another person who testified before the Dies Committee was Eastern Representative of the JACL, Joe Kanazawa. The Committee questioned Kanazawa on the content of a letter received from a Karl Konda of the Manzanar Center. The letter read:

It is difficult to hold on to democracy here at Manzanar. Issei and Kibei are pro-Japanese, and propaganda is Nisei. Nisei sabotage their own people under the JACL banner. Issei and Kibei outnumber Nisei by two to one. (Ibid.)

Kanazawa explained the letter and "stated that JACL has had bad leaders who have sabotaged their own people. He admitted that he knew of such a leader." (Ibid.) The Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service Summary of the Committee added this to the letter from Manzanar.

I saw a clique of rapacious Nisei riding down their parents and under the JACL banner sabotage their own people and even their fellow nisei... This was the type of man who ripped his fellow Japanese up the back with one hand and waved the flag with the other. (Costello Sub-Committee Un-American Activities, July 3, 1943, G-753, File T 1.03, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Kanazawa's response was that he "admitted that among the JACL members there probably were some who fitted the above description." (Ibid.)

Kanazawa's testimony also concluded with his statement "that JACL has advocated segregation of loyal from disloyal Japanese-Americans for some time." (NA, RG 107, Entry \_\_, Box \_\_, File \_\_, Courtesy Jack Herzig.)

The result of the Committee's work was Senate Resolution 166, passed on July 6, 1943 which was a call for segregating the disloyal out of camp, and ultimately into Tule Lake. (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow:New York, 1976, p. 154.)

**NEWSPRINT REQUEST FOR PACIFIC CITIZEN**

On December 7, 1944, Saburo Kido wrote to Dillon Myer, requesting an increase in the number of copies of the *Pacific Citizen*, which had been limited due to a quota on newsprint. The request was based upon Kido's assertion that "inasmuch as we believe that the *Pacific Citizen* is a great contribution to the war effort in that it is serving the persons of Japanese ancestry and their friends." He then asked Myer to "contact Mr. Hanson and give your impression of the *Pacific Citizen* and our value to the government and to the war effort." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 471, File 71.505-JACL.) On the upper right hand corner of the letter is this notation, "1-2-45 Talked to Tajiri on phone DSM". Attached in the file and appended to the letter is a note paper which reads, "D.S. Meyer I think a discreet call to Hansen might be in order. The PC, after all, has been a pretty valuable organ for the program. T." (Ibid.)

Based upon the notation on the letter that Myer spoke to Tajiri on the phone, it is likely that the notepaper was written by Larry Tajiri, editor of the *Pacific Citizen*. He worked out of the Salt Lake City Office where Saburo Kido's letter originated. It is noteworthy to see that JACL was hoping to trade the support and cooperation provided through its organ, the *Pacific Citizen* for an additional 1,000 copies. One also wonders for what "program" Tajiri thought the *Pacific Citizen* was a valuable organ?

#### POSTSCRIPT

After the end of the war, Mike Masaoka, as National Secretary of the JACL wrote to M.M. Tozier, who was at one time, Acting Chief, Reports and Public Relations for the War Relocation Authority. The letter is addressed to "Toze" and asks for "a commendation of the Japanese American Citizens League in your reports for the way we have cooperated with the WRA and have supported pretty generally its program." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 471, File 71.505, JACL.) This letter stands as a concise summary of the WRA-JACL relationship during internment, characterized by cooperation and support to the government from the JACL.

#### MILITARY

At the JACL Special National Conference during November 17-24, 1942, Colonel Kie Rasmussen requested and obtained the assistance of the JACL in recruiting for the Military Intelligence Language School at Camp Savage.

Mr. M. Masaoka

How can we help you? You wish this group to return to the centers and urge their qualified persons to enlist-is that right?

Col. Rasmussen  
Yes. (JACL Archives.)

The six page Minutes of the meeting with Rasmussen were found in JACL Archives, stamped Confidential, Not for Release or Publication.

One other reference to the military was found in JACL inter-office correspondence from Joe Grant Masaoka to the National Secretary and Headquarters for the period covering 4/29 to 5/15, 1943. On the top of the page we read:

FORT RILEY COMMANDANT DISTRUST NISEI SOLDIERS;  
According to reliable sources, including letters from Nisei soldiers stationed there, all Nisei not sent out of camp in special assignment were confined to their barracks on the occasion of President Roosevelt's recent visit there.  
Note to Joe Kanazawa: Could you please bring this to the attention of the War Department and prevent a recurrence? This has been a matter of much griping among Nisei and circulation of this incident is current within the centers. (JACL Archives.)

This is a reference to an incident where Japanese American soldiers were kept out of the President's view by being confined to their barracks. The implication was that the Commandant didn't want Nisei to be seen in uniform, that Nisei soldiers weren't worthy to wear their service uniforms. The Fort Riley incident is one of a number of incident involving Nisei soldiers. However, the JACL memo requesting a stop to such actions is the only reference in JACL documents which was found. Many of the incidents dealing with Nisei soldiers have come under the heading of military resisters, a topic which was not addressed in this study.

## IIC. JACL Activities in Camp

### GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF JACL IN CAMP

At the request of WRA Director Dillon Myer, the FBI undertook a survey of the ten camps. This survey was headed and the report written by Myron Gurnea. In it, Gurnea gives his official assessment of the presence of the JACL in camp.

One of the greatest causes for internal disorder has perhaps been the Japanese-American Citizens League. The members of the Japanese-American Citizens League have been very outspoken in proclaiming their loyalty to the United States. It is of course, commendatory that these individuals would be loyal to this country; however, there are some indications that their views are as political as patriotic. It is the consensus of opinion among the Japanese that the Japanese-American Citizens League in collaboration with the United States Government, "sold them out" and did not put up a fight to block relocation. This feeling is so predominant that the Japanese now refer to Mike Masuoko [sic], the national president of the Japanese-American Citizens League, as Moses Masuoko [sic], stating that he "led them out of California." Many of the individuals who received beatings have been members of the Japanese-American Citizens League, and as such are individuals who either cooperated with the Government agencies or were active in sponsoring loyalty programs. (Gurnea, FBI Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers, File E 11.00, p.7, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Gurnea's survey was made up of two parts. The above comments were contained in Part I. In Part II, Gurnea conducted interviews with WRA Personnel at each of the camps. In his interview of WRA Personnel at the Minidoka Camp, the following comments were made. "Stafford also stated at this point it is his desire to keep the Japanese-American Citizens League from indulging in any political activity in the center." (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 1, Part II, Gurnea Report-Interviews with WRA Personnel, p. 280) Comments from personnel at Poston expressed that "[a] great number of the Japanese feel that the Japanese-American Citizens League sold them out to the Americans. For that reason there is a considerable amount of resentment among the Japanese toward the former members and officials of the Japanese-American Citizens League. (Ibid, pp.291-292.)

