The Lim Report – Part II-C-D

Research Report prepared for Presidential Select Committee on JACL Resolution #7
(aka “The Lim Report”)

submitted in 1990 by Deborah K. Lim
© 2002 by Deborah K. Lim

IIC. JACL Activities in Camp


At the request of WRA Director, Dillon Myer, the FBI undertook a survey of the ten camps. This survey was headed and the report written by Myron Gurnea. In it, Gurnea gives his official assessment of the presence of the JACL in camp.

One of the greatest causes for internal disorder has perhaps been the Japanese-American Citizens League. The members of the Japanese-American Citizens League have been very outspoken in proclaiming their loyalty to the United States. It is, of course, commendatory that these individuals would be loyal to this country; however, there are some indications that their views are as political as patriotic. It is the consensus of opinion among the Japanese that the Japanese-American Citizens League, in collaboration with the United States Government, “sold them out” and did not put up a fight to block relocation. This feeling is so predominant that the Japanese now refer to Mike Masuoko [sic], the national president of the Japanese-American Citizens League, as Moses Masuoko [sic], stating that he “led them out of California.” Many of the individuals who received beatings have been members of the Japanese-American Citizens League, and as such are individuals who either cooperated with the Government agencies or were active in sponsoring loyalty programs.201

Gurnea’s survey was made up of two parts. The above comments were contained in Part I. In Part II, Gurnea conducted interviews with WRA personnel at each of the camps. In his interview of WRA personnel at the Minidoka camp, the following comments were made.

Stafford also stated at this point, it is his desire to keep the Japanese-American Citizens League from indulging in any political activity in the center.202

Comments from personnel at Poston expressed that

[a] great number of Japanese feel that the Japanese-American Citizens League sold them out to the Americans. For that reason there is a considerable amount of resentment among the Japanese toward the former members and officials of the Japanese-American Citizens League.203

One of the main causes of resentment against the JACL stemmed from allegations that many of the leaders had been informants for government intelligence agencies and continued in that capacity while in camp. We have already examined the former allegation. Now let us turn our attention to the latter.


A Western Defense Command confidential Memorandum, circa August 1942, indicated the Army’s intention of utilizing informants from within the internee population for security purposes. The report recommended:

that Civil Affairs Division discover the Kibei leaders in all assembly centers and camps through security police, camp management, and the use of Nisei stooges in staging a similar meeting as was held in Manzanar.204

Attached to this memorandum are letters written by Tokie Slocum, Karl Yoneda, and Fred Tayama in response to meetings held by Kibei at Manzanar, conducted in the Japanese language.

In fact, Assistant Project Director Ned Campbell allegedly remarked that “I didn’t know it, but there are Army and Navy Intelligence and FBI agents right here in camp, but don’t you worry, they haven’t got the power you think they have.205

This is, perhaps, a good seque into the topic of whether any JACLers were involved in these roles and activities.

A number of the members of the Anti-Axis Committee of the Southern District Council of the JACL were highly prominent and outspoken in their work to aid Federal Intelligence Agencies prior to internment. As many Japanese-Americans in the Los Angeles area eventually were interned at Manzanar, it follows that these same individuals would be prominent and outspoken in the same capacity at Manzanar. One of the most infamous of informants, both prior to and during internment was none other than Tokie Slocum.

At Manzanar, rumors that “Slocum is an FBI agent” cropped up as early as May, 1942, immediately following his arrival at the Center. These rumors were frequently traced to Slocum himself, who privately let it be known among enough people for such circulation that he was in constant correspondence with agents of the FBI in Los Angeles as well as prominent officials in veterans groups to which he belonged.206

Slocum had also let it be known what the results of his work with the FBI were.

Slocum also bragging on turning in 40 people to FBI.207

Tokie Slocum testified before “Senator A. B. ‘Happy’ Chandler of Kentucky, who had headed up another of the several state and congressional investigatory subcommittees which sprang up after the Manzanar riot.208 Slocum responded to Chandler’s question of what he was doing in camp.

