

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SELECT COMMITTEE
ON
RESOLUTION NO. 7
TO THE
JACL NATIONAL COUNCIL

Presented at the 31st Biennial Convention

San Diego, California

June 17 - 22, 1990

TABLE CONTENTS

Introduction and Methodology	2
The Prewar World of the Mainland Nisei	5
The Early Years of the JAACL	7
Voluntary Evacuation	9
Meeting with Governor Olson	10
Tolan Committee	10
Special National Board and Council Meeting, JAACL	11
No-No's and Draft Resisters	14
The JAACL Position and Action on the Loyalty Questionnaire	17
JAACL Actions Towards No-No's	17
JAACL Position on Segregation	19
JAACL Position on Draft Resisters	21
Conclusion	27

INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY

At the 30th Biennial JACL National Convention held in Seattle, Washington, the Seattle JACL presented Resolution No. 7 as follows:

WHEREAS, the US of A this year has made a significant and symbolic gesture serving to begin the healing process of deeply felt injuries caused by the gross injustice perpetrated against Americans of Japanese ancestry in 1942 with the mass incarceration of those people in detention camps by the passing of the Civil Liberties Act of 1987,

WHEREAS, In the Civil Liberties Act the President and Congress recognizes and apologizes for the injury, injustice and pain endured by over 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry,

WHEREAS, in the time of uncertainty, stress and social upheaval, a handful of persons had thrust upon them overwhelming responsibilities, without benefit of reflective time, proper delegation of authority nor institutional support,

WHEREAS, a number of Japanese Americans were not only victims of the racist events of 1942 but further were the victims of their own fellow oppressed internees within the confines of particular detention/concentration camps,

WHEREAS, in times of duress not all persons act with noble and honorable instincts, though everyone in the concentration camps were all victims,

WHEREAS, JACL recognizes that pain and resentment remains in the hearts of a number of our fellow citizens of Japanese ancestry and with the bitterness still unresolved--reference is to the "NO-NO BOYS",

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the JACL recognize that a number of our community citizens were injured by persons acting individually and in the name of the JACL and that the JACL apologizes for their injuries, pain and injustice born by them.

FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED that the JACL will do everything in its power to go forth to heal these wounds and to reach out to all of our community to encourage all to endeavor for the benefit of each of us.

The often spirited debate on the issue did not succeed in producing a timely resolution to the issue. As a result, the delegate from the Golden Gate chapter moved to refer the Resolution to a special Presidential Select Committee for a thorough study with all appropriate documentation; and that the report be presented to the 1990 National Council. The motion was passed. A principal argument for the study by a special committee was a feeling by Sanseis that there was a need to understand the issues surrounding the resolution in order to make an informed decision.

At its September 1988 meeting, the JACL National Board directed the National Staff to recommend alternative approaches for factfinding. In November, 1988 the National Staff presented various approaches that included research, public forums, interviews and combinations thereof. At its February 1989 meeting, the JACL National Board directed that research should be conducted to provide information related to the subject matter. Subsequently, interviews were conducted and written comments

were solicited from individuals. In an effort to ensure that all issues pertinent to Resolution No. 7 would be covered in the research, the following outline was provided for the researcher.

1. JACL: Pre-Evacuation (1941 - Spring, 1942)
 - A. The activities and relationship with governmental agencies prior to December 7, 1941.
 - B. Response to declaration of war with Japan.
 - C. Response to various military orders, curfew.
 - D. The decision to cooperate with evacuation.
 - E. Actions initiated in community.

2. Internment Period (1942-45)
 - A. JACL position on legal test cases.
 - B. Relationship with War Relocation Authority and other governmental agencies.
 - C. JACL activities in camp.
 - D. Position and actions on the Loyalty Oath.
 - E. Position and actions on Resisters and the WRA Segregation process.

In addition, the purposes of the research were outlined in the following questions:

1. What were the policies and positions taken by the JACL in response to the military and government actions relative to the curfew, evacuation and detention of Japanese Americans?
2. What actions did the JACL take to implement its policies prior to and during the internment?
3. What impact did the JACL's actions have upon the Japanese American community?

Deborah Lim, was engaged in June 1989 to perform research for the Committee's review. Ms. Lim, a lawyer by training and currently an instructor of Asian Studies at San Francisco State University, was assigned the following responsibilities:

1. Gather current papers and publications discussing the wartime role of JACL relative to the purposes of this study.
2. Research JACL's archives for documents expressing or advocating JACL's wartime position relative to the purposes of this study.
3. Conduct archival research of government documents relative to the purposes of this study.
4. Research oral history collections for the experiences of former internees relative to the purposes of this study.
5. Extract and assemble all information in narrative form for submission to the Committee.

Ms. Lim's research included the following sources: Bound volumes of the Pacific Citizen; approximately 15 file boxes of JACL documents, bulletins, correspondence, inter-office communications and memoranda located at national headquarters; Minutes for the Special Emergency Meeting in March,

1942, Minutes for the Special Emergency Conference in November, 1942 and Biennial Minutes for 1946; two boxes of JACL files from Salt Lake City and Idaho Falls; Bancroft Library including War Relocation Authority Records, the papers of Wayne Collins the Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, the papers of Evelyn Whitehead McCool, a WRA social worker; Special Collections at the University Research Library at UCLA including the papers of Ralph Merritt, Manzanar Project Director, the Japanese American Research Project collection; National Archives and Records Administration including WRA Records, Western Defense Command Records, files of the Commission of Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians; Operational Archives-Naval Historical Center in Washington, DC including Naval Intelligence Reports; The papers of James Y. Sakamoto on microfilm; Oral History Tapes of Saburo Kido, Mike Masaoka, Togo Tanaka, Sally Slocum, Lee Murata; Interviews with Mike Masaoka, Bill Hosokawa.

Shortly thereafter, JACL president, Cressey Nakagawa, appointed the following individuals to serve on the Committee which met in December, 1989 and February, 1990.

- * Cressey Nakagawa, San Francisco; Attorney; Chairman, Presidential Select Committee for Resolution No. 7; JACL National President.
- * Toaru Ishiyama, Cleveland; Ph.D in clinical psychology; Executive Director, Cuyahoga County Community Mental Health Board.
- * Lillian Kimura, New York; Associate National Director, YWCA of the USA; Pacific Citizen Board Chair; President, New York JACL.
- * Marilyn Hall Patel, San Francisco; Judge, Federal District Court for Northern California in San Francisco; presiding judge in the Corum Nobis case of Fred Korematsu; former legal counsel for the National Organization of Women (NOW).
- * Homer Yasui, Portland, Oregon; Retired physician; Former Governor of the Pacific Northwest District Council, JACL.

The following is the report of the Presidential Select Committee on Resolution No. 7.

The Committee's research compilation on areas unrelated to Resolution No. 7 as designated by the JACL National Board will be provided to the National Board.

THE PREWAR WORLD OF THE MAINLAND NISEI: A HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The great majority of Nisei were born before 1930 into a world of racial exclusion. Their Issei parents were denied U.S. citizenship and, thus, a voice in the American political system. Progressively harsher measures deprived the Issei -- nearly half of whom were farmers -- of the right to own land. Few options in housing or occupation were open and few Nikkei families were integrated into mainstream prewar American society. Rather, they concentrated their social and business activities in Japantowns that sprang up along the West Coast.

The denial of citizenship was an enormous burden for the Issei. Lack of citizenship also precluded their ability to develop any political power. In addition, the Alien Land Laws deprived the Issei--nearly half of whom were farmers--the right to own land. In "Strangers From a Different Shore," Ronald Takaki describes the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 as a turning point in the lives of the Issei generation.

The 1924 law was a turning point in the lives of the Issei generation. They saw the handwriting on the wall: They had no future in their adopted land, except through their children--the Nisei. The Issei could see they had been doomed to be foreigners forever, their dreams destroyed and their sweat soaked up in an expanse called America. Denied land ownership and citizenship, the Issei placed their "only one hope left" in their American-born children...But theirs had been a life of constant struggle, ganbatte. And many Issei became even more determined to help their children succeed. Through the Nisei, the parents hoped, Japanese would no longer be forced to be "strangers" in America. English speaking and educated in American schools, the second-generation would be "ambassadors" for the Issei. They would teach white Americans about the culture of Japan and the hopes and history of the immigrant generation. As "intermediaries", they would "interpret" the East to the West and the West to the East."

Issei tried to give the second generation strength and confidence for their mission by teaching them the Japanese principles of ko (duty to parent), giri (mutual obligation), on (ascriptive obligation), and gamanzuyoi (strength and endurance). (Takaki, pp. 212-13)

Takaki continues:

The immigrants worked hard and saved their money in order to send their children to college so that they would not be "inferior to Americans." They stressed the need for the Nisei to excel in education, for it would be the key to overcoming the "handicap" of discrimination and "the racial mark of the Mongolian face." "You are American citizens," Issei reminded their children time and again as though repeating a litany. "You have an opportunity your parents never had. Go to school and study. Don't miss that opportunity when it comes." Education would give the second generation access to employment opportunities denied to the immigrants. The parents were willing to give up their own comforts, even necessities, for the education of their children, for the future of the Nisei generation. "Kodomo no tami ni," they whispered in their hearts, "for the sake of the children." (Ibid, pp. 213-14)

The influence of American public education was strong. Like most children of immigrants, the Nisei were eager to assimilate into American society. But doing so separated them from their parents. In the eyes of one observer, the Nisei's peculiar situation boxed them in.

The [Nisei] children manifest reactions in many ways -- against the Japanese language, against the country of their parents, against Buddhism, against the parents themselves, and against certain social ideals of the Japanese people (Ichihashi, pp. 342-3).

The Nisei fretted incessantly about themselves, their situation and their identity which placed them in two worlds.