One of the main causes for resentment against the JACL stemmed from allegations that many of the leaders had been informants for government intelligence agencies and

continued in that capacity while in camp. We have already examined the former allegation. Now let us turn our attention to the latter.

#### NISEI STOOGES/JACL INFORMANTS

A Western Defense Command confidential Memorandum circa August 1942, indicated the Army's intention of utilizing informants from within the internee population for security purposes. The report recommended:

that Civil Affairs Division discover the Kibei leaders in all assembly centers and camps through security police, camp management, and the use of Nisei stooges in staging a similar meeting as was held in Manzanar. (NA, RG 338, Entry 1, Box 12, File 323.3, Manzanar.)

Attached to this Memorandum are letters written by Tokie Slocum, Karl Yoneda and Fred Tayama in response to meetings held by Kibei at Manzanar, conducted in the Japanese language.

In fact, Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell allegedly remarked that "I didn't know it, but there are Army and Naval Intelligence and FBI agents right here in camp, but don't you worry, they haven't got the power you think they have." (Tanaka, Documentary Reports, 6/42-7/42, pp. 122-123, File O 10.06, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

This is, perhaps, a good segue into the topic of whether any JACLers were involved in these roles and activities.

A number of the members of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council of the JACL were highly prominent and outspoken in their work to aid Federal Intelligence Agencies prior to internment. As many Japanese Americans in the Los Angeles area eventually were interned at Manzanar, it follows that these same individuals would be prominent and outspoken in the same capacity at Manzanar. One of the most infamous of informants, both prior to and during internment was none other than Tokie Slocum.

At Manzanar, rumors that "Slocum is an FBI agent" cropped up as early as May, 1942, immediately following his arrival at the Center. These rumors were frequently traced to Slocum himself who privately let it be known among enough people for such circulation that he was in constant correspondence with agents of the FBI in Los Angeles as well as prominent officials in the veterans groups to which he belonged. (Tanaka,

"Report on Manzanar Riot," p. 34, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Slocum had also let it be known what the results of his work with the FBI were. "Slocum also bragging on turning in 40 people to FBI." (Merritt Collection, #122, Box 17, "Law & Order Misc." File, SC-URL, UCLA.)

Tokie Slocum testified before Senator A.B. "Happy" Chandler of Kentucky, who had headed up another of the several state and congressional investigatory subcommittees which sprang up after the Manzanar riot." (Weglyn, Years of Infamy, Morrow: New York, 1976, p. 153.) Slocum responded to Chandler's question of what he was doing in camp.

So I went and put in 8 months over there and put in 8 months as an observer for the FBI, with the blessing of Mr. Hood, who is the head of the FBI in Los Angeles, and all the time I was there it was my duty, at \$16 a month, which is the standard salary of all internees in the camp, to make observations and analyses, trace down the rumors, gossips, and various subversive activities in camp and make reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I was allowed postage and envelopes and that is all I asked. During that time I believe I was of some help to our government. (Merritt Collection, #122, Box 15, Chandler Investigation Folder, pp. 121-122, SC-URL, UCLA.)

According to another source, "there is ample evidence to support the statement Slocum created the impression at Manzanar that he was 'working for the FBI.' My personal opinion is that Slocum was never employed as a paid agent of the FBI but volunteered information and correspondence regularly." (Tanaka, "Report on Manzanar Riot," pp. 90-91, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Slocum's activities are confirmed by other government sources. An FBI document, dated January 23, 1943 regarding "Tokutaro Slocum, Activities in War Relocation Centers, Internal Security-J," states "it is recommended that Slocum be contacted in Washington, D.C. and warned against representing that he has been employed by the Bureau." (Courtesy Michi Weglyn.) Since much of the document has been "blacked out", it is difficult to know the entire context of this statement. The reference to Manzanar and the date would indicate that the FBI's concern was over Slocum's testimony before the Chandler Committee, previously reviewed.

Another memorandum, dated August 14, 1943 from John F. Embree, Chief Washington Analyst of the WRA, to John H.

Provinse, Chief of Community Services also of the WRA, refers to Tokie Slocum's activities.

...little information of real significance to the military authorities in this country could come to the attention of this government via the Nisei. However, this does not mean that there have not been Nisei anxious to aid the intelligence agencies to the utmost of their abilities. Tokie Slocum, while not in all ways an admirable character, should at least satisfy intelligence agencies by his stool pigeoning activities. (NA, RG 210, Box 286, File 39.051, #2, "August 1943," p.2.)

A person who shared in Slocum's notoriety both during Anti-Axis days as well as at Manzanar was Fred Tayama. This should not be surprising. We have learned in an earlier section how Tayama was originally chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee but welcomed Slocum into the group and quickly turned over the reins of leadership to him.

A confidential WCCA Report from the Inspection and Fiscal Division on Manzanar, dated August 12, 1942, provides information on a number of Japanese Americans at this camp. The notes on Fred Tayama state that he "reports to FBI, G-3 Army, G-3 Navy." (NA, RG 338, Entry 1, Box 12, File 323.2 "Manzanar," p.6.) Later in the same document, Tayama is referred to as "Fred (FBI reporter)..." (Ibid, p.7.) The second reference misspells his surname as Toyaura, but given the context of Joe Kurihara, Ted Akahoshi and the Block Leaders Council, the reference had to be to Tayama.

Even a JACL document contains a reference to Tayama reporting to the FBI. George Inagaki wrote a memo to the National Staff dated Saturday, January 16, 1943, which was stamped received, January 18, 1943. The heading read, "Rumor from Manzanar."

Story is that Tayama's report to FBI or Naval Intelligence got into the hands of Slocum and the latter, in order to focus hatred away from self, circulated copy of letter among people in center. Believe it's just one of those reports, don't see how he could get a copy. (JACL Archives.)

Now the rumor isn't whether Tayama reported to the FBI or Naval Intelligence. According to the context, the rumor is whether Slocum got his hands on said report.

An entry in Ralph Merritt's diary should convert the alleged rumor into fact. Merritt was the Project Director at Manzanar during the Riot of December 6, 1942. His diary

entry for November 13th and 14th of 1945 when he visited the Tule Lake camp, recorded a visit with Joe Kurihara, one of the participants of the riot.

Said he wanted to apologize for trouble he had caused and then launched into story...  
Tayama reporting to FBI. Slocum making copies of his reports (4 and 7) and giving to Kurihara.  
(Merritt Diary, Merritt Collection #122, Box 17, File "Law & Order, Misc." p.1.)

If the last sentence of the diary entry can be read to mean that Slocum made copies of Tayama's reports, then Tayama made quite a few reports to the FBI and Slocum did indeed circulate copies.