So I went and put in 8 months over there and put in 8 months as an observer for the FBI, with the blessing of Mr. Hood, who is the head of the FBI in Los Angeles, and all the time I was there it was my duty, at $16 a month, which is the standard salary of all internees in the camp, to make observations and analyses, trace down the rumors, gossips, and various subversive activities in camp and make reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I was allowed postage and envelopes and that is all I asked. During that time I believe I was of some help to our government.209

According to another source,

there is ample evidence to support the statement (that) Slocum created the impression at Manzanar that he was “working for the FBI.” My personal opinion is that Slocum was never employed as a paid agent of the FBI but volunteered information and correspondence regularly.210

Slocum’s activities are confirmed by other government sources. An FBI document, dated January 23, 1943, regarding “Tokutaro Slocum Activities in War Relocation Centers, Internal Security-J,” states,

it is recommended that Slocum be contacted in Washington, D.C. and warned against representing that he has been employed by the Bureau.211

Since much of the document has been “blacked out,” it is difficult to know the entire context of this statement. The reference to Manzanar and the date would indicate that the FBI’s concern was over Slocum’s testimony before the Chandler Committee, previously reviewed.

Another memorandum, dated August 14, 1943, from John F. Embree, Chief Washington Analyst of the WRA, to John H. Provinse, Chief of Community Services also of the WRA, refers to Tokie Slocum’s activities.

. . . little information of real significance to the military authorities in this country could come to the attention of this government via the Nisei. However, this does not mean that there have not been Nisei anxious to aid the intelligence agencies to the utmost of their abilities. Tokie Slocum, while not in all ways an admirable character, should at least satisfy intelligence agencies by his stool pigeoning activities.212

A person who shared in Slocum’s notoriety both during Anti-Axis days as well as at Manzanar was Fred Tayama. This should not be surprising. We have learned in an earlier section how Tayama was originally chairman of the Anti-Axis Committee but welcomed Slocum into the group and quickly turned over the reins of leadership to him.

A confidential WCCA Report from the Inspection and Fiscal Division on Manzanar, dated August 12, 1942, provides information on a number of Japanese-Americans at this camp. The notes on Fred Tayama state that he reports to FBI, G-3 Army, G-3 Navy.213 Later in the same document, Tayama is referred to as “Fred (FBI) reporter . . .” 214 The second reference misspells his surname as Toyaura, but given the context of Joe Kurihara, Ted Akahoshi and the Block Leaders Council, the reference had to be to Tayama.

Even a JACL document contains a reference to Tayama reporting to the FBI. George Inagaki wrote a memo to the National Staff dated Saturday, January 16, 1943, which was stamped received January 18, 1943. The heading read, “Rumor from Manzanar.”

Story is that Tayama’s report to FBI or Naval Intelligence got into the hands of Slocum and the latter, in order to focus hatred away from self, circulated copy of letter among people in center. Believe it’s just one of those reports, don’t see he could get a copy.215

Now the rumor isn’t whether Tayama reported to the FBI or Naval Intelligence. According to the context, the rumor is whether Slocum got his hands on said report.

An entry in Ralph Merritt’s diary should convert the alleged rumor into fact. Merritt was the Project Director at Manzanar during the riot of December 6, 1942. His diary entry for November 13th and 14thof 1945 when he visited the Tule Lake camp, recorded a visit with Joe Kurihara, one of the participants of the riot.

Said he wanted to apologize for trouble he had caused and then launched into story . . . Tayama reporting to FBI. Slocum making copies of his reports (4 and 7) and giving to Kurihara.216

If the last sentence of the diary entry can be read to mean that Slocum made copies of Tayama’s reports, the[n] Tayama made quite a few reports to the FBI and Slocum did indeed circulate copies.

Informants were not limited to Manzanar. An undated Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer of the 11th Naval District (San Diego) to the Director of Naval Intelligence on the subject of “Activities of Inmates, Japanese Relocation Centers,” writes:

1. From time to time this District Intelligence Officer has forwarded to the Director of Naval Intelligence information as to the serious anti-American and pro-Japanese activities carried out within the relocation camps at Poston, Arizona and Manzanar, California. The information has been obtained from informants within these camps and believed to be reliable . . . .

9. At the present time Lyle KURISAKI, who has cooperated with this office, is on thirty days leave from Poston #1. His family is still in the camp and, according to information, is being made to suffer serious mistreatment . . . 217

Kurisaki’s work with the FBI and ONI prior to evacuation through the Imperial County Citizens Welfare Committee has already been addressed. This present memorandum indicates that Kurisaki continued in his capacity and was an informant with the ONI while in Poston. Now it is possible that the Memo meant to refer to his previous intelligence work. But given the context that the Memo was discussing information obtained within Poston and Manzanar, it appears that Kurisaki was an informant.