The Nisei always seemed to feel their "twoness" -- as both Japanese and American. Their lives and their identities were bifurcated between the land of their parents and the land of their birth, folk stories about the peach boy Momotaro and children's tales about Jack and the Beanstalk, the Japanese love songs their mothers sang in the kitchen and the popular songs they heard on the radio, the summer obon dances and the weekend annual kenjinkai picnics and high-school outings, banzai to the emperor's health and the pledge of allegiance to the flag of the United States...Nisei names reflected their dual identities. Many changed, shortened, or Americanized their Japanese first names -- for example, from Makoto to Mac, Isamu to Sam, and Chiyoji to George...(Takaki, p. 214-15)

Takaki writes further:

What sharpened the edges of the duality Nisei experienced was the condition of their parents as "strangers" in America. Forced to be aliens forever in their adopted country, many Issei parents retained their ties to Japan. They registered their children as citizens of Japan. In 1926, in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain states, 84 percent of the Nisei were registered as Japanese nationals; by 1940 over 50 percent of the Nisei in the United States had Japanese citizenship. They were literally citizens of two countries -- American by birth and Japanese by registration. Actually, although it was not commonly known, thousands of American-born children of European-immigrant parents were also dual citizens. But Issei parents wanted their children to have dual citizenship for a special reason: they were afraid they might be forced to return to their homeland and wanted to be able to take their children with them. They also worried about the difficult future of racial discrimination their children faced here and wanted to give their children the option of moving to Japan. Many parents actually sent their children to Japan to be educated and to learn Japanese ways. Called kibe, these second-generation Japanese lived in Japan for several years and then returned to America. Fearful that Nisei would be forced to seek employment in Japan, immigrants sent their children to Japanese-language schools in America...

But most Issei parents saw America as their new home and Japan as a fallback, a potential refuge for the Nisei if the situation became intolerable. The immigrants wanted their children to study hard and learn English, the language representing a key to their acceptance in the hakujin (white) society as well as a means to livelihood. They were told repeatedly by their parents: "If I could only speak English like you, I would have amounted to something." Their parents urged them to try their best to be the head of the class, insisting they study at home daily. "I studied hard because I felt it was the thing to do," a Nisei explained. "It was important to succeed in school. I enjoyed seeing those A's on my report card, but a big part of the pleasure came in seeing how pleased my parents were. I guess you might say I worked for good grades because it made my parents happy." (Takaki, pp. 216-17)

Despite their efforts to succeed through education, the Nisei still lived in an environment of intolerance and limited opportunities. Takaki writes:

But the Nisei were determined they would not be "Japs" forever. They would prove their worth and force whites to accept them "on the basis of merit, and merit alone." They would overcome prejudice by trying harder, especially at school. Not expecting equal treatment, the second generation knew they had to be better than average if they hoped to overcome the handicap of discrimination. (Takaki, p. 218).

THE EARLY YEARS OF JACL

JACL leaders were not immune to this psychic confusion. Sociologist S. Frank Miyamoto, quoted in Hosokawa (1982, p. 58), asserted that, "One might say that almost all the characteristics of the JACL, good or bad, derived more or less directly from the characteristic mental state of the Nisei."

"All this added up to the impression among some Issei that JACL demonstrated the irresponsibility if not the frivolity of the young," Hosokawa continues. [Saburo] Kido explains that a difference of perception did not add to understanding. "We were thinking of JACL more as a fraternal-civic body to promote the unity and welfare of persons of Japanese ancestry," he had written. "The Issei were looking at this movement from a different angle. They wanted JACL to be more of a political action group. They wanted the Nisei to help fight against the strong anti-Japanese sentiment" (idem.).

Takaki indicates that the early leadership of the JACL maintained an optimistic view of the future—that the Nisei were Americans who were in America to stay which required that they take their rightful place in society. James Sakamoto, editor of the Japanese American Courier determined that the way to achieve this was to become "one hundred percent Americans." (Takaki, p. 222)

Takaki continues:

The JACL struck a chord in the hearts of many Nisei. Between 1930 and 1940, the organization expanded dramatically from eight charter affiliates to fifty chapters, with some fifty-six hundred dues-paying members. The JACL met the needs of Nisei professionals and small businessmen. Through the JACL, they could claim their identity as Americans. They could educate the larger society, disseminating information about the educational and business achievements of the Japanese-American community. Through JACL conferences, banquets, dances, and social community. Ironically, ethnic solidarity seemed to offer a way for Japanese Americans to be accepted by white society.

The JACL focused on the conservative and accommodationist strategies of enterprise and self-help. "Agitation begets best results." The "seeds of discrimination," the editor continued, could be completely uprooted only through the cultivation of friendship and understanding. Economic success in the form of small business and independent professions such as medicine and law would be the "sledgehammer blow" driving the Nisei "stake" into American society. Self-improvement, not political militancy, should be the Nisei approach (Takaki, p. 223).

In continuing his description of the shaping of JACL in the early years, Takaki cites patriotism

and loyalty as key elements in defining the identity of the organization and its membership.

"Patriotism" would be the key to open the door to acceptance. "Only if the second generation as a whole works to inculcate in all its members the true spirit of American patriotism can the group escape the unhappy fate of being a clan apart from the rest of American life," Sakamoto argued. "Instead of worrying about anti-Japanese activity or legislation, we must exert our efforts to building the abilities and character of the second generation so they will become loyal and useful citizens who, some day, will make their contribution to the greatness of American life." The crucial word was "loyal." Japanese Americans, both Issei and Nisei, had already proven their usefulness in the American economy. What the Nisei had to demonstrate was their worth as patriotic sons..." (Takaki, p. 223)

At the time of the evacuation in 1942, there were 66 chapters affiliated with the national headquarters with 56 of the chapters located on the West Coast and a total membership of 17,876 based upon total membership cards issued from headquarters. These numbers dwindled dramatically during and after the evacuation to 4,494 -- 2,274 active members and 220 associated members (JACL Official Minutes 9th Biennial Convention).

Notwithstanding what appeared to be a thriving national organization in the period prior to evacuation, National JACL consisted of a one man staff on December 7, 1941 in a one room office in San Francisco. There was no national network of regional offices and staff as we know it today. To the contrary, chapters were autonomous. Organizational concerns affecting the Japanese American membership was only shared among chapters through whatever means a chapter wished to share information with National or other chapters. The lack of funds and lack of staff at National necessarily confined the control of JACL activities to the strongest chapter in different regions around the country (Interview with M. Masaoka, 2/90).

After the outbreak of World War II and with the issuance of Executive Order 9066, JACL made its fateful decision to "constructively cooperate" with the U.S. government in an effort to win the war against Japan.

It should be noted that the political forces then at work to evacuate Japanese Americans from the West Coast were at the highest levels of government. A finding of "military necessity" was a fait accompli. Not until years later did we learn that as much as five years before the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt was already planning a concentration camp for Japanese aliens and citizens without due process of law. Takaki noted that Secretary of War Stimson, in evaluating the decision on evacuation, had second thoughts about relying upon racial characteristics to justify evacuation. Stimson is quoted as expressing his fear that "using race as a measure for an evacuation policy would "...make tremendous hole in our constitutional system to apply it." ' (Ibid., p. 390) Takaki then goes on to describe Roosevelt's early plans for America's concentration camps as follows:

"President Roosevelt was willing to make such a tremendous hole in the Constitution. In fact, he had been considering the internment of Japanese Americans for a long time. On August 10, 1936, President Roosevelt had written a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations: "One obvious thought occurs to me -- that every Japanese citizen or non-citizen on the island of Oahu who meets these Japanese ships or has any connection with their officers or men should be secretly but definitely identified and his or her name

placed on a special list of those who would be the first to be placed in a concentration camp in the event of trouble." Thus, five years before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was already devising a plan for the imprisonment of Japanese aliens and citizens in a "concentration camp" without due process of law.⁷⁷" (Takaki, p.390)

In order to examine the decision of the JACL to cooperate with evacuation, it would be helpful to examine the foundation laid for the general concept of cooperation by the organization. With such an understanding, the decision on cooperating with evacuation may be seen in its proper perspective.

On December 7, 1941, following news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the National Office of the JACL and National President Saburo Kido, dispatched telegrams to President Roosevelt and other government officials. Both contain statements offering the organization's cooperation.

We pledge our services unreservedly to the officials and authorities of our country...The National Headquarters of the League has been collaborating with the officials in the National defense program and is now re-urging members...to cooperate in every way with the civic and federal authorities. (JACL Archives, Press Release, 12/7/41.)

...in this solemn hour we pledge our fullest cooperation to you, Mr. President, and to our country...we are ready and prepared to expend every effort to repel this invasion together with our fellow Americans. (Hosokawa, JACL In Quest of Justice, Morrow: New York 1982, pp.130-1.)

In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, public opinion, or at least public-official opinion, had not yet been roused and directed against Japanese Americans. However, in the beginning months of 1942, as public opinion turned into public hysteria and fear, the call for evacuation of the citizen children along with the alien parents arose.

VOLUNTARY EVACUATION

A memo from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Francis Biddle discloses a request by the JACL to voluntarily evacuate. Dated February 3, 1942, it is entitled RE: Japanese in California and reads as follows:

I thought you would like to know that at a special meeting on January 30, 1942, at San Francisco, California, the National Headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League passed a resolution to request the Federal Government to permit its members and their alien parents to evacuate West Coast areas voluntarily. I am informed that a petition will be forwarded to the appropriate governmental authority asking permission to move inland and settle in order that all Japanese in the United States may be a producing and useful body rather than a liability. (Hoover, February 3, 1942, File A 7.01, Bancroft Library.)

Six days later, Biddle wrote a memorandum to his assistant, James Rowe. It states:

Please note the attached memorandum from Mr. Hoover to the effect that the Japanese-American Citizens' League want us to evacuate its members and alien parents. I think we should begin exploring with Mr. McNutt the possibility of having some refugee camps for the Japs, which we will need.