Informants were not limited to Manzanar. An undated Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer of the 11th Naval District (San Diego) to the Director of Naval Intelligence on the subject of "Activities of Inmates, Japanese Relocation Centers" writes:

1. From time to time this District Intelligence Officer has forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence information as to the serious anti-American and pro-Japanese activities carried out within the relocation camps at Poston, Arizona and Manzanar, California. The information has been obtained from informants within these camps, and believed to be reliable...

9. At the present time Lyle KURISAKI who has cooperated with this office, is on thirty days leave from Poston #1. His family is still in the camp and according to information, is being made to suffer serious mistreatment...

(NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "WRA", pp. 1-2.)

Kurisaki's work with the FBI and ONI prior to evacuation through the Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee has already been addressed. This present Memorandum indicates that Kurisaki continued in his capacity and was an informant with the ONI while in Poston. Now, it is possible that the Memo meant to refer to his previous intelligence work. But, given the context that the Memo was discussing information obtained from informants within Poston and Manzanar, it appears that Kurisaki was such an informant.

#### **SELF-GOVERNMENT**

A secondary cause for resentment against the JACL during the internment period had to do with the issue of

self-government. As a cause of resentment, it was particular to the leadership and events at specific camps.

An early look into the conditions at the Minidoka Center reveal an initial expectation by members of the JACL that they would inherit the internal leadership. In a September 3, 1942 Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer, 13th Naval District to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the DIO gives the following report.

The Japanese American Citizens League faction which was in charge of the internal administration at the Puyallup Assembly Center, apparently took it for granted that they would be asked to carry on similarly at Minidoka. This, however, has not been the case. The Relocation Authorities have decided that there shall be no group or clique control but a free government based upon elections after arrival of all evacuees. (NA, RG 210, Entry 17, Box 2, File "WRA.")

The DIO described the JACL faction as a "clique" and contrasts their internal administration at Puyallup with "free government" pursuant to elections at Minidoka, as if the two descriptions are mutually exclusive. Moreover, this description of the JACL group at Puyallup is consistent with what earlier commentators such as Frank Miyamoto, Bill Hosokawa, and Ken Nishimoto told us about the lack of elective process at Puyallup.

The Manzanar Camp also had its self-government woes. We are told that,

"in the early stages of Manzanar's development, there is little doubt that individuals associated with the two groups expressed this rivalry in efforts to secure key administrative jobs. In a real sense, there was jockeying and maneuvering for what may be described here as political control or leadership of the population. (Tanaka, Documentarian Report, January 25, 1943, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

One of these two groups, of course, was the JACL. However, it is difficult to examine self-government and the JACL's role in any problems associated with it outside of the context of one of the most major disturbances at a camp, the December 6, 1942, Manzanar Riot.

#### MANZANAR RIOT

While most newspaper accounts at the time characterized the disturbance as Pro-Axis violence targeted at Pro-American victims, the primary sources from that era did not see it that simply. We will begin our examination of this incident from the point of view of one of the participants, Togo Tanaka, Documentary Historian at Manzanar.

The Manzanar Riot of December 6 was the logical outgrowth of pre-evacuation factional conflicts among evacuees, clashes of ideology intensified by War, and the unhealthy condition of accumulating resentment within the limited area of the Center. (Tanaka, "Manzanar Riot," January 29, 1943, p. 1-2, File O 7.50, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Tanaka identifies three groups at Manzanar as 1) the JACL, 2) those anti-JACL but more accurately, left-wing with some being communists, and 3) Anti-Administration-Anti-JACL, which unlike the previous two, had no pre-evacuation history but was primarily indigenous to Manzanar. (Ibid, pp.3-4.)

Tanaka continues and says that "on December 6, 1942, Manzanar was not unlike a powder keg. Groups I, II and III constituted exceedingly short fuses. One single incident--the attack on Fred Tayama and the subsequent arrest of Harry Ueno--ignited the whole barrel." (Ibid, p.9.)

The question remains whether JACL had any role in the resentments or actions which led to the "exceedingly short fuses" within Manzanar. Tanaka's response is yes.

Efforts of pre-evacuation JACL leaders to continue their activities within Manzanar were undoubtedly a contributing cause to the situation which eventually culminated in the December 6 riot. That the JACL, and the individuals who more or less stood impressed in the public mind as representing it (Fred Tayama, Togo Tanaka, Joe Masaoka, Tad Ueno, Tom Imai) as a group enjoyed little--if any--popularity from the outset of the project is generally conceded. (Tanaka, "Report of Manzanar Riot," p.46, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

From this point on, the JACL group found itself excluded from administrative jobs, they complained about life in camp and about the Issei control over the Block leaders' Council, and finally kept in contact with Headquarters at Salt Lake City. Fred Tayama was the acknowledged chairman of the group. (Ibid, p. 47.)

The impression early gained among the Japanese speaking population that the JACL was persecuting the Japanese people, spying upon innocent Issei for the FBI (an impression due more to the activities of a single individual than to any group--that individual in the estimation of the JACL group being Tokutaro Slocum), that the JACL was, to translate a frequently used Japanese expression, "putting a noose around our neck." (Ibid, p.49.)

The next incident occurred when then Project Director Roy Nash made an announcement that the Block Leaders Council would be replaced by an elected council of U.S. citizens only. The reaction was "a camp-wide furor arose; it was directed principally against the JACL; its chief target was Fred Tayama, its lesser targets the individuals associated with him." (Ibid.) Even though an announcement explained that the restriction to U.S. citizens came from Washington, D.C., this did not dispel the rumors that the JACL was responsible. (Ibid, p. 50.)

Tanaka relates that part of the animosity was due to the failed effort by the JACL group to organize a "Manzanar Citizens Federation" in July and August of 1942. (Ibid.)

The next conflict developed when Fred Tayama, elected Chairman of the Manzanar Work Corps came into conflict with Harry Ueno, organizer of the Japanese Mess Hall Workers Union. (Ibid, p.51.) "A campaign of slandering ensued with unusual vigor, even for Manzanar." (Ibid, p.51.) Threatening posters from the Blood Brothers appeared. (Ibid, p.52.)

Another event which has a bearing on the timing of the attack on Tayama and the riot which followed was the JACL Convention held in Salt Lake City, Utah in mid-November. One of the convention's reported resolutions pledged the Nisei as willing to volunteer for the armed forces if given the opportunity to do so from the relocation centers. That this resolution was seized upon by the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group to arouse intense anti-JACL sentiment in Manzanar was evident everywhere in the Center, and Kurihara was reported to have gone about various blocks announcing that "we're going to have another Poston riot here, only it will be a hundred times worse; we are going to kill all the dogs." (Ibid, p.52.)