A secondary cause for resentment against the JACL during the internment period had to do with the issue of self-government. As a cause of resentment, it was particular to the leadership and events at specific camps.

An early look into the conditions at the Minidoka Center reveal[s] an initial expectation by members of the JACL that they would inherit the internal leadership. In a September 3, 1942 Memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer, 13th Naval District, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, the DIO gives the following report.

The Japanese American Citizens League faction, which was in charge of the internal administration at the Puyallup Assembly Center, apparently took it for granted that they would be asked to carry on similarly at Minidoka. This, however, has not been the case. The Relocation Authorities have decided that there shall be no group or clique control but a free government based upon elections after arrival of all evacuees.218

The DIO described the JACL faction as a “clique” and contrasts their internal administration at Puyallup with “free government” pursuant to elections at Minidoka, as if the two descriptions are mutually exclusive. Moreover, this description of the JACL group at Puyallup is consistent with what earlier commentators, such as Frank Miyamoto, Bill Hosokawa, and Ken Nishimoto, told us about the lack of elective process at Puyallup.

The Manzanar Camp also had its self-government woes. We are told that,

in the early stages of Manzanar’s development, there is little doubt that individuals associated with the two groups expressed this rivalry in efforts to secure key administrative jobs. In a real sense, there was jockeying and maneuvering for what may be described here as political control or leadership of the population.219

One of the two groups was, of course, the JACL. However, it is difficult to examine self-government and the JACL’s role in any problems associated with it outside of the context of one of the most major disturbances at a camp, the December 6, 1942, Manzanar Riot.


While most newspaper accounts at the time characterized the disturbance as Pro-Axis violence targeted at Pro-American victims, the primary sources from that era did not see it that simply. We will begin our examination of this incident from the point of view of one of the participants, Togo Tanaka, Documentary Historian at Manzanar.

The Manzanar Riot of December 6 was the logical outgrowth of pre-evacuation factional conflicts among evacuees, clashes of ideology intensified by War, and the unhealthy condition of accumulating resentment within the limited area of the Center.220

Tanaka identifies three groups at Manzanar as I) the JACL; II) those anti-JACL but, more accurately, left-wing with some being Communists; and III) Anti-Administration-Anti-JACL, which, unlike the previous two, had no pre-evacuation history but was primarily indigenous to Manzanar. 221

Tanaka continues and says that

on December 6, 1942, Manzanar was not unlike a powder keg. Groups I, II, and III constituted exceedingly short fuses. One single incident-the attack on Fred Tayama and the subsequent arrest of Harry Ueno-ignited the whole barrel.222

The question remains whether JACL had any role in the resentments or actions which led to the “exceedingly short fuses” within Manzanar. Tanaka’s response is yes.

Efforts of pre-evacuation JACL leaders to continue their activities within Manzanar were undoubtedly a contributing cause to the situations which eventually culminated in the December 6 riot. That the JACL and the individuals who more or less stood impressed in the public mind as representing it (Fred Tayama, Togo Tanaka, Joe Masaoka, Tad Ueno, Tom Imai) as a group enjoyed little-if any-popularity from the outset of the project is generally conceded.223

From this point on, the JACL group found itself excluded from administrative jobs, they complained about life in camp and about Issei control over the Block leaders’ Council, and finally kept in contact with Headquarters at Salt Lake City. Fred Tayama was the acknowledged chairman of the group. 224

The impression early gained among the Japanese-speaking population that the JACL was persecuting the Japanese people, spying upon innocent Issei for the FBI (an impression due more to the activities of a single individual than to any group-that individual in the estimation of the JACL group being Tokutaro Slocum), that the JACL was, to translate a frequently used Japanese expression, “putting the noose around our neck.225

The next incident occurred when then Project Director, Roy Nash, made the announcement that the Block Leaders Council would be replaced by an elected council of U.S. citizens only. The reaction was

a camp-wide furor arose; it was directed principally against the JACL; its chief target was Fred Tayama, its lesser targets the individuals associated with him.226

Even though an announcement explained that the restriction to U.S. citizens came from Washington, D.C., this did not dispel the rumors that the JACL was responsible.227

Tanaka relates that part of the animosity was due to the failed effort by the JACL group to organize a “Manzanar Citizens Federation” in July and August of 1942.228

The next conflict developed when Fred Tayama, elected Chairman of the Manzanar Work Corps, came into conflict with Harry Ueno, organizer of the Japanese Mess Hall Workers Union. “A campaign of slandering ensued with unusual vigor, even for Manzanar.” 229 Threatening posters from the Blood Brothers appeared.