(initialed) FB Francis Biddle
Attorney General
Dept. of Justice Memos,
(File A 7.01, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

Critics of JACL have referred to the latter memo, without reference to the first one, as proof that JACL requested evacuation. However, it appears that Biddle's memo was in response to information from Hoover on voluntary evacuation, not forced evacuation.

MEETING WITH GOVERNOR OLSON

On February 6, 1942, California Governor Culbert Olson had a meeting with members of the Japanese community whom he had summoned to the State Capitol himself. Among those present were Saburo Kido, National President of JACL; Mike Masaoka, National Secretary; Ken Matsumoto, National Vice-President; Walter Tsukamoto, past-President of the National JACL; Togo Tanaka, English Editor of the *Rafu Shimpo* and Publicity Chair of the National JACL. Among the others were members of other Japanese organizations and individuals from around the state.

At this meeting, the Governor made a statement to the effect that the Japanese, both nationals and citizens, should be prepared to move out of the area at any time. After he concluded his statements, he then wanted to hear "attitudes and willingness to cooperate." One by one, those present gave their comments. Matsumoto spoke to the effect that Japanese American citizen should be treated like any other citizens, with the Governor expressing dissatisfaction to such "reluctance." Similarly, Kido also felt that Japanese Americans should not be singled out and that their citizenship rights should be respected. The Governor was able to extract a vague commitment to cooperate from Tsukamoto, although he, too, emphasized recognition for Japanese American citizenship rights. Masaoka urged recognition for the distinction between American citizens and enemy aliens, as well as the need to have the "active cooperation" and "voluntary support" from those being moved. The remaining individuals basically reiterated the comments of the four previous speakers. After the meeting, there was the increasing fear that evacuation would come to pass. (Tanaka, "Journal," 12/2/41-4/3/42, File A 17.07; 2/6/42 pp.3-4, SERS, Bancroft Library.)

TOLAN COMMITTEE

In hearings before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, House of Representatives, 77th Congress, during the latter part of February through the beginning of March 1942, JACL representatives in San Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles appeared and testified on the issue of evacuation.

Mike Masaoka, as National Secretary and Field Executive of the JACL, submitted a prepared statement into the record of the Tolan Committee Hearings. The portion on Evacuation follows:

...With any policy of evacuation definitely arising from reasons of military necessity and national safety, we are in complete agreement. As American citizens, we cannot and should not take any other stand. But, also, as American citizens believing in the integrity of our citizenship; we feel that any evacuation enforced on grounds violating that integrity should be opposed.

If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese residents from the West Coast is a primary step toward assuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in that judgment. But, if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel that we have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens. (Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, San Francisco, February 21 and 23, 1942; 11137.)

Thus in his statement, Masaoka agreed to cooperation on evacuation if it was deemed a military necessity. On the other hand, he did object to evacuation on the grounds that a discriminatory motive would be contrary to the rights of American citizens. Masaoka continued with recommendations on policy and procedure in the event of evacuation.

Shortly after the San Francisco hearings were completed, hearings were held in Seattle and Portland, on February 26, 28, and March 2, 1942. James Sakamoto, founder and past-National President of the JACL testified. He expressed opposition "to the idea of indiscriminate, en masse evacuation of all citizens and loyal aliens of Japanese extraction" and emphasized the desire of Japanese Americans to contribute to the war effort. However, "[i]f, finally, the decision is that Japanese must go, the committee is assured of the Japanese Citizens League's complete cooperation in the evacuation movement. Loyalty demands that orders, no matter what, be obeyed, willingly and efficiently." (Tolan Committee Hearings: Part 30, Portland and Seattle, February 26,28, March 2, 1942, 11451.) Most notable in Sakamoto's comments on the issue of evacuation, was his proposal for a "model city" within the interior of the nation. (Ibid)

SPECIAL NATIONAL BOARD AND COUNCIL MEETING, JACL, MARCH 8-10, 1942

Minutes of this emergency meeting of the National Board and Council in San Francisco reflect the final decisions made on cooperation with evacuation. The Board minutes indicate that Mike Masaoka read a statement of the National Board on the policy of the JACL regarding evacuation which did not depart much from his statement to the Tolan Committee.

1. We are opposed to the principle of evacuation, unless it is ordered by the military as a national defense measure and is applied to all persons, citizens and aliens alike, indiscriminately and without reference to race, color or creed.
2. If the military authorities believe that national safety requires the removal of "enemy aliens" from any regions or areas, we believe that all "enemy aliens" from all countries with which the United States is now at war should be removed, and that no one group or nationality should be singled out for special attention.
3. If it becomes necessary to remove citizens from these areas or regions, as designated by the military, we believe that all citizens should be treated alike and that no single block of citizens be singled out for special consideration or attention.
4. Even though our beliefs may not be recognized by the military and they should single out the American citizens of Japanese extraction, as they have done, for special attention,

we believe that, as good American citizens, we ought to accept the word of those charged with the responsibility of national safety and that we should cooperate with them to the best of our abilities, trusting that our cooperation will inspire a reciprocal cooperation on the part of our government in the humane and reasonable treatment of our mutual problem. (Minutes, Special Board Meeting, JACL, March 8-10, 1942, p.4.)

That last phrase in Point Four would be a theme throughout the comments expressed by JACL leaders in their meetings with government officials during this special meeting of the National Board and Council. Saburo Kido made a comment to that effect to Tom Clark, Department of Justice liaison to the Western Defense Command. "It has been our premise that the more we cooperate with you gentlemen, the more in turn you will cooperate with us." (Ibid, p. 5 of Conference.) James Sakamoto also made comments to the same effect that:

...the government is going to cooperate with us to the fullest extent possible, so now it is up to us to cooperate with the government agents. To you people gathered here now...you have a job to do, go back to your respective communities to get people working with the government in the evacuation order." (Ibid, Sixth Session, p.1)

The Special National Council Meeting approved of five resolutions, one of the most important being, "a resolution on the evacuation of Nisei as a measure based on military necessity and not a reflection on their loyalty." The second key resolution was to the President, and offered him "our sacred pledge that we will cooperate wholeheartedly in the evacuation program, and in any and all matters integral to the defense of our country." (Ibid, Resolutions, pp. 22-3.)

An examination of the situation in Seattle during evacuation led Frank Miyamoto to conclude that "it seemed to me, the JACL was far more efficient in administering the process of evacuation than in organizing against it." (Miyamoto, "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation", File T 6.24, p. 26, JERS, Bancroft Library.) Miyamoto documented the work of the JACL in operating as an intermediary between the Japanese and the U.S. Employment Service, in acting as a clearinghouse for evacuation sales and, most importantly, in communicating information about evacuation from government agencies to the community. (Ibid, pp. 24-5.)

The weakness of the JACL in organizing against evacuation, however, may have had its basis in the general political stand which it took from December 7 on...If the JACL was weak in organizing against evacuation it seems that this weakness arose from the stand the organization took...The Nisei were not in a position to condemn powerful governments in their action against weaker minorities. Out of this paradox it seems, grew the attitude of cooperation with the Army that prevailed among the JACL leader in Seattle throughout this period. (Ibid, pp.26-27.)

Consistent with Miyamoto's "The Seattle JACL and its Role in Evacuation" is an assessment of the JACL by the District Intelligence Officer from the 13th Naval District in a confidential report entitled "Japanese Evacuation and Relocation, in the Thirteenth Naval District (to March 10, 1943)." The Thirteenth Naval District encompasses the greater Seattle area and Pacific Northwest.

Under the heading of Japanese American Citizens League, the report indicates the following:

When it became certain that evacuation of the Japanese was inevitable, the local chapters

of the Japanese American Citizens League seemingly cooperated wholeheartedly with the designated evacuation authorities, offering the services of their members as translators and interpreters and in Seattle, Washington, loaning their office at 517 Main Street together with clerical and stenographic staff, to the Provost Marshal and his staff and personnel of the Wartime Civil Control Authority. With the knowledge and approval of the United States military authorities in charge of the evacuation, the Seattle Japanese American Citizens League prepared, along military lines, an organization known as the "Evacuee Administration Headquarters", that was to be in charge of the internal administration of the Puyallup Assembly, under the Caucasian staff of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. (NA, RG 210 Entry 17 Box 2, File "Office of Naval Intelligence," pp.5-6.)

Saburo Kido later responded in an oral history phonotape to the question of JACL's role after outbreak of war, "we were too naive. JACL didn't put much effort into stopping evacuation. Tried to make things easier for everybody involved." Later on in the same tape, Kido continues, "When the actual evacuation started, why, most only thing JACL could do was help lighten the load." (Phonotape 1050B, Saburo Kido, Reels 1 & 2, Counter number 427, 480, January 4, 1967, by Joe Grant Masaoka and Robert Wilson, Bancroft Library.)

Paul Spickard, in his otherwise critical article "The Nisei Assume Power: The Japanese Citizens League 1941-1942," credits the JACL with devoting time to "welfare activities."

The chief service that JACL leaders rendered was the dissemination of information. They maintained contact with local and federal officials and let Japanese Americans know what was expected of them. As the date for evacuation approached, the people needed all kinds of information: where to report, how to register, what to bring, how to care for possessions left behind, and so on. Through their newspapers and privately printed bulletins, league chapters spread the word. They also answered innumerable letters, referring people with questions to the proper government agency. The League also contributed money to agencies such as the Japanese churches, the YMCA, and the International Institute... Sometimes a chapter provided material help directly: tins of food, sacks of rice, perhaps help in finding a job. The League helped Issei fill out alien registration forms and provided places for Nisei to register for the draft. In San Pedro, California, the JACL reported to the police instances of exploitation of Terminal Island Japanese by non-Japanese junkmen. When the evacuation came, the JACL in Gardena, California, offered farmers a place to store their tractors and farm tools. (Spickard, "The Nisei Assume Power: The Japanese American Citizens League, 1941-1942," *Pacific Historical Review*, 52:2, May, 1983, p. 167.)

From the above excerpt, it appears that Seattle was representative in so far as JACL facilitating evacuation was concerned. The Seattle activities are consistent with what Spickard tells us went on in other chapters.