Morris Opler, the Community Analyst for Manzanar writes of the impact of JACL advocating for the Nisei Draft upon the Manzanar Riot.

Many of the JACL leaders never entered Centers. From their Salt Lake City headquarters they issued manifestoes which were designed to assure the American people of the patriotism and pro-democratic views of those of Japanese ancestry in this country. They underestimated the disillusionment and the cynicism over such slogan which the people in the Centers felt. There grew a marked disjunction between the public statements of the leaders of the JACL and the material published in their journal, and what the people in the Centers were thinking. When the JACL advocated the formation of a Nisei Battalion, the smoldering rebellion broke out into violence and JACL representatives in Manzanar were intimidated or beaten up. This was an important factor in the incident of December 6, 1942. (Opler, "The Effects of the Nisei Draft at Manzanar," 3/11/44, Merritt Collection, #122, Box 23, File #9 "Registration 1944-1945, p.13.)

In fact, tension was already building when the announcement of the JACL Convention appeared.

Each Center was to name two official delegates. Obviously, with feeling against the JACL at fever pitch, there could be no open election of delegates at Manzanar. When some prominent young men of the Center, who were obviously preparing to go somewhere, were asked about their destination, they gave evasive answers. It was not until the men in question had left that a notice appeared in the Free Press, giving the names of these who had gone to Salt Lake City as "representatives from Manzanar." It was known that the JACL had been active in Second Front Petitions and in appeals that Americans of Japanese Ancestry be used in the draft. There was apprehension among the residents concerning what action the National body would take at this convention, especially since the JACL had been charged with speaking without authorization for all Japanese in America on other occasions of crisis. There were threats about what would be done to the "delegates" if they dared to claim that they represented the people of Manzanar or if they took any objectionable action which was in any way binding upon the residents of Manzanar. (Opler, "A History of Internal Government at Manzanar, March 42-Dec 42," 7/15/44, pp. 97-8, Merritt Collection, #122, Box 12, File #1, SC-URL, UCLA.)

Needless to say, Fred Tayama was one of the Manzanar delegates. He returned to camp on December 4, 1942. Coincidentally, the night of his return was marked by the removal of a Block representative by the FBI.

When Fred Tayama was beaten and Harry Ueno accused of being one of the attackers, the powder keg blew. To be fair, "JACL Activity" was by no means the only contributing cause to this event. Tanaka also lays blame at the "inadequate, ill-prepared or ill-advised Administrators," to the government decision of mass evacuation based upon race, and basic incompatibility of the conflicting groups. (Tanaka, "Report of Manzanar Riot," pp. 59, 46, File O 10.12, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Government sources, other than Opler also lay the blame for the disturbance, in part on JACL members. When Robert Throckmorton, the Project Attorney concluded his Memorandum to Ralph Merritt on the "events leading up to the Riot of December 6, 1942" he wrote the following:

Perhaps, the main significance of these comments is that they show that the primary reasons for the demonstration did not involve the question of loyalty or disloyalty or the fact that the anniversary of Pearl Harbor was at hand. The primary causes appear to be (1) those which led the people to believe that Ueno had been unjustly arrested; and, (2) those which led them to hate Fred Tayama, other JACL leaders and certain members of the Administrative staff.

(Throckmorton, 12/6/43, p.3, Merritt Collection, #122, Box 16, File "Law & Order," SC-URL, UCLA.)

Ralph Merritt himself, in a letter to Dillon Myer, dated January 7, 1943 referred to "the chief sources of the disturbance to the peace of Manzanar-the Los Angeles JACL crowd, headed by the Tayamas...and the Tanakas." (Merritt Collection, #122, Box 16, File "Law & Order Incident," SC-URL, UCLA.)

It may be fair to say that the actions of a handful of men, who were one of several contributing causes for the riot at Manzanar, should not bring down the organization to which they belonged. However, as was pointed out by one of those men, Togo Tanaka, these men, more or less represented in the public's mind the JACL. Any impact they had upon events leading up to December 6, 1942 was and has been perceived as JACL'S impact on the same events.

IID. Position and Action on Loyalty Oath

**NO-NOS**

After Registration, what were the JACL's position and actions towards those who answered NO to questions 27 and 28 of the "Application for Leave Clearance" first distributed on February 10, 1943?

Inter-office correspondence beginning May 19, 1943 from Saburo Kido to Teiko Ishida contains the following discussion:

Regarding the members who answered "no", Mike suggests that we send out a bulletin to all chapters that such members will be suspended. He believes this is necessary for our records; that is, we should be clear as to the loyalty of our members. Also we cannot accept anyone who has answered, "no." (JACL Archives.)

The response, dated May 21, 1943, from Teiko Ishida, to Kido offers this:

Mike certainly has had a change of heart. We felt right along that the no-no's should be segregated and no further effort be expended upon them. However, a bulletin to all chapters announcing that all "no-no" members would be suspended will be of no avail unless we have a list of such registrants. Furthermore, we must have this list of no-no's in order to refuse membership to certain individuals. Please have Mike secure such a list from the WRA before we can issue such a bulletin or know to whom to refuse membership. (JACL Archives.)

Kido writes another letter, dated May 25, 1943 to Hito Okada and Teiko Ishida, which begins with this paragraph:

As far as the "no-no" ones are concerned, I don't think we can possibly find out so the best thing is just issue the request to sign the loyalty pledge of all associated members. Then if there is a chapter, issue a special letter to the chapter that the "no-no" ones will have to be suspended until such time as the records are cleared. And if they have any reason for changing the answer to yes, possibly we can suggest to write to the WRA. It is the best that we do this and protect our position. (JACL Archives.)

The response, dated May 27, 1943, was that "we shall continue having our Associated members execute the Oath of Allegiance if they have not previously done so." Also, only two chapters would be requested to suspend their "no-no" members. This same information was also sent to Mike Masaoka by Teiko Ishida on the same date, May 27, 1943. (JACL Archives)

It would seem that JACL's position towards the "no-nos" was that they should be segregated. This was expressed by Teiko Ishida, a staffer at the Salt Lake City Headquarters Office. Not just segregated but "no further effort expended upon them." Interestingly, Masaoka was not of the same opinion initially, as was also reflected in Ishida's letter, but must have come around. What is both implied and expressed in this correspondence is the presumption that those who answered "no" to both questions were disloyal, and should be dealt with accordingly.