Another event which has a bearing on the timing of the attack on Tayama and the riot which followed was the JACL Convention held in Salt Lake City, Utah in mid-November. One of the Convention’s reported resolutions pledged Nisei as willing to volunteer for the armed forces if given the opportunity to do so from the relocation centers. That this resolution was seized upon by the Ueno-Kurihara-Yamaguchi group to arouse intense anti-JACL sentiment in Manzanar was evident everywhere in the Center, and Kurihara was reported to have gone about various blocks announcing that “we’re going to have another Poston riot here, only it will be a hundred times worse; we are going to kill all the dogs.230

Morris Opler, the Community Analyst for Manzanar, writes of the impact of JACL advocating for the Nisei Draft upon the Manzanar riot.

Many of the JACL leaders never entered Centers. From their Salt Lake City headquarters, they issued manifestoes which were designed to assure the American people of the patriotism and pro-democratic views of those of Japanese ancestry in this country. They underestimated the disillusionment and cynicism over such slogan which the people in the Centers felt. There grew a marked disjunction between the public statements of the leaders of the JACL and the material published in their journal, and what the people in the Centers were thinking. When the JACL advocated the formation of a Nisei battalion, the smoldering rebellion broke out into violence and JACL representatives in Manzanar were intimidated or beaten up. This was an important factor in the incident of December 6, 1942.231

In fact, tension was already building when the announcement of the JACL Convention appeared.

Each Center was to name two official delegates. Obviously, with feeling against the JACL at fever pitch, there could be no open election of delegates at Manzanar. When some prominent young men of the Center, who were obviously preparing to go somewhere, were asked about their destination, they gave evasive answers. It was not until the men in question had left that a notice appeared in the Free Press, giving the names of these who had gone to Salt Lake City as “representatives from Manzanar.”

It was known that the JACL had been active in Second Front petitions and in appeals that Americans of Japanese ancestry be used in the draft. There was apprehension among the residents concerning what action the National body would take at this convention, especially since the JACL had been charged with speaking without authorization for all Japanese in America on other occasions of crisis. There were threats about what would be done to the “delegates” if they dared to claim that they represented the people of Manzanar or if they took any objectionable action which was in any way binding upon the residents of Manzanar.232

Needless to say, Fred Tayama was one of the Manzanar delegates. He returned to camp on December 4, 1942. Coincidentally, the night of his return was marked by the removal of a Block Representative by the FBI.

When Fred Tayama was beaten and Harry Ueno accused of being one of the attackers, the powder keg blew. To be fair, “JACL Activity” was by no means the only contributing cause to this event. Tanaka also lays blame at the “inadequate, ill-prepared or ill-advised Administrators,” to the government decision of mass evacuation based upon race, and basic incompatibility of the conflicting groups.233

Government sources, other than Opler, also lay the blame for the disturbance, in part on JACL members. When Robert Throckmorton, the Project Attorney concluded his memorandum to Ralph Merritt on the “events leading up to the Riot of December 6, 1942,” he wrote the following:

Perhaps, the main significance of these comments is that they show that the primary reasons for the demonstration did not involve the question of loyalty or disloyalty or the fact that the anniversary of Pearl Harbor was at hand. The primary causes appear to be (1) those which led the people to believe that Ueno had been unjustly arrested; and, (2) those which led them to hate Fred Tayama, other JACL leaders and certain members of the Administrative staff.234

Ralph Merritt himself, in a letter to Dillon Myer, dated January 7, 1943, referred to “the chief sources of the disturbance to the peace of Manzanar-the Los Angeles JACL crowd, headed by the Tayamas . . . and the Tanakas.235

It may be fair to say that the actions of a handful of men, who were one of several contributing causes for the riot at Manzanar, should not bring down the organization to which they belonged. However, as was pointed out by one of those men, Togo Tanaka, these men, more or less represented in the public’s mind the JACL. Any impact they had upon events leading up to December 6, 1942 was and has been perceived as JACL’s impact on the same events.