The Minutes of the March 8-10, 1942 Emergency Meeting in San Francisco corroborates the JACL facilitating evacuation process. "An announcement was received from the Federal Reserve Bank that the office and facilities of the JACL machinery will be used as their official channel of news dissemination in the evacuation program." (JACL Archives, Minutes, Fifth Session, p.4.)

Masaoka himself recounts the "welfare" work of the JACL following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

When the Federal Government ordered the registration of all aliens, JACL chapters cooperated with the authorities to the extent of furnishing interpreters so that both the Japanese alien and the Justice Dept. officials had their work facilitated, and in some communities, and in some communities the registration for Japanese aliens were arranged within the Japanese communities themselves under the auspices of the JACL, thereby saving the Japanese parent much time and possible embarrassment. (Masaoka, "Final Report," 4/22/44, File T 6.15, pp. 34-5.)

National Headquarters and most of the chapters adopted a 24 hour service day in order that we might be able to help any and ally no matter what the time or circumstances...[M]any JACL chapters became social service agencies which gave food and money to destitute and starving families, many on the verge of being evicted because they could not pay their rent...I still recall with a thrill the many JACL leaders up and down the Pacific Coast and in the Intermountain States who dipped deep into their own pockets and savings accounts in order that those who needed food, clothing, or shelter would need not go without...And chapters all over the west converted their treasuries into service "gifts" and saw to it that no one starved and few were evicted. (Ibid, p.41.)

And all the while National Headquarters was keeping the telephone and telegraph lines between San Francisco and Washington, D.C. busy as we tried to have the restrictions against Japanese alien bank accounts lifted...National Headquarters arranged with the Justice, Treasury and all other federal agencies concerned to receive all announcements as soon as they were made. National Headquarters hired a special translator who would translate the official information into Japanese. English and Japanese copies would then be stenciled and mimeographed. These would be air-mailed to all chapters and sub-chapters and to many sections where no chapters existed but who desired our service. (Ibid, pp.42-3.)

Thus, from these excerpts we see the extensive efforts by the JACL in facilitating the process of evacuation.

NO-NO's AND DRAFT RESISTERS

Early in 1943, the U.S. Army announced that a special combat regiment of Japanese American volunteers would be formed. President Roosevelt supported the creation of this combat team with a focus on military services as a demonstration of loyalty by Japanese Americans. Loyalty for Nisei males of military age was to be determined through a loyalty questionnaire form (DDS Form 304A dated 01/23/43) which was imprinted with the seal of the Selective Service System and entitled: "Statement of United States Citizens of Japanese Ancestry."

The WRA decided to hasten the process for relocating evacuees at the same time that the Army sought to establish the number of eligible and loyal Nisei men for military service. Although the Army had requested that the WRA submit its Selective Service loyalty questionnaire only to Nisei men of military age, the WRA "adopted" the Selective Service form (DDS Form 304A) to create its own form for Nisei females and Issei males and females which was entitled: "War Relocation Authority Application For Leave Clearance." (Form WRA - 126 Rev.)

Ronald Takaki provides the following description of the situation.

But the war had also begun to open a future for the Nisei. In September 1942, the Selective Service had classified all young Japanese men as IV-C, or enemy aliens. A month later, however, the Director of the Office of War Information urged President Roosevelt to authorize the enlistment of Nisei: "Loyal American citizens of Japanese descent should be permitted, after an individual test, to enlist in the Army and Navy... This matter is of great interest to OWI. Japanese propaganda to the Philippines, Burma, and elsewhere insists that this is a racial war. We can combat this effectively with counter propaganda only if our deeds permit us to tell the truth." President Roosevelt understood the need to neutralize "Japanese propaganda": in December the army developed a plan for forming an all- Nisei Combat team. On February 1, 1943, hypocritically ignoring the evacuation order he had signed a year earlier, Roosevelt wrote to Secretary of War Stimson: "No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of ancestry....Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. Every loyal American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve this country...in the ranks of our armed forces...."⁹²

Five days later the government required all internees to answer the loyalty questionnaires. The questionnaires had two purposes: (1) to enable camp authorities to process individual internees for work furloughs as well as for resettlement outside of the restricted zones, and (2) to register Nisei for the draft. Question 27 asked draft-age males: "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?" Question 28 asked all internees: "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?"⁹³ (Takaki, p. 396-7)

Issei men and women viewed the title of "Application For Leave Clearance" with trepidation. Then in their middle age, with a hostile world outside the camps, and stripped of their means of livelihood during evacuation, the Isseis had no immediate desire to be forced out of the camps to face an uncertain world. Question 27 was troubling to the Isseis because they did not feel they could agree to serve in the armed forces on combat duty given their age among other reasons. As to the Niseis who were asked to answer Question 27, they asked and debated why they should serve unless their rights as citizens were first reinstated.

Question 28 was a nightmare. For Isseis who were denied American citizenship, renunciation of an affiliation with Japan could only mean that they would become "people without a country." As American citizens by birth the Niseis felt that the swearing of any allegiance to the emperor of Japan implied that such an allegiance existed when it did not.

Any discussion of this loyalty questionnaire episode must include an explanation of the categories of responses given by the imprisoned internees. There were No-Nos, and renunciants and Yes-Yes and draft registers, with other varied qualified answers.

The No-No Boys were those Niseis who responded with a "No" to both Questions 27 and 28. The government took steps to separate or segregate the "loyal" from the "disloyal" by sending most of the No-

No respondents to Tule Lake. In some cases, the No-No response was a gesture of defiance and anger at the unjust actions of the U.S. Government. In other cases involving younger Niseis, they had no choice but to follow a family decision.

Among the No-Nos however, were Niseis who had lost hope in America and sought repatriation to Japan as a desperate last resort. There were reportedly more than 7,000 such "renunciants" who applied for repatriation. Approximately 4,700 actually went to Japan. In making application for repatriation and therefore refusing to report for induction, many such renunciants had to prepare and submit formal written statements renouncing U.S. citizenship, usually coupled with declaration of loyalty for Japan.

The Yes-Yes group of internees responded to their own sense of loyalty to country and to their desire to leave the camps for a better environment. The draft eligible Nisei men either volunteered for military service or appeared for induction after receipt of their draft notices.

Among the Yes-Yes group was a distinct group of Nisei men who became the so-called "war-time resisters" or "draft resisters." They were men who believed that demonstration of loyalty to their country by service in the armed forces first required that their country restore the constitutional rights denied each of them. While vowing to fight for their country if necessary, these "draft resisters" demanded "fair play" and the restoration of their rights as citizens before induction into military service. The most prominent group were the Heart Mountain Draft Resisters who gathered under the banner of so-called Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee. By protesting the draft law as it applied to them, they were prosecuted and convicted under federal law.

According to WRA statistics, as of September 2, 1944, the number of young men from relocation camps who refused to report for induction were 91. There were 55 from Colorado River or Poston, and 33 from Minidoka. The total number of those who refused to report for physical examination was 164. Broken down by camp, the numbers follow:

Central Utah	4
Colorado River	14
Gila River	0
Granada	32
Heart Mountain	84 (notation reads subject to revision)
Jerome	1
Manzanar	0
Minidoka	2
Rohwer	3
Tule Lake	24

(NA, RG 210, Entry 3, Box 3, File "Semi-Annual Report-WRA, Printed Jan 1 to June 30, 1944, p.20)

A later table, in Weekly Report 41, for June 9, 1945 had a total of 157 who refused induction, and 177 who refused to report for physicals. Out of 310 who were then arrested, 144 had been convicted, 97 in the process of being tried, 28 released, and 27 awaiting trial. (War Relocation Authority, Statistics Section, found in JACL Archives.)

THE JACL POSITION AND ACTION ON THE LOYALTY QUESTIONNAIRE

As a result of the confusion caused by Question 28, the JACL National Headquarters issued its Bulletin 3-D dated February 23, 1943 to its Washington representative to request clarification. There was concern that Japanese nationals (Isseis) might become citizens without a country if they answered in the affirmative. (Bulletin No. 3-D)(See Exhibit A)

...Confusion exists as to whether question No. 28 has been officially changed or not. If it has not, it is suggested that Japanese nationals, by replying in the affirmative, would repudiate their Japanese citizenship and thereby become citizens without a country because they cannot become naturalized citizens of the United States. (JACL Bulletin No. 3-D, February 23, 1943)

Thus, JACL sought clarification of Question 28. The question was later revised by WRA to read: "Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war efforts of the United States?"

Patriotism and loyalty to the United States was the foundation of JACL's approach to its interaction with the U.S. Government in its attempt to protect a future for the Japanese American community. During this time the Japanese American community had no political power to counteract the impact of Executive Order 9066. Loyalty to the United States meant that such loyalty should be demonstrated by military service. As Roosevelt clearly stated in his aforementioned letter to Stimson, the creation of a new combat team of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry assures the "opportunity" for all loyal Americans, including Americans of Japanese ancestry, to serve their country at a time when the fullest and wisest use of our manpower is all-important to the war effort."

The JACL welcomed the opportunity to demonstrate the loyalty of Japanese Americans by participating in the armed forces. It officially did so in communication to the Director of Selective Service in January, 1943 requesting that the Selective Service Division of the War Department reclassify Americans of Japanese ancestry on the same basis as all other Americans. This official resolution passed at a Special National Emergency Council meeting in Salt Lake City in January, 1943 called specific attention to the fact that "Americans of Japanese ancestry have been and are being classified in the Selective Service rolls in those classifications originally assigned to enemy aliens and friendly aliens but now designated as classifications for those unfit or undesirable for military services."

JACL ACTIONS TOWARDS NO-NOS

Inter-office correspondence of JACL in May, 1943 reflects the organizational concern that the membership of JACL should not include No-No's. In a letter dated May 19, 1943 from Saburo Kido to Teiko Ishida, the following statements are made therein:

Regarding the members who answered "no", Mike suggests that we send out a bulletin to all chapters that such members will be suspended. He believes this is necessary for our records; that is, we should be clear as to the loyalty of our members. Also we cannot accept anyone who has answered, "no." (JACL Archives.)