Contrast the JACL view with the concerns expressed to Dillon Myer by Ralph Merritt, Project Director at Manzanar. In his February 27, 1943 letter, he states:

On the other hand, it is important to determine whether the "no" answer on the loyalty question actually means a renouncing of citizenship or whether it is a protest indirectly arising from the pressures of the father who is a non-citizen or directly representing the outcry of a man who has, in his opinion, been ruthlessly and wrongfully deprived during the last year of his rights and position as a citizen. When all the motives have been reviewed it must be concluded that there is no such thing as a line of strict demarcation...It is my considered conclusion that the answer "No" has many shades of meaning and is prompted by many motives, some of which are attributable to our failures both past and present, and some of which may yet be modified and reversed without damage to the principles of American citizenship. (Merritt Collection #122, Box 15, File "Chandler", SC-URL, UCLA.)

Thus, unlike the JACL, Merritt saw no presumption of disloyalty in the "no" answer and acknowledged both the possibility of WRA errors and a means of rehabilitation.

On the other hand, the JACL was well aware of the confusion posed by Question #28, particularly to the Issei. Bulletin No. 3-D, dated February 23, 1943 from JACL National Headquarters listed a number of items of which the Washington representative was requested to seek clarification. "Confusion exists as to whether question No. 28 has been officially changed or not." (JACL Archives.)

The concern expressed was that Japanese nationals might become citizens without a country if they answered in the affirmative. The clarification was that "Question No. 28 has been officially changed by the WRA and recognized by the War Department. The justice of the Issei complaints was quickly realized." (JACL Archives)

On the issue of renunciation of citizenship, an April 13, 1944 letter to the War Relocation Authority from Teiko Ishida, now Acting National Secretary indicated JACL's position. "It is a matter of debate, but we agree with Attorney General Biddle that those who answered in the negative to question 28 heretofore have not expatriated. In other words they are still American citizens." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 142, General Classified Files 21.012, File #32, "April 1944.")

IIE. Position and Action on Resisters and the WRA Segregation Process.

**RESISTERS-HEART MOUNTAIN**

The policies and positions taken by the JACL relative to the draft resisters at Heart Mountain were clearly and plainly spelled out in correspondence, bulletins, memoranda and in the editorials of the Pacific Citizen.

One document in which JACL's position was concisely put forth is a copy of a letter from Saburo Kido, dated April 3, 1944. On page two is a short paragraph dealing with the Heart Mountain Resisters. "The group at Heart Mountain definitely should be charged with sedition, especially the leaders. The FBI has been studying the situation in the centers and we were asked to loan them copies of the Rocky Shimo." (JACL Archives.)

In Bulletin #9, dated April 11, 1944 from JACL in Salt Lake City, National President Saburo Kido introduced copies of letters sent to Kiyoshi Okamoto of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee and a Jack Nakagawa of Littleton, Colorado. We are told that "both letters were sent by Mr. Roger N. Baldwin, National Director of the American Civil Liberties Union." (JACL Archives.) Both letters inform their respective recipients of the moral strength and legal weakness of their refusal to accept the military draft. "The men who have refused to accept military draft are within their rights, but they of course must take the consequences. They doubtless have a strong moral case, but no legal case at all." (JACL Archives.)

This particular Bulletin and the refusal of Roger Baldwin to represent any of the draft resisters has led three historians to question the role of the JACL in this refusal of legal assistance.

What had occurred was that Kiyoshi Okamoto, head of the Fair Play Committee, had written to the ACLU for legal assistance in challenging the constitutionality of drafting internees. National Director of the ACLU, Roger Baldwin responded with the letter which was reprinted by the JACL in the aforementioned Bulletin #9 by Saburo Kido and which Baldwin had released to the press.

Thus the question which has been raised by Richard Drinnon, Douglas Nelson and Roger Daniels is why Baldwin made the letter public and what the JACL's role was in this action?

Douglas Nelson, in his Heart Mountain: The History of an American Concentration Camp, (Wisconsin State Historical Society: Madison, 1976.) pp. 153-54 indicated that there was

evidence which implied that Baldwin's action had been at the request of the JACL's Salt Lake City headquarters.

Likewise Roger Daniels writes, "what caused Baldwin to release his letter publicly is not clear, but a letter from Project Director Robertson to Dillon Myer implies that the JACL's Salt Lake City headquarters may have requested him to do so." (Concentration Camps:North America, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co. Inc.:Malabar,Florida,1981, pp. 126-7.)

The evidence to which all three authors point is a letter dated April 17, 1944 from Guy Robertson, Project Director of Heart Mountain Relocation Project to Dillon Myer, Director of the WRA. The first two paragraphs from the letter follow below:

In our lead story, this week we carried a letter written by Roger Baldwin, National Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and directed to Kiyoshi Okamoto, former leader of the Fair Play Committee within this center. The letter, mimeographed and released by the Salt Lake City Headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League with the approval of the New York office of the ACLU, is the strongest documentary evidence that has come to our hands to support our contention that draft resistance is not only ill advised, but unsupported legally as a means toward securing full citizenship rights for Japanese Americans. (File M 1.09, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

We can determine from this letter that at the least, the ACLU and JACL worked in concert on the release of the Baldwin-to-Okamoto letter to the public. Nor were their joint efforts just in the logistics of releasing the matter to the public, but they undoubtedly shared in what both organizations must have anticipated as the impact upon the resistance movement and the Fair Play Committee as Heart Mountain. "[T]he major spokesman for civil liberties in the United States had supported the JACL line, whose adherents were jubilant: ACLU TAKES ISSUE WITH OKAMOTO was the Sentinel headline." (Daniels, Concentration Camps:North America, Krieger:Malabar, 1981, pp.126-7.)

Whether JACL had any hand in the content of the letter is not revealed by the Robertson-Myer letter. In Richard Drinnon's view, referring to the "ACLU-JACL-WRA axis" (p.301)

[e]vidence abounds that close working relationships kept the national line taut. Myer rode in tandem with Masaoka, as we

have seen, and also shared information and documents with Baldwin. On August 31, 1943, for instance, he sent Baldwin the "confidential" case history of Roku M. (NA, RG 210), the former chief of the warehouse at the Heart Mountain Hospital and currently an inmate of Leupp. In turn Baldwin shared data and views with Myer and the JACL Secretary-see, for example, his memorandum "for Ernest Besig, A.L. Wirin, Mike Masaoka," April 19, 1943 CHS 3580.

The next significant JACL document is one entitled VISIT TO CHEYENNE COUNTY JAIL WITH JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT DELINQUENTS. The interviewers were Min Yasui, who identified himself as an attorney and Joe Grant Masaoka, JACL Regional Representative. The purposes of the trip, according to the first page of this five page document, were two-fold.

By interviewing the boys in the Cheyenne County Jail, it was hoped that some indication of the processes of thinking and the manner of organization behind the draft resistance could be gained, so as to be able to work the best procedures and the most practical programs to counteract such influences in the relocation centers. In addition thereto, it if were possible to persuade any of the boys at the Cheyenne County Jail to reconsider his stand, it was felt that such repudiation would have some effect upon the draft-resistance group in the centers, and tend to dissuade others from following the same course of action. (JACL Archives, p.1.)