IID. Position and Action on Loyalty Oath


After registration, what were the JACL’s position and actions towards those who answered NO to questions 27 and 28 of the “Application for Leave Clearance” first distributed on February 10, 1943?

Inter-office correspondence beginning May 19, 1943 from Saburo Kido to Teiko Ishida contains the following discussion:

Regarding members who answered “no”, Mike suggests that we send out a bulletin to all chapters that such members will be suspended. He believes this is necessary for our records; that is, we should be clear as to the loyalty of our members. Also we cannot accept anyone who has answered, “no.”236

The response, dated Mary 21, 1943, from Teiko Ishida to Kido offers this:

Mike certainly has had a change of heart. We felt right along that the no-no’s should be segregated and no further effort be expended upon them. However, a bulletin to all chapters announcing that all “no-no” members would be suspended will be of no avail unless we have a list of such registrants. Furthermore, we must have this list of no-no’s in order to refuse membership to certain individuals. Please have Mike secure such a list from the WRA before we can issue such a bulletin or know to whom to refuse membership.237

Kido writes another letter, dated May 25, 1943 to Hito Okada and Teiko Ishida, which begins with this paragraph:

As far as the “no-no” ones are concerned, I don’t think we can possibly find out so the best thing is just issue the request to sign the loyalty pledge of all associated members. Then if there is a chapter, issue a special letter to the chapter that the “no-no” ones will have to be suspended until such time as the records are cleared. And if they have any reason for changing the answer to yes, possibly we can suggest to write to the WRA. It is the best that we do this and protect our position.238

The response, dated May 27, 1943, was that “we shall continue having our associated members execute the Oath of Allegiance if they have not previously done so.” Also, only two chapters would be requested to suspend their “no-no” members. This same information was also sent to Mike Masaoka by Teiko Ishida on the same date, May 27, 1943. 239

It would seem that JACL’s position towards the “no-nos” was that they should be segregated. This was expressed by Teiko Ishida, a staffer at the Salt Lake City Headquarters Office. Not just segregated but “no further effort expended upon them.” Interestingly, Masaoka was not of the same opinion initially, as was reflected in Ishida’s letter, but must have come around. What is both implied and expressed in this correspondence is the presumption that those who answered “no” to both questions were disloyal, and should be dealt with accordingly.

Contrast the JACL view with the concerns expressed to Dillon Myer by Ralph Merritt, Project Director at Manzanar. In his February 27, 1943 letter, he states:

On the other hand, it is important to determine whether the “no” answer on the loyalty question actually means a renouncing of citizenship or whether it is a protest indirectly arising from the pressures of the father who is a non-citizen or directly representing the outcry of a man who has, in his opinion, been ruthlessly and wrongfully deprived during the last year of his rights and position as a citizen. When all the motives have been reviewed, it must be concluded that there is no such thing as a line of strict demarcation. . . . It is my considered conclusion that the answer “No” has many shades of meaning and is prompted by many motives, some of which are attributable to our failure, both past and present, and some of which may yet be modified and reversed without damage to the principles of American citizenship.240

Thus, unlike the JACL, Merritt saw no presumption of disloyalty in the “no” answer and acknowledged both the possibility of WRA errors and a means of rehabilitation.

On the other hand, the JACL was well aware of the confusion posed by Question #28, particularly to the Issei. In Bulletin No. 3-D, dated February 23, 1943, from JACL National Headquarters, listed a number of items of which the Washington representative was requested to seek clarification.

Confusion exists as to whether question No. 28 has been officially changed or not.241

The concern expressed was that Japanese nationals might become citizens without a country if they answered in the affirmative. The clarification was that “Question No. 28 has been officially changed by the WRA and recognized by the War Department. The justice of the Issei complaints was quickly realized.242

On the issue of renunciation of citizenship, an April 13, 1944 letter to the War Relocation Authority from Teiko Ishida, now Acting National Secretary, indicated JACL’s position. “It is a matter of debate, but we agree with Attorney General Biddle that those who answered in the negative to question 28 heretofore have not expatriated. In other words, they are still American citizens.”243

End Notes

Abbreviations used:

AAC Anti-Axis Committee
CWRIC Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
DIO District Intelligence Officer
DNI Director, Naval Intelligence
JACL Japanese American Citizens League
JACL Archives Japanese American Citizens League Archives, San Francisco
JARP Japanese American Research Project, Special Collection, University Research
Library, University of California, Los Angeles
JERS Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study, Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley
Merritt Collection Merritt Collection, #122, Special Collection, University Research
Library, University of California, Los Angeles
NA National Archives, Washington, D.C.
ND Naval District
NDC Northern District Council
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
RG Record Group
SDC Southern District Council
WRA War Relocation Authority

IIC. JACL Activities in Camp

(201) Myron Gurnea, FBI Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers, p. 7, File E 11.00, JERS.
(202) Part II, Gurnea Report — Inteview with WRA Personnel, p. 280, Box 1, Entry 17, RG 210, NA.
(203) Ibid., pp. 291-292.
(204) Manzanar, File 323.3, Box 12, Entry 1, RG 338, NA.
(205) Togo Tanaka, Documentary Reports, 6/42-7/42, pp. 122-123, File 0 10.06, JERS.
(206) Tanaka, “Report,” p. 34.
(207) “Law & Order Misc.” File, Box 17, Merritt Collection.
(208) Weglyn, Years, p. 153.
(209) Chandler Investigation Folder, pp. 121-122, Box 15, Merritt Collection.
(210) Tanaka, “Report.” pp. 90-91.
(211) “Tokutaro Slocum Activities in War Relocation Centers, Internal Security-J,” 1/23/43, The Michi Weglyn Collection.
(212) Memorandum, John F. Embree to John H. Provinse, 8/14/43, “August 1943,” p. 2, Box 286, RG 210, NA.
(213) “Manzanar,” p. 6, File 323.2, Box 12, Entry 1, RG 338, NA.
(214) Ibid., p. 7.
(215) Memorandum, George Inagaki to National Staff, 1/16/43, JACL Archives.
(216) Merritt Diary, 11/13-14/45, Box 17, Merritt Collection.
(217) Memorandum, DIO, 11th ND, to DNI, undated, File “WRA,” pp. 1-2, Box 2, Entry 17, RG 210, NA.
(218) Memorandum, DIO, 13th ND, to DNI, 9/3/42, File “WRA,” Box 2, Entry 17, RG 210, NA.
(219) Togo Tanaka, Documentarian Report, 1/25/43, File 0 7.50, JERS.
(220) Tanaka, “Report,” p. 1-2.
(221) Ibid. pp. 3-4.
(222) Ibid. p. 9.
(223) Ibid. p. 46.
(224) Ibid. p. 47.
(225) Ibid. p. 49.
(226) Ibid.
(227) Ibid. p. 50.
(228) Ibid.
(229) Ibid.
(230) Ibid. pp. 51-52.
(231 Morris Opler, “Registration 1944-1945,” p. 13, File #9, Box 23, Merritt Collection.
(232) Morris Opler, “A History of Internal Government at Manzanar, March 42-December 42,”
7/15/44, pp. 97-98, Box 12, Merritt Collection.
(233) Tanaka, “Report,” pp. 59, 46.
(234) Memorandum, Robert Throckmorton to Ralph Merritt, 12/6/43, p. 3, Box 16, Merritt Collection.
(235) Letter, Ralph Merritt to Dillon Myer, 1/7/43, Box 16, Merritt Collection.

IID. Position and Action on Loyalty Oath

(236) Memorandum, Saburo Kido to Teiko Ishida, 5/19/43, JACL Archives.
(237) Memorandum, Teiko Ishida to Saburo Kido, 5/21/43, JACL Archives.
(238) Letter, Saburo Kido to Hito Okada and Teiko Ishida, 5/25/43, JACL Archives.
(239) Letter, Teiko Ishida to Mike Masaoka, 5/27/43, JACL Archives.
(240) Letter, Ralph Merritt to Dillon Myer, 2/27/43, Box 15, Merritt Collection.
(241) Bulletin #3-D, 2/23/43, JACL Archives.
(242) JACL Archives.
(243) Letter, Teiko Ishida to WRA, 4/13/44, Box 142, Entry 16, RG 210, NA.

The history and literature of Japanese American resistance to wartime incarceration

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