The response, dated May 21, 1943, from Teiko Ishida, to Kido offers this:

Mike certainly has had a change of heart. We felt right along that the no-no's should be segregated and no further effort be expended upon them, However, a bulletin to all chapters announcing that all "no-no" members would be suspended will be of no avail unless we have a list of such registrants. Furthermore, we must have this list of no-no's in order to refuse membership to certain individuals. Please have Mike secure such a list from the WRA before we can issue such a bulletin or know to whom to refuse membership. (JACL Archives.)

Kido writes another letter, dated May 25, 1943 to Hito Okada and Teiko Ishida, which begins with this paragraph:

As far as the "no-no" ones are concerned, I don't think we can possibly find out so the best thing is just issue the request to sign the loyalty pledge of all associated members. Then if there is a chapter, issue a special letter to the chapter that the "no-no" ones will have to be suspended until such time as the records are cleared. And if they have any reason for changing the answer to yes, possibly we can suggest to write to the WRA. It is the best that we do this and protect our position. (JACL Archives.)

The response, dated May 27, 1943, was that "we shall continue having our Associated members execute the Oath of Allegiance if they have not previously done so." Also, only two chapters would be requested to suspend their "no-no" members. This same information was also sent to Masaoka by Teiko Ishida on the same date, May 27, 1943. (JACL Archives)

Because of the limited documentation that was available for review it is well to understand while reading these letters that the "loyalty" or "disloyalty" of the No-Nos was judged by the WRA - not the JACL.

Research has produced one other document which could be made to appear that it clashes with the views of JACL as set forth in the correspondence referred to hereinabove. In a letter from Manzanar Project Director Ralph Merritt to Dillon Myer dated February 27, 1943, Merritt states in part:

On the other hand, it is important to determine whether the "no" answer on the loyalty question actually means a renouncing of citizenship or whether it is a protest indirectly arising from the pressures of the father who is a non-citizen or directly representing the outcry of a man who has, in his opinion, been ruthlessly and wrongfully deprived during the last year of his rights and position as a citizen. When all the motives have been reviewed it must be concluded that there is no such thing as a line of strict demarcation...It is my considered conclusion that the answer "No" has many shades of meaning and is prompted by many motives, some of which are attributable to our failures both past and present, and some of which may yet be modified and reversed without damage to the principles of American citizenship. (Merritt Collection #122, Box 15, File "Chandler," SC-URL, UCLA.)

One could attempt to say that this letter by Merritt shows that the WRA saw no presumption of disloyalty in the "No" answer to the loyalty questionnaire. Does this letter in February, 1943 therefore somehow show that the aforementioned JACL correspondence in May, 1943, in contrast, presumed disloyalty? The only fair response is "No" for several reasons.

Merritt's letter is from one camp director (Manzanar) to Myer as the Chief of the WRA. Whatever Merritt's views may have been, the official view of the WRA was that a "No" answer was a mark of "disloyalty."

On the subject of renunciation of citizenship, there appears to have been a question raised in 1944 as to whether a "No" answer to Question 28 automatically meant that the individuals became an expatriate. The JACL's position then was that a "No" answer did not automatically cause the loss of U.S. citizenship. In a letter dated April 13, 1944 to the War Relocation Authority from Teiko Ishida, Acting National Secretary of JACL, he stated:

"It is a matter of debate, but we agree with Attorney General Biddle that those who answered in the negative to question 28 heretofore have not expatriated. In other words they are still American citizens." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 142, General Classified Files 21.012, File #32, "April 1944.")

JACL POSITION ON SEGREGATION

An issue related to the No-Nos was the matter of segregating the so-called agitators in the camps and those persons who openly professed some sentiment for Japan. The segregation issue was an important one for JACL because some of the agitators physically abused internees who were members of the JACL.

Research shows that the earliest statement of JACL on the issue of segregation was a June 6, 1942 Memorandum signed by Masaoka, Matsumoto, and Inagaki: The relevant portion reads, "[i]ncidentally, we are in unanimous agreement as to the principle of segregation." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 286, File 39.050.) This is corroborated by the diary entry of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, for Thursday, June 11, at 11:06.

Mr. Matsuoka [sic], Mr. Inagaki [sic]-conference Mr. Eisenhower present, they wanted segregation system set up in camps. We are disinclined to do it. Very agreeable interview. ("Diary of John J. McCloy 1942. Entries Responsive to Subpoena Served by CWRIC." 57 pages. NA, G 220 CWRIC Numerical File #29570-29626.)

The next discussion appeared in an exchange of correspondence between Myer of the WRA and Masaoka. In a confidential letter dated December 24, 1942, Myer replies to Masaoka, by air mail, to a "wire of yesterday concerning the removal of disloyal evacuees. As you must know the problem of segregation is probably the most complex of the many complex problems developing out of the evacuation." (Myer, December 24, 1942, File T 6.11, Bancroft Library.) In this letter, Myer proceeds to outline the difficulties and dangers of formulating a segregation program. He closes by asking Masaoka to submit a statement to Myer's committee on the subject. (Ibid.)

Masaoka responded in a letter dated January 14, 1943, via air mail, special delivery, out of the Salt Lake City Headquarters. The cover letter indicates that the "enclosed report is one which combines our thinking as well as our recommendations." (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 559, File 71.505.) The statement is a "collaboration of certain of our key people in the centers." (Ibid.) Titled "Confidential Statement," the five-page document discusses the problem of "segregating 'loyal to America' Japanese from those who are 'loyal to Japan'." After outlining the difficulties in segregation and indicating that the bulk of both Issei and Nisei are at least passively loyal to the U.S., Masaoka emphasized:

Notwithstanding these difficulties, it seems imperative to us that immediate action should be taken in every center to "pull out" those who are constantly agitating against this government or its representatives, or fomenting dissension and violence. The people in the center must be convinced beyond all doubt that the government means to protect the loyal and to enforce law and order at all times and for all persons. (Ibid, p.2.)

The reference in a later paragraph to the "agitation in Manzanar and Poston" leads to the conclusion that Masaoka's original telegram was in response to the uprisings in these camps during November and December of 1942, as well as to the threats against JACL leaders there.

The approach offered by Masaoka was as follows:

Immediate action should be taken whereby, without warning or hearing, known agitators and trouble-makers are moved out of the relocation centers and placed in special camps of their own...We believe that, should they be forewarned of their approaching segregation, they would either create a militant sentiment against their removal or organize to resist it. Too, if hearings are provided, they might raise the cry that they were unjustly accused and tried, that they were "framed," etc. In order to avoid such arrangements and charges, we suggest that the WRA, upon completion of their investigation, should segregate, summarily all those whom they feel are dangerous to internal security. (Ibid, p.3.)

Masaoka listed those who were the troublemakers; single men without vested interests in the U.S., those released from Department of Justice camps, professional gamblers, pro-Japan Kibei, bachelors who most everything in evacuation, members of the Tokyo Club and the Black Dragon Society. (Ibid.)

The memorandum expressed the concern that "practically every person who has been 'beaten up' in the centers is a member of our Japanese American Citizens League." (Ibid.)

What role did the JACL envision for itself in the segregation process?

Most of our chapter leaders have signified their willingness to name those whom they consider inimical to center welfare if their own names are not revealed. The names which they might submit could be checked with others who are reliable and are not members of the JACL in order to insure against possible prejudices simply because of organizational differences. (Ibid.)

Masaoka proposed a four step process.

1) the immediate apprehension and removal of known troublemakers, 2) the segregation of those who desire repatriation to Japan, 3) the placing of trained investigators within the centers to ferret out those who are disloyal, and 4) the selection of experienced internal security administrators and more careful appointment of departmental personnel. (Ibid, p.5.)

Thus, JACL had been an early and consistent advocate for segregation, though it was not until disturbances at Poston and Manzanar, as well as the number of beatings of JACL leaders, that specific measures were offered to the WRA. In the months after this confidential statement was submitted to Myer,

we are told how the registration process also impacted upon the question of segregation.

After the registration of February, 1943, increasing pressure was brought to bear on the administration of the WRA by the Army, the Japanese American Citizens League, and all project directors, to segregate those who had refused to answer the questionnaire or who had answered the "loyalty" questions in the negative. (tenBroek, Jacobus; Barnhart, Edward; Matson, Floyd, Prejudice, War and the Constitution, Univ. of Calif. Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954, p. 161.)

Masaoka's "Final Report" also addressed this issue in the following manner:

The National President [Saburo Kido], in fact, welcomed the attack upon his person as the beginning of a campaign to cleanse and purge the relocation centers of undesirables and trouble makers. JACL demanded a segregation program whereby those professing disloyalty, causing continual trouble, or expounding un-American doctrines be taken out of the relocation centers and placed in a special camp reserved for their kind. (Masaoka, "Final Report", 4/22/44, pp. 115-116, File T 6.15, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

JACL POSITION ON DRAFT RESISTERS

Reactions to the process of registering for the draft were both positive and negative. Patriotism and loyalty to country were the cornerstone of JACL policy during World War II. A clash between those who believed military service would demonstrate loyalty to the United States and those who believed that the Selective Service draft of internees who were being deprived of their constitutional rights as citizens of the United States was unlawful came to head in 1944. On the one hand, the accomplishments of the 442nd Rct in Europe was receiving favorable attention by end of 1943. On the other hand, the basic stand on the principle that no Japanese American male interned in camp should be compelled to serve without the restoration of his constitutional rights started receiving press attention. Various representatives of the JACL started expressed their negative views about draft resistance, and the position of the draft resisters, especially at Heart Mountain. The basis for these negative views stemmed from the concern that virulent charges of sedition directed against the Japanese American community would undermine all the positive progress brought about by the acts of heroism performed by the 442nd and 100th veterans. Of equal concern was the fact that the charge of "draft dodgers" would haunt young Nisei men thereafter.