Many authors, Peter Irons included, have noted with some irony, the fact that Min Yasui attempted to dissuade these young draft resisters from taking a stand which was similar to his earlier challenge of the curfew restrictions. Yasui himself in this document attests to the similarity between his struggle and that of the draft resisters. In identifying himself in the document, Yasui states that he is,

a licensed attorney in the State of Oregon, who had attempted to secure a Supreme Court declaration of citizenship rights of the Nisei, identical to that which these Nisei draft violators are now seeking...(JACL Archives, p. 1.)

Regardless of this admitted identity in why Yasui had challenged curfew and why these resisters had challenged the draft, Min's purpose in this interview was to try to change their minds. Yasui "believed that a personal interview with these boys would reveal to them the legal fallacies of their

thinking and attitude. It was felt that a man who has had legal training and experiences in a county jail would have some effect upon the boys in the Cheyenne County Jail." (Ibid.) At a recent forum on the Heart Mountain Draft Resisters, the irony of what Min Yasui was attempting to do did not go unaddressed. "It was all right for Min Yasui to challenge the government and to fight for his constitutional rights, but it was wrong for us to do so." (Koshiyama, Mits, Pacific Citizen, Friday, September 8, 1989, "So. Calif. JACLers Throw Spotlight on Nisei WWII Draft Resistance Movement.")

Of particular note in the interview of the Heart Mountain Resisters is the content of a conversation between Yasui and Masaoka and Carl L. Sackett, the U.S. Attorney for Wyoming.

In talking to the U.S. Attorney, we pointed out that the actions of these boys was not a deliberate and intentional act of disloyalty, but rather an ineffectual and certainly ill-advised protest against the injustices and suspension of certain civil rights for the past two years suffered by those of Japanese ancestry. (JACL Archives, p.2.)

This is a remarkable statement in light of the earlier comments by Saburo Kido that these men should be charged with sedition and in view of the comments seen in the Pacific Citizen and Heart Mountain Sentinel editorials. Moreover, the conversation with Sackett took place prior to the commencement of any interviews with draft resisters. Nonetheless, it appeared clear from the interview document that neither Yasui or Masaoka felt the draft resisters were disloyal or seditious. Not only that, but that the resisters were willing to serve in the military once their citizenship rights were restored. This is confirmed later in the text when six of the 17 resisters who were housed in the Cheyenne County Jail (out of a total of 59 who were scattered in six jails throughout Wyoming) were interviewed.

Unanimously, they admitted they were fighting to secure court action in order to clarify their citizenship rights and status. Apparently, they believe that this is the last resort by which they can hope to gain a restoration of suspended civil rights, such as the right to return to the Prohibited Areas on the West Coast. None of the boys have signed expatriation papers. They continue to express a willingness to enter the Army, if their concepts of equality of treatment and citizenship are fulfilled. (JACL Archives, p.3.)

In fact, the basic issues of loyalty and willingness to serve in the military had been confirmed earlier during the registration period at Heart Mountain. As Roger Daniels tells us:

As it turned out, almost all of the key leaders of what I have called the "left opposition" remained at Heart Mountain after segregation because they had either answered "Yes-Yes" to the crucial questions or had so qualified their answers that they were not "eligible" for segregation. (Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger:Malabar 1981, p.123.)

A flyer distributed at a public forum co-sponsored by the PSWDC JACL and the Southern Calif. Japanese American United Methodist Council also claimed that most the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee Draft Resisters "answered 'yes' to both questions or had qualified their answers." (Flyer.)

All of this notwithstanding, two copies of the interview were furnished to the FBI's Denver Special Agent in Charge who then transmitted the same to the Director of the FBI. This is documented by an FBI Office Memorandum Cover Memo, dated May 26, 1944. (Courtesy Aiko Herzig.)

What then is the significance of draft resistance by "loyal" Japanese Americans and JACL's response to same? Perhaps Roger Daniels can best sum it up.

This account of the "loyal" Japanese American resistance-what I have called the "left opposition"-is highly significant. It calls into question the stereotype of the Japanese American victim of oppression during World War II who met his fate with stoic resignation and responded only with superpatriotism. This stereotype, like most, has some basis in reality. Many Japanese Americans, conforming to the JACL line, honestly felt that the only way they could ever win a place for themselves in America was by being better Americans than most. Whether or not this kind of passive submission is the proper way for free men to respond to injustice and racism, is, of course a matter of opinion. But it is important to note that not all "loyal" Japanese Americans submitted; the resistance of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee and of other individuals and groups in the other camps, has been almost totally ignored and in some instances deliberately suppressed by chroniclers of the Japanese Americans. The JACL-WRA view has dominated the writing of the evacuation's postwar history, thereby nicely illustrating E.H.

Carr's dictum that history is written by the winners. The authors of these works have in some cases been ignorant of the nature and scope of the "left opposition"; others, more knowledgeable, have either consciously underplayed it or suppressed it completely, hoping thereby, in their view at least, to manage and improve the image of an oppressed people. There are those, however, who will find more heroism in resistance than in patient resignation. (Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger:Malabar, 1981, pp.128-9.)

### PACIFIC CITIZEN

The first editorial discussion of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee in the Pacific Citizen was in Saburo Kido's column "Timely Topics" in the Saturday, March 25, 1944 issue, p.6. The title was HEART MOUNTAIN'S FAIR PLAY GROUP, and it read:

Any person who incites or encourages any citizen to evade the draft is assuming a grave responsibility. It is needless to say the offense constitutes sedition. One must remember that one of the most serious offenses a person can commit is to become a 'draft dodger'. A nation will not easily forgive or quickly forget anyone who refuses to serve when his country calls in a national emergency. It will be a tragic mistake to have young men who are 18 or thereabouts to become stigmatized as "draft dodgers" for the rest of their lives. (Pacific Citizen, vol. 18, Jan 1 to June 24, 1944.)

Again in a subsequent column, Saburo Kido wrote "... no one will be sympathetic or condone 'draft dodging'. This is one of the worst crimes that any citizen can commit." (Ibid, Saturday, April 1, 1944.)

In the same issue, Bill Hosokawa in his "From the Frying Pan" column, subtitled "Periodic Patriots in Relocation Centers", stated:

At first glance it would seem that the committees that have sprung up in the various relocation centers are all motivated by a sincere desire to seek a showdown, once and for all, as to the legal status of the nisei. Undoubtedly many of the individuals behind these committees are sincere, and their loyalty is beyond question. But there are others who can be identified only

as periodical patriots, individuals who protest their Americanism and demand their rights as citizens only when they are confronted with the task of fulfilling the responsibilities of that citizenship. (Ibid, p.5.)