Research of the JACL archives discloses several documents that reflect the attitudes of Saburo Kido, the President of the JACL. For example, in a letter dated April 3, 1944, Kido stated:

"The group at Heart Mountain definitely should be charged with sedition, especially the leaders. The FBI has been studying the situation in the centers and we were asked to loan them copies of the **Rocky Shimpo**." (JACL Archives.)

In Bulletin #9, dated April 11, 1944 from JACL in Salt Lake City, National President Saburo Kido introduced copies of letters sent to Kiyoshi Okamoto of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee and a Jack Nakagawa of Littleton, Colorado. Bulletin 9 reported that "both letters were sent by Mr. Roger N. Baldwin, National Director of the American Civil Liberties Union." (JACL Archives.)

Both letters inform their respective recipients of the moral strength and legal weakness of their refusal to accept the military draft. "The men who have refused to accept military draft are within their

rights, but they of course must take the consequences. They doubtless have a strong moral case, but no legal case at all." (JACL Archives.)

This particular Bulletin and the refusal of ACLU to represent any of the draft resisters has led three historians to question the role of the JACL in this refusal of legal assistance.

What occurred was that Kiyoshi Okamoto, head of the Fair Play Committee at Heart Mountain, had written to the ACLU for legal assistance in challenging the constitutionality of drafting internees. Baldwin responded with the letter which was reprinted by the JACL in the aforementioned Bulletin #9 by Kido and which Baldwin had released to the press.

Thus the question which has been raised by Richard Drinnon, Douglas Nelson and Roger Daniels is why Baldwin made the letter public and what the JACL's role was in this action.

Douglas Nelson, in his Heart Mountain: The History of an American Concentration Camp, (Wisconsin State Historical Society: Madison. 1976, pp. 153-54.) indicated that there was evidence which implied that Baldwin's action had been at the request of the JACL's Salt Lake City headquarters.

Likewise, Roger Daniels writes, "what caused Baldwin to release his letter publicly is not clear, but a letter from Heart Mountain Project Director Guy Robertson to Dillon Myer implies that the JACL's Salt Lake City headquarters may have requested him to do so." (Concentration Camps: North America, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co. Inc.: Malabar, Florida, 1981, pp. 126-7.)

The evidence to which all three authors point is a letter dated April 17, 1944 from Robertson to Myer, Director of the WRA. The first two paragraphs from the letter follow below:

In our lead story, this week we carried a letter written by Roger Baldwin, National Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and directed to Kiyoshi Okamoto, former leader of the Fair Play Committee within this center.

The letter, mimeographed and released by the Salt Lake City Headquarters of the Japanese American Citizens League with the approval of the New York office of the ACLU, is the strongest documentary evidence that has come to our hands to support our contention that draft resistance is not only ill advised, but unsupported legally as a means toward securing full citizenship rights for Japanese Americans. (File M 1.09, JERS, Bancroft Library.)

It appeared to these authors, at least, that the ACLU and JACL worked in concert on the release of the Baldwin-to-Okamoto letter to the public. "[T]he major spokesman for civil liberties in the United States had supported the JACL line, whose adherents were jubilant: ACLU TAKES ISSUE WITH OKAMOTO was the Sentinel headline." (Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger: Malabar, 1981, pp.126-7.)

Research on this point has produced no document that establishes or confirms the connection between JACL and the ACLU as suggested by Drinnon, Nelson and Daniels. A more telling and convincing reason why the ACLU (Baldwin) released such advice through his letter is that the National Board of the ACLU was severely split on the issue of whether Executive Order 9066 should be challenged. In the recently published history of the ACLU written by Samuel Walker (1990) and entitled:

"In Defense of American Liberties," Walker explains this as follows:

Split in the ACLU

While Baldwin assembled the test cases, an improbable coalition on the ACLU board questioned the ACLU's stance.¹⁴ With somewhat different motives, conservatives, liberals, and leftists opposed challenging the president's order. The conservatives, led by Whitney North Seymour, instinctively deferred to presidential authority in wartime. The liberals--Morris Ernst, Roger Riis, Elmer Rice, and Raymond Wise-- were swayed by political loyalty to Roosevelt and their horror regarding Hitler. Successful prosecution of the war was the nation's top priority, and they did not even want to appear to question the judgment of the commander in chief. Alexander Meikeljohn saw no violation of fundamental civil liberties: "For us to say that they are taking away civil rights, would have as much sense as protesting because a 'measles' house is isolated. The Japanese citizens, as a group, are dangerous both to themselves and to their fellow-citizens." He had already voted against the Northern California affiliate's challenging the curfew order. Ernst did not see "any possible constitutional question if there is military necessity," adding sarcastically, "and I assume the ACLU does not pretend to know anything about military necessities." Leftists Corliss Lamont and William Spofford, moved by their sympathy for the Soviet Union which was then carrying virtually all of the burden of the war against Germany, also emphasized the urgency of the war effort. The ACLU's position, Lamont charged, was "obstructionist" and gave "aid and comfort" to the enemy.¹⁵

The strongest opposition to the president's order came from the old pacifists--Baldwin, Norman Thomas, and John Haynes Holmes--and Art Hays. The pacifists instinctively recoiled at any infringement on individual liberty in the name of military necessity. (Walker, p. 139)

Walker then goes on to further explain how guarded the ACLU became in its approach to litigating the test cases on evacuation. He states that on June 22, 1942, the ACLU National Committee approved its Resolution 2 which accepted Executive Order 9066 in principle but hedged any endorsement of it with procedural constraints:

Resolution 2, put forward by the conservative-liberal-left coalition, was a compromise. Although many undoubtedly wanted the ACLU to take no action at all, they realized that the ACLU majority would not agree. Thus they offered a statement accepting the president's order in principle but hedging it with procedural constraints. It began by conceding that "the government has the right in the present war to establish military zones and to remove persons either citizens or aliens, from such zones when their presence may endanger national security, even in the absence of a declaration of martial law." Any action, however, had to be "directly necessary to the prosecution of the war or the defense of national security." The wording implied that the government had not met this burden of proof. The removal of individuals, moreover, must be carried out by civilian rather than military authorities and "should be based on a classification, having a reasonable relationship to the danger intended to be met." This seemed to imply that a racial classification was unacceptable. Every person was entitled to a separate hearing before being removed. Finally, there could be no prolonged detention, and evacuees "should be allowed full liberty in the United States outside of such military zones."¹⁸ (Ibid, pp. 140-1)

Baldwin, as the National Director of the ACLU, had to carry out the policies adopted by his National Board. Given the political split on his Board, Baldwin could not have taken the position that the draft laws of America should be violated by Japanese American internees or anyone else. This point is made very clear in Baldwin's letter to Mrs. Frank Emi, dated July 25, 1944:

I have your letter of July 20th as well as the telegram from Arthur Emi. I also had a letter from Frank Emi the other day, to which I replied.

Unfortunately, we cannot handle cases of conspiracy to violate the Selective Service act unless they are clearly based upon utterances and publications which do not directly encourage other to break the law.

Without knowing the basis of this charge, we could not act. We have declined to go into practically all the Selective Service cases involving Japanese Americans because, however justified their indignation in being required to do military service in the face of all the discrimination, that is no legal justification.

No reasonable legal defense could be made if there is any evidence to support such a charge. If you will give me the full information, particularly a copy of any complaint, I can advise you further on that point.

I suggest that you get in touch with Raymond G. Corbett, 412 Wyoming National Building, Casper, Wyoming, who is the nearest attorney in our files to Heart Mountain. (Baldwin Letter, July 25, 1944)

Another JACL document is entitled VISIT TO CHEYENNE COUNTY JAIL WITH JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT DELINQUENTS. The interviewers were Min Yasui, who identified himself as an attorney, and Joe Grant Masaoka, JACL Regional Representative. The purposes of the trip, according to the first page of this five-page document, were two-fold:

By interviewing the boys in the Cheyenne County Jail, it was hoped that some indication of the processes of thinking and the manner of organization behind the draft resistance could be gained, so as to be able to work the best procedures and the most practical programs to counteract such influences in the relocation centers. In addition thereto, were possible to persuade any of the boys at the Cheyenne County Jail to reconsider his stand, it was felt that such repudiation would have some effect upon the draft-resistance group in the centers, and tend to dissuade others from following the same course of action. (JACL Archives, p.1.)

Writers have noted the fact that Min Yasui attempted to dissuade these young draft resisters from taking a stand which was similar to his earlier challenge of the curfew restrictions. Yasui himself in this document attests to the similarity between his struggle and that of the draft resisters. In identifying himself in the document, Yasui states that he is:

a licensed attorney in the State of Oregon, who had attempted to secure a Supreme Court declaration of citizenship rights of the Nisei, identical to that which these Nisei draft

violators are now seeking...(JACL Archives, p.1.)

Regardless of this self-described motivation on why Yasui had challenged curfew and why these resisters had challenged the draft, his purpose in this interview was to try to change their minds. Yasui "believed that a personal interview with these boys would reveal to them the legal fallacies of their thinking and attitude. It was felt that a man who has had legal training and experiences in a county jail would have some effect upon the boys in the Cheyenne County Jail." (Ibid.)

Of particular note in the interview of the Heart Mountain Resisters is the content of a conversation between Yasui and Masaoka and Carl L. Sackett, the U.S. Attorney for Wyoming:

In talking to the U.S. Attorney, we pointed out that the actions of these boys was not a deliberate and intentional act of disloyalty, but rather an ineffectual and certainly ill-advised protest against the injustices and suspension of certain civil rights for the past two years suffered by those of Japanese ancestry. (JACL Archives, p.2.)

This is a noteworthy statement in light of the earlier comments by Saburo Kido that these men should be charged with sedition and in view of the comments in the **Pacific Citizen** and **Heart Mountain Sentinel** editorials. Moreover, the conversation with Sackett took place prior to the commencement of any interviews with draft resisters. Nonetheless, it appeared clear from the interview document that neither Yasui or Masaoka felt the draft resisters were disloyal or seditious. Not only that, but that they were aware that the resisters were willing to serve in the military once their citizenship rights were restored. This is confirmed later in the text when six of the 17 resisters who were housed in the Cheyenne County Jail (out of a total of 59 who were scattered in six jails throughout Wyoming) were interviewed.

Unanimously, they admitted they were fighting to secure court action in order to clarify their citizenship rights and status. Apparently, they believe that this is the last resort by which they can hope to gain a restoration of suspended civil rights, such as the right to return to the Prohibited Areas on the West Coast. None of the boys have signed expatriation papers. They continue to express a willingness to enter the Army, if their concepts of equality of treatment and citizenship are fulfilled. (JACL Archives, p.3.)

In fact, the basic issues of loyalty and willingness to serve in the military had been confirmed earlier during the registration period at Heart Mountain. As Roger Daniels tells us:

As it turned out, almost all of the key leaders of what I have called the "left opposition" remained at Heart Mountain after segregation because they had either answered "Yes-Yes" to the crucial questions or had so qualified their answers that they were not "eligible" for segregation.(Daniels, Concentration Camps: North America, Krieger: Malabar, 1981, p.123.)

The first editorial discussion of the Heart Mountain Fair Play Committee in the **Pacific Citizen** was in Saburo Kido's column, "Timely Topics," in the Saturday, March 25, 1944, issue, p.6. The title was HEART MOUNTAIN'S FAIR PLAY GROUP, and it read:

Any person who incites or encourages any citizen to evade the draft is assuming a grave responsibility. It is needless to say the offense constitutes sedition. One must remember that one of the most serious offenses a person can commit is to become a 'draft dodger.'

A nation will not easily forgive or quickly forget anyone who refuses to serve when his country calls in a national emergency. It will be a tragic mistake to have young men who are 18 or thereabouts to become stigmatized as "draft dodgers" for the rest of their lives. (Pacific Citizen, vol.18, Jan 1 to June 24, 1944.)

Again in a subsequent column, Kido wrote "... no one will be sympathetic or condone 'draft dodging.' This is one of the worst crimes that any citizen can commit." (Ibid, Saturday, April 1, 1944.)

Larry Tajiri wrote in an editorial, called, "The Bitter Harvest":

This act of defiance by 41 young men is the result of a combination of circumstances, misguided leadership and information, and strong pressures and influences. Its effect may be that of negating the victory of loyal Japanese Americans in winning the reinstatement of selective service, and may retard the eventual full restoration to Japanese Americans of the privileges of freedom which are the birthright of every American. By their action these young men, and those who prompted their action, have injured the cause of loyal Japanese everywhere. (Ibid, Saturday, April 8, 1944, p.4.)

Two other documents which do offer the position of the JACL are a March 20th, 1944 letter to Frank Yamasaki, and a March 30, 1944 letter to Chaplain Yamada, both written by Saburo Kido, with copies sent to Myer. The relevant excerpts are set forth below.

Although we are in fully [sic] accord with all the principles set forth by your committee, we firmly believe that the Nisei must prove their loyalty by service first. We must be realistic in meeting this crucial test. If the Nisei produce a mass of "draft dodgers", and that will be the brand which will be attached to anyone who refuses to comply with the law, regardless of the reasons advanced, the fight for the restoration of any rights suspended will be that much difficult.

Even the action of two at the Minidoka Relocation Center and the five at the Granada Relocation Center have had unfavorable repercussions. A draft dodger will not be easily forgiven or quickly forgotten by the nation...Every "draft dodger" is going to betray these staunch, loyal friends who have suffered humiliation, insults and threats besides loses in business in some instances. In one sense, the Nisei have come to pity and feel sorry for their plight to such a degree that their thinking is becoming self-centered. (NA, RG 210, Entry 16, Box 471, File 71.505, JACL, "From 1942," pp.1-2.)

The excerpt from the letter to Chaplain Yamada:

When the 442nd Combat Team was organized, the JACL supported it...The JACL was blamed as the "busybody" instrumental in having such a thing brought about when the draft was reinstated for the Nisei. We do not claim credit for this restoration of the Nisei to serve their country...We have fought any agitation which would influence the Nisei to violate the draft laws. (Ibid, p.3.)

A letter of acknowledgment written by Myer to Kido, dated April 19, 1944, states "it seems to me that the position of the JACL is clearly set forth in these two letters." (Ibid.)

CONCLUSION

In the time following the attack on Pearl Harbor and continuing until the end of the war, Japanese Americans were forced to react to intense and unpredictable pressures created by the actions of the United States government. Divisions were created in the community that have never been healed. With the hindsight afforded by history, it is all too easy to look back on those times and the difficult choices thrust upon ordinary people, and sit in judgment or assess blame as to those choices. The U.S. government has finally admitted its error in forcing those choices and creating the divisions in the community. Each person who lived through those times, making decisions in response to the crisis, has vivid memories of the experience. Later generations and those outside the community, however, are largely unfamiliar with the uncertainties of the time, the complex community pressures and positions and the actions taken by various groups and individuals, including the Japanese American Citizens League. This report is intended to add to the knowledge of that time and the role of the JACL in those events.

The task presented to this Presidential Select Committee was to investigate through research, review and present whatever documented facts there may be covering the issues raised by Resolution No. 7. More specifically, the Committee was to determine what policies the JACL adopted on the issues raised by Resolution No. 7 and the actions JACL took to implement such policies, if any.

The JACL did not have complete control over the community or over the decisions of the time. The organization did adopt a policy of cooperation. The community impact of their decisions, however, and the leadership roles that they voluntarily assumed, placed a heavy responsibility upon the JACL leadership to act in the community's best interests. Disagreement over their choices was and is inevitable. Sometimes, it is not clear whether an individual's actions were taken while wearing the mantle of the JACL or whether an individual's actions were an expression of her or his private views. But if they were closely associated with the JACL, especially as an officer or staff person, and they acted in a way that affected others; they either knew or should have known that even expressly individual acts would be interpreted as JACL's and would have community impact.

An organization such as the JACL has a responsibility to protect the members of its community. For its part, and in the context of the times, JACL's values of patriotism and loyalty almost demanded cooperation with the government. A current similar circumstance would insist that the organization hold the government to its constitutional commitments and, by that standard, it can be concluded that the JACL leadership of that day could have protested the inevitability of their situation.

Every individual's view of that time will be colored by his or her unique perspectives. This report is for the purpose of understanding history and not for the purpose of placing blame or escaping it. It is important that we try to understand and appreciate positions and actions taken by all involved. Based upon its findings, the Presidential Select Committee concludes and recommends that the National Council of the JACL appropriately acknowledges that those so-called draft resisters who clearly professed their loyalty to America and were otherwise willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States, but for the deprivation of their constitutional rights by internment in America's concentration camps, were honorable and loyal Americans who fought for the same constitutional rights as those Japanese American men who were then in active service in the defense of this country.

It is important to learn from our experience. It is important to understand why government failed in 1942 and succeeded in 1988 to provide redress. As an organization, we must always stand vigilant. We

must expend all energy and resource to defend constitutional rights. In 1942 too many organizations and individuals stood silent in the face of a human and constitutional tragedy. Today, we must cultivate our organizational and political relationship while encouraging and supporting the advancement of Japanese Americans to public office and positions of influence in public policy. In 1942 a half century of pervasive racism and intolerance was a major factor which lead to the internment. Today, intolerance continues within society necessitating programs of prejudice reduction and the dissemination of information on the Japanese American experience for the purpose of creating understanding. The Japanese American community today is what it is due to the cumulative effect of our history in this country and both because of and in spite of the decisions of the JACL and of other groups and of individuals at that time. Where we are going and whether we will survive as a community will depend upon our ability to face that history and move beyond it so that we may focus together on the challenges of the future.

PACIFIC CITIZEN

Bound Volume 15, Nos. 1-31; June 4 to December 31, 1942

Bound Volume 16, Nos. 1-25; January 7 to June 24, 1943

Bound Volume 17, Nos. 1-25; July 8 to December 25, 1943

Bound Volume 18, Nos. 1-22; January 1 to June 24, 1944

Bound Volume 19, Nos. 1-26; July 1 to December 30, 1944

BARNHART INDEX

* Note asterisk indicates material which has already been reviewed.

Miscellaneous Material on Exclusion

*Statements by American Civil Liberties
Union Officials and Civic Leaders - A19.01

Policies and Programs Of Fed. Govt: Exec. agencies

*Navy report - Ringle -A5.01

Bendetsen Interview

*442 was his idea - A5.02
*A7.02 ?

Federal Security Agency

*Neu Stadt of Alien Enemy Evacuation - A11.01
*Neu Stadt File - A11.02

Department of Justice

*Memos Etc. White House, War, Navy - A7.01
*Alien Enemy Control Program - A7.03

Studies of Public Opinion: JERS

*Tanaka, T. Pre-Evacuation Pressure group in S-CA1.
- A16.260
*Tanaka, Togo Journal (Sept. 4-1940 - NOV.29,41)
(Dec.2,41-Apr.3,42) - A17.07

Official Correspondence

*Dewitt/Bendetsen; Dewitt/Clark - B2.09

Statistical Section

*Public Correspondence - B2.10

Civic Affairs Division

*Memos with Japanese Organizations in U.S. - B2.25
* Yusa, Earle: Internal Security Dept., Japanese - B8.38

Civic Affairs Division

*Memos on JA organizations in the U.S - B2.25

Community Government in Assembly Centers

*Tanforan - B4.100
*Puyallup - B4.101

Evacuee Newspaper and Publications

Fuyallup - B5.000
Fresno - B5.001
Merced - B5.002
North Portland - B5.003

Pomona - B5.004
 Sacramento - B5.0041
 Salinas - B5.005
 Santa Anita - B5.006
 Stockton - B5.007
 Tanforan - B5.008
 Tulare - B5.009

Incidents and Special Events

*Santa Anita Riots - B7.01

Miscellaneous Matters

American Friends Service Committee - B13.00

WRA

*WRA/WDC Correspondence/Memos - C1.02
 *Wra/DOJ Correspondence and Memos - C1.05

Early Programs and Policies

*Evacuee Employment in Relocation Centers - C1.06
 * Correspondence on Implementing Proposals - C1.07

Internment in Relocation Centers and Conditional Freedom

Progress Report of the Relocation of Japanese - D.1001

War Department

*Japanese American Joint Board - D2.044
 *Induction of JA/442nd Plans and Proposals - D2.041
 *Role of Military Police at Centers - D2.043
 *JAJB Memos and Correspondence - D2.044

Western Defense Command and Forth Army

*Proposed Segregation of Disloyal from Loyal - D2.050
 Military Police at Tule Lake Center - D2.051
 *Selective Service Memos - D3.04

Office of Director

Correspondence - E2.04
 *Non-Gurital Relatives/Memos/Correspondence - E2.09

F.B.I.