Larry Tajiri wrote in an editorial called "The Bitter Harvest":

This act of defiance by 41 young men is the result of a combination of circumstances, misguided leadership and information, and strong pressures and influences. Its effect may be that of negating the victory of loyal Japanese Americans in winning the reinstatement of selective service, and may retard the eventual full restoration to Japanese Americans of the privileges of freedom which are the birthright of every American. By their action these young men, and those who prompted their action, have injured the cause of loyal Japanese everywhere. (Ibid, Saturday, April 8, 1944, p.4.)

#### HEART MOUNTAIN SENTINEL

Lauren Kessler, an associate professor of journalism at the University of Oregon recently published a study of camp newspapers. Kessler concluded that "the journalistic product that emerged reflected the fettered freedoms of internees, not the realities of internment." (Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese Internment Camps, Journalism History 15:2-3 Summer/Autumn 1988, p. 71.) Kessler examined the Heart Mountain Sentinel and found it "the most professionally produced and edited paper." (Ibid, p.73.) The Sentinel was edited by Bill Hosokawa. "The paper devoted considerable space to stories about Japanese American war heroes, the successes of relocated camp inmates and news of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) a national accommodationist organization in which Hosokawa was active." (Ibid, emphasis in original.) In assessing whether the Sentinel maintained editorial independence, Kessler wrote that Hosokawa was "echoing accommodationist ideology," and avoided controversial issues. (Ibid.) "When the newspaper did recognize controversial issues, it invariably took the side of the administration." (Ibid, p.74.)

Nowhere was this more the case than when the issue of draft resistance arose.

But perhaps the best examples of where the Sentinel's sympathies lay was its ongoing editorial rebuttal of Heart Mountain's draft

resistance movement. The paper heralded the reclassification and drafting of Nisei as "a great news" early in 1944, mirroring the accomodationist line that being allowed to join the military was an unbeatable opportunity for Japanese Americans to prove their loyalty...The Sentinel called the draft resisters variously "stubborn and intensely bitter," "deluded youths," and warped-minded members" who made "wild-eyed statements" and "lacked both physical and moral courage." (Ibid, p.74.)

One editorial in particular captured the type of feelings brought out by the draft and opposition to it by the Fair Play Committee at Heart Mountain. It was published on March 18, 1944, and was titled "Provocateurs". The most strongly worded portions are reproduced below.

Since the announcement of reinstatement of selective service for nisei, Heart Mountain as has other centers, been infected by a new type of provocateur, who lacking both moral and physical courage is doing his utmost to discredit honest and straight-forward persons of Japanese ancestry. These Janus-faced individuals are using the same tactics that have been employed on other occasions. While their bulletins profess loyalty and plead good citizenship, they proceed rat-like with stealthy approach to intimidate and even threaten with bodily harm those who oppose them. (Heart Mountain Sentinel, March 18, 1944, p.4.)

This particular editorial also used such language as "slow-witted", "warped-minded", "wild-eyed", "foolhardy", "whimpering weaklings", "carpings of a small, vicious group" to describe the draft resisters and Fair Play Committee members at Heart Mountain. (Ibid.)

The July 1, 1944 editorial, which was written in response to the trial of 63 Heart Mountain Resisters, read as follows:

Loyal Japanese Americans as a whole condemn the Fair Play Committee and the action of the 63 defendants as being as serious an attack on the integrity of all nisei as the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. (Kessler, "Fettered Freedoms", Journalism History, 15:2-3 Summer/Autumn, p. 74.)

Kessler concluded,

in avoiding certain issues and toeing the

accomodationist line on others, the Sentinel published material that must have been pleasing to camp officials. For this reason, Hosokawa and Haruo Omura, who took over the editorship in 1944, undoubtedly experienced the freedom to publish what they wished. (Ibid.)

Indeed, Kessler is not the only author who characterized the editorials of the Heart Mountain Sentinel as "accomodationist." Roger Daniels also wrote that "the Sentinel, now under the editorship of Haruo Omura, ... [was] still following the JACL line..." (Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger:Malabar, 1981, p. 123.)

#### RESISTERS-OTHER CAMPS

According to WRA statistics, as of September 2, 1944, the number of young men from the camps who refused to report for induction were 91. There were 55 from Colorado River or Poston, and 33 from Minidoka. The total number of those who refused to report for physical examination was 164. Broken down by camp, the numbers follow:

|                |    |                                      |
|----------------|----|--------------------------------------|
| Central Utah   | 4  |                                      |
| Colorado River | 14 |                                      |
| Gila River     | 0  |                                      |
| Granada        | 32 |                                      |
| Heart Mountain | 84 | (notation reads subject to revision) |
| Jerome         | 1  |                                      |
| Manzanar       | 0  |                                      |
| Minidoka       | 2  |                                      |
| Rohwer         | 3  |                                      |
| Tule Lake      | 24 |                                      |

(NA, RG 210, Entry 3, Box 3, File "Semi-Annual Report-WRA, Printed Jan 1 to June 30, 1944, p.20)

A later table, in Weekly Report 41, for June 9, 1945 had a total of 157 who refused induction, 177 who refused to report for physicals. Out of 310 who were then arrested, 144 had been convicted, 97 in the process of being tried, 28 release, and 27 awaiting trial. (War Relocation Authority, Statistics Section, found in JACL Archives.)

The JACL was apparently concerned enough about the resistance at other camps to send Min Yasui to report on a meeting held at Granada-Amache on April 6, 1944. Yasui prepared a five page report on a discussion which took place between Hugh McBeth, a black civil rights attorney from Los Angeles and the family members of the young men who were incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Engelwood, Colorado for violation of Selective Service regulations. On the document was handwriting which read

"Saburo Kido" "Strictly Personal" and "Min Yasui requests that this be kept under wraps, Joe." (JACL Archives.) The content of the report is irrelevant to this study, since it is mostly a tirade on the question of race as it relates to the war and the United States.

A JACL inter-office correspondence dated June 29, 1944, reporting on activities between May 17, 1944 and June 24, 1944, began with the heading, "Amache Draft Situation Reported Getting Worse." The report also had news on the attorney for the "Amache Draft Delinquents." Based upon the discussion in the document, it seems there were some 14 "draft delinquents" who were going to trial. They had dismissed their individual attorneys and obtained the services of Samuel D. Menin, the same attorney who represented the Heart Mountain Resisters. No indication of policy was set forth, other than a concern that the previously appointed attorneys might serve the men better than Menin. (JACL Archives.)

Two documents which do offer the position of the JACL are a March 20th, 1944 letter to Frank Yamasaki and a March 30th, 1944 letter to Chaplain Yamada, both written by Saburo Kido, with copies sent to Dillon S. Myer. The relevant excerpts are set forth below.

Although we are in fully [sic] accord with all the principles set forth by your committee, we firmly believe that the Nisei must prove their loyalty by service first. We must be realistic in meeting this crucial test. If the Nisei produce a mass of "draft dodgers", and that will be the brand which will be attached to anyone who refuses to comply with the law, regardless of the reasons advanced, the fight for the restoration of any rights suspended will be that much difficult. Even the action of two at the Minidoka Relocation Center and the five at the Granada Relocation Center have had unfavorable repercussions. A draft dodger will not be easily forgiven or quickly forgotten by the nation...Every "draft dodger" is going to betray these staunch, loyal friends who have suffered humiliation, insults and threats besides loses in business in some instances. In one sense, the Nisei have come to pity and feel sorry for their plight to such a degree that their thinking is becoming self-centered. (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 471, File 71.505, JACL, "From 1942" pp.1-2.)

The excerpt from the letter to Chaplain Yamada:

When the 442nd Combat Team was organized, the

JACL supported it...The JACL was blamed as the "busybody" instrumental in having such a thing brought about when the draft was reinstated for the Nisei. We do not claim credit for this restoration of the Nisei to serve their country. ...We have fought any agitation which would influence the Nisei to violate the draft laws. (Ibid, p.3.)

A letter of acknowledgment written by Dillon Myer to Saburo Kido dated April 19, 1944 states "it seems to me that the position of the JACL is clearly set forth in these two letters." (Ibid.)

### SEGREGATION

The earliest statement of JACL policy on the issue of segregation is the June 6, 1942 Memorandum on War Relocation Authority letterhead, signed by Masaoka, Matsumoto and Inagaki, discussed in the section of this study dealing with the WRA. The relevant portion reads "[i]ncidentally, we are in unanimous agreement as to the principle of segregation." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 286, File 39.050.) This is corroborated by the diary entry of Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, for Thursday, June 11, at 11:06.

Mr. Matsuoka [sic], Mr. Inigaki [sic]-conference Mr. Eisenhower present, they wanted segregation system set up in camps. We are disinclined to do it. Very agreeable interview. (Courtesy Michi Weglyn.)

The next discussion appears in an exchange of correspondence between Dillon Myer of the WRA and Mike Masaoka. In a confidential letter dated December 224, 1942, Myer replies to Masaoka, by air mail to a "wire of yesterday concerning the removal of disloyal evacuees. As you must know the problem of segregation is probably the most complex of the many complex problems developing out of the evacuation." (Myer, December 24, 1942, File T 6.11, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Apparently, Masaoka considered the issue urgent enough to send a telegram to Myer. In this letter, Myer proceeds to outline the difficulties and dangers of formulating a segregation program. He closes by asking Masaoka to submit a statement to Myer's committee on the subject. (Ibid.)

Masaoka responds in a letter dated January 14, 1943, via air mail, special delivery, out of the Salt Lake City Headquarters. The cover letter indicates that the "enclosed report is one which combines our thinking as well as our recommendations." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 559, File 711.505.) The statement is a "collaboration of certain of

our key people in the centers." (Ibid.) Titled "Confidential Statement," the five page document discusses the problem of "segregating 'loyal to America' Japanese from those who are 'loyal to Japan'." After outlining the difficulties in segregation and indicating that the bulk of both Issei and Nisei are at least passively loyal to the U.S. Masaoka emphasizes:

Notwithstanding these difficulties, it seems imperative to us that immediate action should be taken in every center to "pull out" those who are constantly agitating against this government or its representatives, or fomenting dissension and violence. The people in the center must be convinced beyond all doubt that the government means to protect the loyal and to enforce law and order at all times and for all persons. (Ibid, p.2.)

The reference in a later paragraph to the "agitation in Manzanar and Poston" leads to the conclusion that Masaoka's original telegram was in response to the uprisings there during November and December of 1942, as well as to the threats against JACL leaders there.

This is the approach offered by Masaoka.

Immediate action should be taken whereby, without warning or hearing, known agitators and troublemakers are moved out of the relocation centers and placed in special camps of their own...We believe that, should they be forewarned of their approaching segregation, they would either create a militant sentiment against their removal or organize to resist it. Too, if hearings are provided, they might raise the cry that they were unjustly accused and tired, that they were "framed," etc. In order to avoid such arrangements and charges, we suggest that the WRA, upon completion of their investigation, should segregate, summarily all those whom they feel are dangerous to internal security. (Ibid, p.3.)

Masaoka lists those who are the troublemakers; single men without vested interests in the U.S., those released from Justice Camps, professional gamblers, pro-Japan Kibei, bachelors who lost everything in evacuation, members of the Toyo Club and Black Dragon Society. (Ibid.)

A further concern is that "practically every person who has been 'beaten up' in the centers is a member of our Japanese American Citizens League." (Ibid.)

What role did the JACL envision for itself in the segregation process?

Most of our chapter leaders have signified their willingness to name those whom they consider inimical to center welfare if their own names are not revealed. The names which they might submit could be checked with others who are reliable and are not members of the JACL in order to insure against possible prejudices simply because of organizational differences. (Ibid.)

Masaoka proposed a four step process.

1) the immediate apprehension and removal of known troublemakers, 2) the segregation of those who desire repatriation to Japan, 3) the placing of trained investigators within the centers to ferret out those who are disloyal, and 4) the selection of experienced internal security administrators and more careful appointment of departmental personnel. (Ibid, p.5.)

Thus, JACL had been an early and consistent advocate for segregation, though it was not until disturbances at Poston and Manzanar, as well as the beatings of JACL leaders, that specific measures were offered to the WRA. In the months after this confidential statement was submitted to Myer, we are told how the registration process also impacted upon the question of segregation.

After the registration of February, 1943, increasing pressure was brought to bear on the administration of the WRA by the Army, the Japanese American Citizens League, and all project directors, to segregate those who had refused to answer the questionnaire or who had answered the "loyalty" questions in the negative. (tenBroek, Jacobus; Barnhart, Edward; Matson, Floyd, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, Univ. of Calif. Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954, p. 161.)

Masaoka's "Final Report" also addressed this issue in the following manner.

The National President [Saburo Kido], in fact, welcomed the attack upon his person as the beginning of a campaign to cleanse and purge the relocation centers of undesirables and trouble makers. JACL demanded a segregation program whereby those professing disloyalty, causing continual trouble, or expounding un-American doctrines be taken out of the relocation centers

and placed in a special camp reserved for their kind. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, pp. 115-116, File T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

We assume that answering NO to questions 27 and 28 of the Application for Leave Clearance was a profession of disloyalty according to Masaoka.