* All-Center Conference Utah - E13.00
 * Correspondence of Organizers - E13.10

Leave from Relocation Centers

Memos and Correspondence on Policies and Procedures - E4.00

Segregation of "Disloyal" in Tule

- *WRA Correspondence - E6.00
- *Misc. Docs - E6.20

FBI Survey of Centers

- *Part 1 Recommendations - E11.00
- *Letter, Meyer to Hover - E11.10

Segregation

- Known factor: Resegregation Program - H8.00
- *Observers-Studies of Center Events And Evacuees:-H9.00
- *Hayashi, Doris Diary - H9.02
- *Hoshiyama, Fred Diary - H9.04
- *Administrative Staff of Topaz - H9.06
- Personal Narrative Report - Evacuee Documents - H10.00
- Tsujimoto, E.M. 'A letter to Ophelia' - H10.01

Final Reports

- Correspondence with Washinton and Evacuees - J1.11

Poston - Community Council

- Issei - Informal Representative Council -J1.491
- Issei Advisory Board Meeting - J1.492
- Strike at Poston - J1.6115
- Segregation: Minutes of Community Meetings - J5.02

Poston - Studies of Center Events And Evacuees

- *Correspondence with Wash. - J1.11
- *Correspondence and Misc. Reports; Military Police-J2.52
- *Correspondence of Staff and Misc. Memos - J2.80
- *Nishimoto, Firebreak Gang - J6.07
- *Impact of Army Announcements - J6.11
- *Nishimoto Journals - J6.13 A,B,C,D,& E.
- *Expatriation and Repatriation - J6.15c
- *Nishimoto Journal Data - J6.15a
- *Miscellaneous: Center Dynamics - J6.15f
- *Life Histories; Political Structure - J6.15g
- *Red cross, Religion, Wayne Collins Mat. - J6.151
- *Aftermath of the Strike - J6.18
- *Beating of Saburo Kido - J6.19
- *Poston Strike - J6.24
- Segregation Tule Lake - J6.25L
- Kikuchi, C. and JERS Staff - J6.30
- Tsuchiyama and JERS - J6.32
- Tsuchiyama and Evacuees - J6.34

Evacuee Observers: Evacuee Documents Diaries and Journals

- Japanese Internees and Their Families - J7.00
- Public Sentiment -J7.10

Evacuee Documents: Petitions and Proposals - J8.00

Studies of Center Events and Evacuees: JERS

Shooting of Satoshi Kira - K8.12
 Formation of the Political Organization - K8.18
 Development of Gila JAOL - K8.22
 Tada incident - K8.32
 Evacuee and Administration/Interrelationships in Gila
 - K8.42
 Political Organization in the Gila Center - K8.48
 Pressure Groups - K8.54
 Rise of Political Pressure in Gila River - K8.62

Heart Mountain Staff Reports Correspondence History

*Unnumbered memos - M1.15
 *Correspondence with Washington headquarters, WRA, Etc.
 - M1.18
 *Correspondence, Minutes, of Committees, Etc. - M1.27
 *Final Report - Evacuees viewpoint - M2.25
 Induction, Regulations and Selective Service - M3.00
 *M3.50
 *M4.00

Manzanar

*Correspondence with Wash, Headquarters, WRA - 01.25
 *Correspondence, Miscellaneous, Memos - 02.70
 *History of Internal Gov. at Manzanar - 03.20
 *The Manzanar incident - 07.00
 *Correspondence with Washington - 07.50
 *Notes on Manzanar disturbance - 010.00
 *JERS - Tanaka Journals - 010.06
 - Tanaka Journals - 010.08
 - Tanaka Journals - 010.10
 * Report on Riots - 010.12
 * Agenda - 010.14
 * Staff reports on JAOL - 010.16
 * Staff correspondence - 010.20

Tule Lake

*Unnumbered memos - R1.35
 *Correspondence to Washington - R1.40
 *Center Trend Reports - R4.60
 *Miscellaneous Documents - R6.30

Segregation - Tule Lake

*Memos: Problems of Segregation - R8.00
 *WRA Investigation of Complaints - R10.00
 *JERS - R20.00

Section Six

*Senate - 78th Congress - Chandler Segregation - T1.01
 *Hure 78th Dies - T1.02

- *Costello - T1.03
- *Myer Stats - T1.04
- *JERS - T1.05

JACL

- *Staff Correspondence -T6.10
- *Studies of Activities - Miyamoto, Frank:Seattle JACL
and it's Role in Evacuation -T6.24
- *Tanaka, Togo - History of JACL - T6.25
- *Bulletins Etc. - T6.11
- *Minutes; Special Emergency Meeting - T6.12

Miscellaneous References

List of Items Released by WRA in Connection with
Costello Hearings DIES Committee - N.D 1p. Doc Department

- *McCool, Evelyn Whitehead, 1942 papers - 84/74c
- *Collins Wayne papers - 78/177c Carton 3

ARTICLES

"Draft Resistance at Heart Mountain", Hokubei Mainichi, San Francisco, September 26, 1986

"One for All, All for One", Hokubei Mainichi, San Francisco, September 30, 1986

"Nisei America, Know the Facts", Hokubei Mainichi, San Francisco, October 1, 1986

"Heart Mountain Resisters Speak Out at Forum" Hokubei Mainichi, San Francisco, June 26, 1989

"Debunking JACL Fallacies" Vox Populi, Rafu Shimpo, Los Angeles, April 13, 1989

April 14, 1989

April 17, 1989

April 18, 1989

"The Doctoring of Nikkei History" Vox Populi, Rafu Shimpo, Los Angeles, June 5, 1989

"Saiki Replies to Omura" Vox Populi, Rafu Shimpo, Los Angeles June 19, 1989 and June 20, 1989

"Another Response to James Omura" Vox Populi, Rafu Shimpo, Los Angeles, July 13, 1989

"A Wartime Hero Wins His Due", Commentary, San Jose Mercury News, April 1989

"James Omura's Commitment to Free Speech Rewarded", San Francisco Examiner, April 10, 1989

"Re-examining History-Emi and Omura Recollect Heart Mountain Resistance" Cross Currents

"Recovery of JA History Urged At Conference" Pacific Citizen, May 27, 1988

BOOKS

Biddle Francis, In Brief Authority.

Chuman Frank, The Bamboo People.

* Drinnon Richard - Keeper of Concentration Camps.

* Girdner Audrey, & Loftis Anne, The Great Betrayal.

* Grodzins Morton, Americans Betrayed.

Grodzins Morton, The Political Aspects of the Japanese Evacuation.

Hori William Minoru, Repairing America.

* Irons Peter, Justice at War.

James Thomas, Exile Within.

Masaoka Mike M., They Call Me Moses Masaoka.

Myer Dillion S., Uprooted Americans.

Rogers Daniels, Concentration Camp U.S.A..

Rogers Daniels, The Decision to Relocate JA's.

Wallinger, Dispersal of JA's.

* Weglyn Michi, The Years of Infamy.

* Report of the Commission of Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied.

WAR Department: JA Evacuation from the West Coast.

Takaki Ronald, Strangers From A Different Shore.

ORAL HISTORIES

Manzanar Martyr: An Interview with Harry Y. Ueno;
Embrey, Sue Kunitomi; Hansen, Arthur A.; Mitson, Betty
Kulberg

Voices Long Silent: An Oral Inquiry into the Japanese
American Evacuation; Hansen, Arthur A.; Mitson, Betty K.

Specifically: Fukasaka, George O.H. 1336

Kanno, George O.H. 10

Tanaka, Togo O.H. 1271b

Tashima, Masayuki O.H. 1361

Earl Warren Oral History Project

The Japanese American Relocation Reviewed

Volume I: Decision and Exodus

Volume II: The Internment

JOURNALS

"James Matsumoto Omura: An Interview", Amerasia Journal 13:2
(1986-87) 99-113. Hansen, Arthur A.

"A Study in Dualism: James Yoshinori Sakamoto and the
Japanese American Courier, 1928-1942" Amerasia Journal 13:2
(1986-87) 49-81. Ichioka, Yuji.

"The Search for Spies: American Counterintelligence and the
Japanese American Community 1931-1942" Amerasia Journal 6:2
(1979) 45-75. Kumamoto, Bob.

"Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps: A
Re-evaluation" Amerasia Journal II (Fall, 1973) 20-34.
Oshinko, Gary

PERSONS CONTACTED

Abe, Frank 7/7/89
Barnett, Arthur 6/28/89
Besig, Ernest 6/27/89
Hansen, Arthur 7/10/89
Herzig-Yoshinaga, Aiko 6/22/89, 7/19/89
Hirabayasi, Gordon 6/27/89
Ichioka, Yuji 7/26/89
Korematsu, Fred 7/5/89
Suzuki, Peter 6/26/89, 7/24/89
Uyeda, Clifford 7/7/89
Weglyn, Michi 7/5/89